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Abstract
Background
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a well established method for qualitative as well as probabilistic
reliability and safety analysis. Fault trees are Boolean models and thus do not support modelling
of dynamic effects like sequence dependencies between fault events. In order to overcome this
limitations, dynamic fault tree methods were defined previously. Most of these are based on
complete or partial transformation of the fault tree model into state-space-models like Markov
chains or Petri nets. These state-space-models generally suffer from exponential state explosion
which imposes the necessity to define small “dynamic” modules which need to be independet
from the rest of the model. Moreover, these state-space-models lack some of the FTA’s benefits
like logical simplification of complex system functions or a real cutset analysis. Because of these
deficiencies, a method is needed that allows consideration of sequence dependencies without
transformations into state-space. This work describes such a new approach.
Concept
The new temporal fault tree analysis (TFTA) described in this work extends the Boolean FTA
in order to take sequence dependencies into account. The TFTA is based on a new temporal
logic which adds a concept of time to the Boolean logic and algebra. This allows modelling of
temporal relationships between events using Boolean operators (AND “∧”, OR “∨”, NOT “¬”)
and two new temporal operators (PAND “∧” and SAND “=∧”). With a set of temporal logic
rules, a given temporal term may be simplified to its temporal disjunctive normal form (TDNF)
which is similar to the Boolean DNF but includes event sequencies. In TDNF the top event’s
temporal system function may be reduced to a list of minimal cutset sequences (MCSS). These
allow qualitative analyses similar to Boolean cutset analysis in normal FTA. Furthermore the
TFTA may also be used for probabilistic analyses. Probabilities and rates of MCSS may be
calculated without using state-space models. Again the procedure is similar to the normal FTA:
top event failure probabilities and rates are derived from the failure probabilities and rates of
the basic events including sequence dependencies.
Realisation
Starting with the Boolean FTA this work describes a new notation and new rules for a temporal
logic. This temporal logic aims at transforming temporal terms into a TDNF, which then
may be transformed further into a form where all terms are mutually exclusive. This form is
well suited for quantification, too. Several examples are provided which explain each step in
detail. Furthermore, there are two probabilistic approximation methods described, which allow
a significant reduction of the calculatory effort.
Results
One significant aspect of the new TFTA described in this work is the possibility to take se-
quence dependencies into account for qualitative and probabilistic analyses without state-space
transformations. Among others, this allows for modelling of event sequencies at all levels within
a fault tree, a real qualitative analysis similar to the FTA’s cutset analysis, and quantification
of sequence dependencies within the same model.
ix
General Remark and Disclaimer
All safety and reliability analyses in this work are presented solely for the purpose of demon-
strating new analysis methods and are to be seen as simplifications and examples only. While
they use, among others, technical functions and data similar to those of real systems, they must
not be taken as evidence for the safety or reliability of existing or planned “real life” systems,
functions, or components.
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1 Introduction
System safety is organized common sense.
(Mueller)
1.1 Motivation
The fault tree analysis (FTA) is one of the most important methods of modelling and analyzing
the realibility and safety of systems qualitatively as well as probabilistically. In the automative
domain there is a trend towards more safety critical electronics [1], and thus functional safety is
increasingly important [2]. Therefore the domain specific functional safety standard ISO26262
[3] is currently being derived from the more generic IEC61508 [4].
In the automotive domain the FTA is used during development for several reasons: the
allocation of safety requirements, as well as the confirmation and verification of requirements
(e.g. failure rates as required by ISO26262), and the comparison of safety architectures.
Today, the FTA is generally considered as state of the art, e.g. [5–9]. Nevertheless certain
problems remain, and there is an ongoing scientific interest for the FTA method.
This thesis results from years of practise experience during my time at the functional safety
department of a german automotive manufacturer. Contrary to expectations, the conventional –
i.e. static – FTA is still having difficulties at providing realistic and not too conservative results
when applied to modern electric/electronic (EE) systems.
The operational behaviour and failures of such systems are highly dynamic in a sense that
subsystems, functions and components (or their failures) depend on each other (structural
dependencies) or depend on their relative timing (temporal dependencies) [10].
The fault tree methode on the other hand is limited to binary parameters as it is based on
Boolean (failure-)logic. As a consequence, temporal dependencies and dependencies between
failure rates of fault tree basic events must be omitted. Both limitations may usually be cir-
cumvented, or at least mitigated, by taking specific assumtions and approximations into accout.
But both problems can not be completly solved from within the conventional FTA.
Furthermore, when using fault trees one has to keep in mind that conservative approximations
(less modelling effort) usually conflict with the wish to avoid an unnecessarily expensive system
design. Unprecise (approximated) fault tree models must not lead to overly complex and overly
expensive technical solutions in the system under consideration.
This problem and conflict is well known [11–13]. In general, there is always the possibility
to analyze the system using other methods that can take dynamic effects into account, like e.g.
state based methods. On the other hand there is a reason for the FTA’s success as one of the
most widely used methods for analyzing the reliability and safety of complex systems [14]: in
1
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comparison to other methods fault trees are easy to use, to read, to understand, and they are
scalable. This is, because a system’s fault tree is similarly structured as the system architecture.
Especially state based methods (e.g. markov diagrams) lack this feature.
For years there have been several approaches to combine state based methods with the con-
ventional FTA. These aim at combining the benefits of both methods while circumventing their
disadvantages. Usually the user shall stay within the more intuitive fault tree, while modelling
the system under consideration; then, the system’s dynamic effects and dependencies are hidden
from the user by state based models that do the calculations in the background automatically.
Such hybrid techniques are often called dynamic FTA; but they also have some specific disad-
vantages. Mostly they use fault trees as a tool for easy visualization or relatively simple creation
of models; but they do not also fully use the fault tree for the analysis and calculation, and thus
they do without some of the FTA’s biggest benfits.
These problems, as well as pure scientific curiosity, lead to intense research on a more efficient
way to handle dynamic effects and dependencies from within fault trees.
This thesis presents the results of this research.
1.2 Structure of this Thesis
This thesis deals with dynamic effects in safety and reliability analyses, and specifically with
the modelling of failure sequences in fault trees. It is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 presents the state of the art as relevant for this thesis; specific focus goes to the
conventional Boolean FTA (chapter 2.2), as well as to dynamic extensions of the FTA (chapter
2.3); the latter includes methods where the fault tree model is transformed into a state based
model, as well as methods using temporal logics.
This survey points to several shortcomings of the current state of the art; specifically these
result from changing the modelling and analysis and calculation’s focus and are listed in chapter
3 which also derives criteria and requirements for improvements.
Chapter 4 describes the proposed new approach for including failure event sequences into the
fault tree without changing to the state space. This new temporal fault tree analysis (TFTA)
relies on an temporal extension to the conventional Boolean algebra and logic; this temporal logic
has its own notation (chapter 4.1) and its own laws of transformation (chapter 4.2). Chapter
4.3 then shows how to transform temporal terms into disjunct minimal failure event sequences.
There is also an extended form of the TFTA which is presented in chapter 4.4; it allows for
reduced calculatory effort when solving more complex temporal failure functions.
Chapter 5 discusses the quantification of temporal terms, which in turn allows probabilistic
evaluation of temporal fault trees.
Chapter 6 compares the new TFTA approach with a) conventional Boolean FTA, b) the
dynamic fault tree approach (DFT) as a typical dynamic extension of the Boolean FTA, and c)
markov diagrams.
Chapter 7 applies the TFTA to a more complex and complete example in order to demonstrate
its practical use. A typical automotive ECU architecture is analyzed: beginning with its system
analysis, followed by creation of a corresponding temporal fault tree, and finally the qualitativ
as well as probabilistic fault tree transformation and analysis.
This thesis closes with a summary and outlook in chapter 8.
2 State of the Art: Static and Dynamic
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Of course, it is safe, we certified it.
(An FAA administrator)
This chapter provides an overview over the state of the art as relevant for the TFTA method.
• Chapter 2.1 describes the field of safety related fault tree analysis in general.
• The conventional and solely static FTA is among the most common methods for systematic
top down failure analysis of complex systems, see chapter 2.2.
• As shown in chapter 2.3, today there are several extensions to the conventional FTA; they
take dynamic failure behaviour into account and try to mitigate the FTA’s shortcomings
in this field. Chapter 2.3.3 presents state based methods, and methods using temporal
(failure) logics are discussed in chapter 2.3.4.
• Chapter 2.4 summarizes the state of the art, which leads to the main problem description
of this thesis in the following chapter 3.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Reliability and Safety Analyses
The reliability of a system or a component (in general: an entity) is defined as its “capability [. . . ]
to meet expected performance criteria, given by its intended use, during a defined time period
[15]. An entity that has failed can no longer provide its functionality; therefore, conventional
reliability analysis reflects upon entities’ failure behaviour.
Such an analysis usually covers the following steps [16]: it supports develoment of new systems
by comparing different – existing or proposed – system designs among each other, as well
as comparing them to objective requirements (i.e. reliability prediction, reliability comparison,
reliability pursuit, identification of weak spots). Additionally, it allows reliability verification of
existing systems and concepts. The same methods and analytical approaches are usually used
for all these purposes.
In comparison to reliability analysis, the safety analysis is focused on only those system and
component failures that lead to loss of “safety”, where safety is defined as “freedom from un-
acceptable risks” [4]. From a safety perspective, an entity’s relevant reliability is therefore its
3
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capability – or, in case of a more probabilistic view, its probability – to not induce danger-
ous effects (i.e. damage) during a defined time period and under given circumstances. Thus,
reliability, from a safety perspective, takes failures consequences into account, too.
Safety analyses therefore need to define which risks and which damages are relevant. In the
context of conventional safety of technical systems these typically are the danger for life and
limbs, or injuries and death of persons [4]. In general, the same analysis methods are used in
other contexts, too; e.g. in the context of security of technical systems [17, 18]. This thesis only
addresses the safety context1.
2.1.2 Static and Dynamic Analyses
2.1.2.1 Dynamic System Behaviour
A system behaves dynamically if [19] the system response to a initial disturbance develops
over time, while the system’s components interact among each other, as well as with their
surrounding. In comparison, conventional fault tree analysis looks at unwanted events (i.e.
system failures) as static, determined, and time invariant consequence to certain component
failures [19].
In a world full of dynamic influences and interactions basically all technical systems also
behave dynamically. Statistical methods and models for reliability and safety analysis of systems
therefore necessarily only approximate a system’s real dynamic behaviour.
This simplification is the main reason why handling of statistical analysis like FTA or reliability
block diagrams (RBD) is relatively easy. Actually, in many cases it is the assumption of static
behaviour that makes an analysis feasible at all. In practise the relevant question is which static
approximations allow “good enough” representation of the actual dynamic failure behaviour.
It has been demonstrated that conventional FTA is very well suited for logical and probabilis-
tical analyses of systems, if their failure behaviour is – at least in the first approximation – free
of time dependencies or dynamic interactions between its components.
On the other hand, and since the very beginning of systematic failure behaviour analysis
after the mid-20th century, researchers and users are complaining about static analysis being
too imprecise [20]. Therefore, scientists are researching how static analysis methods like FTA
may be extended by the most important dynamic effects – but without excessively increasing
modelling and calculatory effort.
2.1.2.2 Methods of Modelling
In sight of [21] and [22] three types of dynamic realiability and safety analyses (ZSA) may be
distinguished by their different modelling approaches. These are
• state transition models, especially makov models, e.g. [23],
• direct simulation of systems, especially using MoCaS, e.g. [13, 24], and
• extensions of static event sequence analysis and the FTA in order to also represent dynamic
effects.
The following chapters cover those methods in more detail.
1Author’s remark: in german there is only one term “Sicherheit” for both of the english “safety” and “security”;
therefore, a further distinction and limitation of this thesis’ scope follows at this place, but is omitted in the
english translation.
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2.2 Static FTA – the Classical Approach
The history of FTA can be traced to the mid-20th century and starts with the reliability analysis
of the Minuteman missle [25, 26].
The conventional fault tree [6–8] is a Boolean model, that systematically and methodically
describes the interaction of failures within a system that lead to a system failure. It is a top
down or deductive method. Starting from an undesirable event or system state – the so-called
TOP –, more detailled failure events are searched for iteratively, that cause this TOP. Graphical
representation of these failure events is done using a tree notation, the so-called fault tree. The
components’ failure events modelled in the fault tree are represented by events that can be
in one of two states according to Boolean logic: “intact/unfailed/failure has not occurred” is
represented by a Boolean False or 0, and “defect/failed/failure has occurred” is represented by
a Boolean True or 1, respectively.
Evaluation of the fault tree is done qualitatively as well as probabilistically. The system
is comprised of clearly separable elements (components), each of which has its own reliability
and safety characteristics, and that influence the system reliability and safety according to the
components’ logical interconnection. Using these connections, the fault tree model is then able
to derive the system charateristics from its component characteristics.
With the simplifying laws of Boolean algebra the system function/failure function, i.e. the
logical function of the TOP event, is transformed into a minimal disjunctive normal form.
Thereby determined minimal cutsets of the fault tree may then be further used probabilistically
together with the laws of probability calculus. The probability or frequency of occurrence of
the undesirable event or system state is – for non-repairable systems – the failure probability
and the failure density or failure rate of the TOP event, respecively; for repairable systems, it
is the unavailability and failure frequency of the TOP event, respecively, [27].
Furthermore, qualitative analysis of the system architecture is possible, too, because of the
similarity of the fault tree model to the real system structure; specifically, such qualitative
analysis allows analysis of redundancy structures as well as sensitivity analysis [28], importance
analysis [29], and confidence analysis [30].
Qualitative and probabilistic static FTA is state of the art in many domains like nuclear [5],
aerospace [31], and automotive industries [9, 32]. There is demand for further research on using
FTA for analysis of software “failures” [33], especially because of difficulties stemming from
proper representation of dynamic effects, see below.
FTA is intuitive in its application – in comparison to other methods like e.g. state based
markov diagrams; thus, learning the FTA method is comparatively easy, and fault trees are
easy to create, read, understand, rework, and edit, as well as to detail iteratively, and to use in
modules.
One main limitation of the FTA is that its event are (only) bivalent, i.e. True or False; another
limitation is that the assumptions of monotony or coherence must be satisfied [34, 35]; a third
limitation is the implied independence of its basic events. Furthermore, FTA has only very
limited possibilities of representing dynamic failure and repair behaviour [12]. Reason for this is
the underlying Boolean logic [36], that has no concept of time, and thus only covers structural
aspects of failure combinations [34]. No statement is made about the sequence in which events
occur, as well as about other time dependencies, see chapter 2.3.1.
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2.3 Dynamic FTA
The expression dynamic FTA is often used as a synonym for the dynamic fault tree (DFT)
approach according to Dugan [37]. The DFT uses markov chains to extend the static FTA to
model and to analyze sequence dependencies.
The DFT approach therefore defines its “dynamic” with event sequences. This thesis and the
TFTA approach, as described in chapter 4, are also based on this underlying interpretation of
“dynamic”, i.e. on the possibility of representing event sequences.
2.3.1 Defining Dynamic with Event Sequences
Boolean logic with its AND, OR, and NOT operations is not capable of expressing temporal
relationships. For example, the failures of two components A and B in a system shall be
considered. The event “A AND B” represents “both components have failed”. It does not,
though, provide any information on the real points in time at which A and B occurred, and
from that: the sequence, in which both events occur. This Boolean view grasps only the static
state that the two components are (or are not) failed.
In contrast to that, a dynamic view discriminates between different ways of reaching this
event or state. It extends the all-static analysis of only considering possible combinations of
events [38].
For “A AND B” there are three different such ways. First, A may fail before B, and then B
fails later, too. Second, B may fail before A, and then A fails later, too. Third, A and B may
fail exactly simultaneously.
Each of these ways leads to the – from a Boolean point of view: identical – state, that both
components have failed. This discrimination of possible ways to an event or state may be
visualized using state-transition diagrams. Figure 2.1 shown such a state-transition diagram,
corresponding to the example above. “Dynamic” as discrimination of different ways to an event
or state works with temporal expressions like “before”, “after”, “first”, “then”, “simultaneous”,
and so on. Modelling such “dynamics” requires to differentiate the different points in time
when events occur. This capability requires that a concept of time exists within the model [39].
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Figure 2.1: State-transition diagram of a simple, redundant, and non-reparable system, that
consists of two components A and B; this diagram shows the possible four states
and five transitions.
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Conversely, differentiating points in time when events occur also allows to distinguish between
different event sequences. And with event sequences a multitude of dynamic effects can be
described [12, 40].
Next Steps
The contribution to dynamic FTA, as presented in this thesis, also uses “dynamic” in the sense of
representation of event sequences. The next section 2.3.2 differentiates this meaning of “dynamic”
from others that are also used in the context of ZSA, and specifically are used in the context of
FTA. Section 2.3.3 discusses typical implementations of this meaning of “dynamic”, specifically
implementations based on markov chains and petri nets. Section 2.3.4 outlines a very different
way of extending the FTA by event sequences, and for this purpose describes several approaches
of extended (temporal) failure logics. Chapter 2.4 summarizes this state of the art of dynamic
FTA.
2.3.2 Other Definitions of Dynamic
Apart from the consideration of event sequences there are other temporal dependencies among
(failure) events, and consequently other definitions of “dynamic” in the ZSA field, too, some of
which are listed below. One overview in [41] is not he most recent, but is still valid.
In [42] dynamic effects in analyses result either from time-dependent failure rates, or from
time-dependent unavailabilities, or from reduction of uncertainty whether the reliability data
used is correct, or from failure sequences.
Abstracting these categories, dynamic either results from variable reliability data, or from the
failure events’ sequence. Sometimes, phased mission methods are seen as a third such category,
see e.g. [39, 43] or [44]. But these may as well be seen as belonging to either of the first two
categories, or they may be interpreted as piecewise static analysis.
A further distinction into “fast” and “slow” dynamic temporal dependencies is given in [22].
Slow dynamic effects occur during normal operation, e.g. by aging, learning effecs, or changes
in the system. On the other hand, fast dynamic effects describe incidents, and thus dynamic
ZSA focus on these. In [22] dynamic ZSA is based on MoCaS.
The referenced work comes mainly from the nuclear domain. They emphasize explicit con-
sideration of temporal dependencies as well as consideration of HRA (HRA) [45] as another
important contribution of dynamic ZSA. On the other hand, HRA is not as relevant in the
automotive domain today; reasons for this are
1. that safety critical systems are preferably designed as fail safe systems, thus real fail
operational systems are rare [46],
2. the lack of human operators as part of the safety systems, which directly influence the
system’s behaviour during normal operation as well as during incidences, and
3. the lack of inspection, maintenance, and repair crews, as they are known in plants or in
the aerospace domain.
It is expected that HRA will become more and more relevant for the functional safety of au-
tomotive systems, too, specifically because of the increase of high-voltage systems in electric
and hybrid cars, and because of the increasing integration of active safety systems and driver
assistance systems.
Moreover, there are special approaches to dynamic ZSA using MoCaS in the automotive
domain, too. For example, [24] considers the influence of dynamic system behaviour on the
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system’s failure behaviour by taking time-dependent failure data into account. As these ap-
proaches require comparably high effort, they are used only for special cases and are not (yet)
widespread.
2.3.3 Dynamic FTA – Other Approaches
From here on this thesis on dynamic FTA focusses on “dynamic” in the sense of representation
of event sequences.
Known approaches to extending the FTA by dynamic effects typically are either simulations,
or they automatically transform the fault tree model into a markov model, and then solve the
resulting differential equation system.
The well known DFT approach [37] is based on modularizing the fault tree into static and
dynamic modules, that are then calculated using binary decision diagrams (BDD) [47, 48] and
markov chains. Static modules consist only of Boolean fault tree gates and events; dynamic
modules also include dynamic fault tree gates. The latter are used to represent effects like
sequences, or cold, warm, and hot redundancies, or trigger events. Figure 2.2 shown the main
steps of this approach and compares them to the conventional static FTA.
The DFT method is included into numerous fault tree tools in differing completeness; e.g. in
DIFTree [49] or Galileo [38], as well as in several commercial FTA tools like Isograph Faulttree+
[50], ITEM Toolkit [51], or RELAX Reliability Studio [52]. DFT are also mentioned in the recent
edition of the Fault Tree Handbook [31].
A similar approach is presented in [53], which uses dynamic bayesian networks instead of
creating and solving markov chains, a method for reducing calculatory costs.
Another alternative in [54] solves DFT modules with modified BDD, which are called zero-
suppressed binary decision diagrams; this approach requires to manually include sequenc infor-
FTA simplification
(boolean algebra)
conventional FTA (qualitative as well as probabilistical)
FTA creation
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of minimal cutsets
conventional dynamic FTA
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probabilistic results
boolean modules
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Figure 2.2: Main steps in conventional FTA (top) and - for comparison - main steps of a con-
ventional dynamic fault tree extension using state-based modelling.
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mation into the relevant minimal cutsets, instead of using markov models. This manual step
limits the use of dynamic gates to relatively simple structures, though. Another similar such
method is discussed in [55].
The approach introduced in [56, 57] is based on Boolean logic driven markov processes
(BDMP) and, compared to the listed approaches from above, improves qualitative system anal-
ysis, and to some extent also allows taking repairable components into account.
A different approach to dynamic FTA based on petri nets, and without markov models, is
chosen in [58] and [59, 60]; a further possibility are state-event-fault-trees given in [61].
Discussion
All these approaches to dynamic FTA are based on transforming the original fault tree model
into state-based models. The latter are able to consider temporal dependencies and thus event
sequences, too. The different approaches differ in their choice of transformation method – on
the one hand, the complete fault tree is transformed; on the other hand, modularization and
transformation only of those sub-trees that carry relevant dynamic data –, and they differ in
their choice of state-based method.
But they have in common that, firstly, their calculatory cost grows exponentially with the
size of their dynamic modules. Newer methods in [62, 63] reduce the time needed for the
actual modularization, so that the calculatory effort grows only linearly with the number of
modelled elements. But the complexity for solving the markov chains is always O{K ·N3} [64].
K is dependent on the number of computation-steps, and thus from the mission time and the
calculations precission. And N is dependent on the number of states within the markov model;
this number in in the range of N = nn for n elements under consideration. This state explosion
[65] requires modularization with as small dynamic modules as possible. On the other hand,
these markov models and their resulting differential equation systems can, in many cases, only
be solved approximately, even despite of modularization (see e.g. [64]).
Secondly, modularization requires that the modules are independent from each other. This
limits the dynamic dependencies between the system’s elements that can be considered in the
model; or it implies increasing the size of the dynamic modules – with the described negative
impact on calculatory effort.
Thirdly, qualitative analyses are not possible, or possible only for very simple structures.
This is owed to the transformation into the state space which does not follow the real system
architecture as closely as the Boolean system model. One of the main benefits of the FTA is
therefore missing in state based models: they can not “automatically” transform the modelled
structure into a minimal form. For example, the DFT provides – depending on its specific imple-
mentation – either “normal” Boolean minimal cutsets without any event sequence information,
or provides minimal cutsets with “meta-events”, that cover complete markov models without
further breaking them apart.
Fourthly, state based models lack the “user-friendliness” of Boolean methods, also resulting
from the Boolean model’s closeness to the real system architecture. Instead, components and
their dependencies are, for example, expressed by states and state-transitions (in markov mod-
els), or by places and transitions and marks (in petri nets). Figure 2.3 shows an example. One
effect resulting from these differences is that state-based methods and models are less easy read-
able, less comprehensible, less easy in maintenance, and less scalable than the conventional FTA
[67].
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Figure 2.3: On the left side, a PAND gate with inputs A and B, that need to occur in the
sequence “A first, and then B”, in order for the gate event to occur. The symbol
used is not the one used in [5] but is taken from the TFTA approach in chapter 4.
The top right side shows a markov model from [66], which is equivalent to the PAND
gate; the bottom right side shows a petri net from [59], which is also equivalent to
the PAND gate (TA and TB represent the time-to-failure of A and B).
2.3.4 Dynamic FTA – Based on a Temporal Failure Logic
Another possibility to include temporal dependencies is to use a temporal logic that extends
the conventional Boolean logic. A temporal logic describes not only structural combinations of
different events – that is the Boolean approach –, but also has a concept of time. The latter
is used to make statements on the points in time at which events occur, and to include such
statements into the logic function.
Applied to the field of reliability and safety, there are several approaches to use temporal logic
for fault trees. One early approach of describing event sequences is found in [68]. It concentrates
on probabilistic modelling aspects for individual event sequences; this is an approach that has
later been revived and refined, e.g. in [59] and [69]. All these works do not expand onto a general
temporal logic, which goes beyond taking individual event sequences into account. Therefore,
they require that the relevant minimal failure sequences, that lead to the TOP event, have
been found with other methods. This, of course, severely limits their application for complex
projects.
The first version of the fault tree handbook [5] was a de facto standard for fault tree analysis for
a long time; it also describes a so-called priority AND (PAND) gate. This gate is used exclusively
for qualitative modelling of event sequences; probabilistically it is treated as a conventional AND
gate. This approach again focusses on individual event sequences, and it does not provide a
further and generic temporal logic. For example, it is not discussed, whether – and how –
the fault tree structure shown on the left side of figure 2.4 may be simplified, and/or if it is
equivalent to the structure shown on the right side of figure 2.4. In the Boolean model with
AND instead of PAND gates, both fault trees are equivalent, as the Boolean distributive law –
see (4.32) on page 31 – yields (A∧B)∨ (A∧C) = A∧ (B ∨C)
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Figure 2.4: Questions on the state of the art of dynamic FTA using temporal logic. As the PAND
gates introduced in [5] lack a universal temporal logic, it is undefined, whether both
shown fault trees are equivalent or not. The PAND gates’ symbols used in this figure
are not the ones from [5], but from the TFTA approach presented in chapter 4.
The interval-based temporal logic of the so-called AND-Then gates in [70] pursue a broader
approach, as well as the work presented in [71, 72] and the so-called temporal fault trees in
[73]. They all stem from the field of formal fault tree analysis, which is mainly motivated by
adopting the conventional fault tree analysis method, so as to model software based systems
and their “failures”. Failure analysis of software based systems is fundamentally different from
the conventional and hardware orientated ZSA, especially because of their very different failure
mechanisms. An overview on the state of the art of FTA for software based systems is given
in [74]. Because of the high dynamic of software based systems, the temporal logics presented
in the works above are also complex and complicated; furthermore, their application is quite
different to conventional FTA, because of their very strict defininitions.
In earlier work, Heidtmann interpreted modal logic [75], which originates in the field of the-
oretical philosophy, for reliability modelling, see [11] and [34]. His temporal logic describes
event sequences not directly, but asserts so-called anytime- and always-relationships between
events. Using these, many temporal dependencies and contexts may be portrayed, including
event sequences. Heidtmann discusses the qualitative as well as the probabilistic application
of his temporal logic, and he is not limited to the fault tree method. On the other hand and
because of its power, his logic involves comparably complex models and calculations.
The dedicated aim of the Pandora approach in [76, 77] is to provide a “useable” method that is
similar to conventional FTA. The term “Pandora” puns on the figure from greek legend, as well
as it is a composite of “Priority AND” and the greek term ω´ρα (ora), which means “time” [76].
Creation and analysis of Pandora fault trees is similar to conventional Boolean FTA. By using
additional temporal gates – which are called PAND, SAND, and POR –, a temporal failure
function of the TOP event is built. This function is then transformed into a minimal form
by applying temporal logic simplification laws that are sketched in [77]. Central to these laws
is the concept of so-called “doublets”. A doublet describes the temporal relationship between
exactly two events, and is itself treated like a basic event. Temporal relationships are given only
relatively to each other, i.e. the absolute points in time when events occur are not considered.
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The minimal form is the equivalent to the minimal cutsets in conventional FTA; it allows a
qualitative analysis of the failure behaviour including event sequence information. The concept
of doublets simplifies the analysis greatly; but it also limits the Pandora approach in terms of
probabilistic analysis, specifically because it leaves unresolved (temporal) dependencies between
doublets. For example, in Pandora [77] the expression “A occurs first, and then B and C occur”
is written as
A
∧ (B ∧C) = [(A ∧C)∧ (B ∧C)]∨ [(A ∧B)∧ (B =∧C)]∨ [(A ∧B)∧ (C ∧B)] . (2.1)
Instead of the original Pandora notation, the notation from chapter 4 is used here, in order to
improve comparability of the results. Each term in round brackets on the right side indicates
one doublet.
These doublets allow qualitative analyse, but they can not be simply quantified, as shown by
the following considerations.
A Boolean conjunction, e.g. (A∧C)∧ (B ∧C), must not, in general, be quantified by simple
multiplication of the individual event probabilities; i.e.
F(A∧C)∧ (B ∧C) 6= (FA ·FC) · (FB ·FC) , (2.2)
if it is not given in a minimal form, already, or the individual events are not independent from
each other. If these conditions are satisfied, e.g. after transforming into
(A∧C)∧ (B ∧C) = A∧B ∧C , (2.3)
then a direct quantification is possible.
F(A∧C)∧ (B ∧C) = FA∧B ∧C = FA ·FB ·FC . (2.4)
In analogy, Pandora expressions, like the one shown above, must not be quantified directly. For
example, the “joint” event C in both doublets, i.e. an unresolved dependency between both
doublets, is the reason for
F(A∧C)∧ (B ∧C) 6= F(A∧C) ·F(B ∧C) . (2.5)
The TFTA approach presented in this work adopts some aspects of Pandora. But the TFTA
goes beyond Pandora by (among others)
• providing a complete and systematic set of logic transformation laws of universal validity
and applicability, where Pandora only sketches temporal logic rules in [77], and
• allowing probabilistic, as well as qualitative modelling and analysis, where Pandora stays
qualitative, and
• not pursuing the concept of doublets, that is not well-suited for probabilistic analysis, and
• not using a POR operator.
The differences from that may be demonstrated by comparing the Pandora expression from
above with an equivalent expression according to the TFTA approach. Anticipating the chapters
below, the latter is given as
A
∧ (B ∧C) = [A ∧B ∧C]∨ [B ∧A ∧C]∨ [A ∧C ∧B]∨ [C ∧A ∧B]∨
∨
[
(A
=∧B) ∧C]∨ [A ∧ (B =∧C)]∨ [(A =∧C) ∧B] . (2.6)
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As shown in this thesis, these terms may be quantified directly – and they may also be trans-
formed into a more compact form in order to reduce the calculatory effort:
A
∧ (B ∧C) = [(A∧B) ∧C]∨ [(A∧C) ∧B]∨ [A ∧ (B =∧C)] . (2.7)
The right side expressions are mutually exclusive (disjoint), thus
FA∧ (B ∧C)(t) = F(A∧B)∧C(t) + F(A∧C)∧B(t) + FA∧ (B =∧C)(t) =
=
t∫
0
(
FA(τ)FB(τ)fC(τ) + FA(τ)FC(τ)fB(τ)
)
·dτ .
(2.8)
2.4 Summary
Conventional Boolean FTA is state of the art for systematic, top-down, and qualitative as well
as probabilistic analysis of the failure behaviour of complex systems in several industries and
application fields (see chapters 2.1 and 2.2).
The call for an improved consideration of time-dependencies lead to development of several
extensions of the Boolean FTA in order to take into account dynamic effects and specifically
sequence dependencies, see chapter 2.3.1. There are two main strategies for such consideration
of event sequences: On the one hand the Boolean fault tree model is transformed into a state-
based model, which allows the calculation of dynamic effects (see chapter 2.3.3). On the other
hand, an extended and temporal logic is used instead of the Boolean (failure) logic, see chapter
2.3.4.
In the past several proposals for each of the two strategies were presented. Moreover, some of
the state-based extensions are being used for solving real-world problems today. But by switch-
ing into the state-space these approaches loose some of the main advantages of conventional
FTA, specifically with respect to the necessary calculatory effort, its intuitive useability, and its
ability to provide meaningful qualitative analyses.
Very powerful but also very complex methods dominate the field of extensions by temporal
logic; they stem mainly from research on applying the FTA on software. Further research
is needed for improved useability, in order to convey the conventional Boolean FTA’s “user-
friendliness” onto dynamic FTA.
Figure 2.5 shows how the TFTA approach presented in this thesis fits into the state of the
art, and it differentiates the TFTA from other methods.
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3 Problem Definition: Event Sequences in
FTA without Modularization
Simplicity is the final achievement.
(Frédéric Chopin)
3.1 Demand for Improved Methods
3.1.1 Demand for Dynamic FTA
One of the FTA’s vital objectives is the probabilistic evidence that the failure rate and failure
probability of a system are lower than given target values. Practical experience shows that in
many cases reaching these target values – derived from e.g. safety standards like IEC61508 or
ISO26262 – is a close call. Modelling the same system with a dynamic FTA provides less con-
servative results than the conventional FTA; this, of course, helps to comply with probabilistic
target values. It is much more credible to improve one’s system analysis by using such a dy-
namic and more detailed method than to reach compliance with one’s objectives by improving
(reducing) the failure data input to the basic events; the latter is often hardly justifiable.
For systems with higher safety levels the conventional qualitative single failure analysis using
FMEA is not sufficient [9, 78] In such cases and for complex system architectures the qualitative
FTA improves systematic understanding of multiple failure interaction. For example, it is very
efficient to improve the safety of programmable systems by making the conditions of switch-
ing elements dependend on sequential information. Fail-activation is reduced as only certain
sequences of trigger events are relevant. In many cases such sequential conditions can be added
into integrated circuits with only negliable costs. When compared to the conventional FTA, an
FTA that takes such sequences into account can then provide a much more meaningful view on
the system under consideration.
Chapter 6 shows an example system where conventional Boolean fault tree modelling and
analysis provides only unprecise results.
3.1.2 Demand for Improved Dynamic FTA
Dynamic extensions to FTA, as listed in chapter 2.3, aim at the correct probabilistic calculation
of fault trees; this is especially true for the state based methods like DFT. Chapter 6.3 shows
an example where the DFT succeeds in this respect and thus proves to be a real improvement
when compared to the conventional Boolean FTA.
Criticism of state based extensions comprises mainly from the following aspects:
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• state based extensions are limited in their use for qualitative analysis of sequence effects.
This comes from the forced change between methods with Boolean fault tree logic on the
one hand and a state based dynamic model on the other hand.
• they are limited in case of interdependencies between dynamic and non-dynamic parts
(modules) of the same fault tree.
• probabilistic calculation is rather costly and approximations are not easy to identify and
use.
Practical experience shows that there is a certain correlation between the necessities of proba-
bilistic and qualitative analyses of dynamic effects. Therefore, from an effort point of view it
is beneficial to cover both aspects with the same modelling method. Methods are needed that
allow both analyses with reasonable effort and idealy also allow a step wise workflow: first the
results are only approximated, then the most important contributors are identified, and then
only for those the more complex but exact calculations are done.
3.1.3 Remarks on Using Dynamic FTA
In general, an analysis’ effort and its benefit must not be disproportionate to each other even if
there is a very understandable quest to model the reality (which is dynamic, see chapter 2.1.2.1)
as exact and detailled as possible. Today there are several attempts to extend the Boolean FTA
with dynamic effects and event sequenes; but many of those extensions are limited to simple
and mostly academic examples. This is especially true for approaches based on a temporal logic;
their very high complexity conflicts with their practical useability.
Useability, (relative) ease of use, and scalability are three critical success factors of the con-
ventional FTA; and they have added tremendously to the FTA being first choice for safety and
reliability analyses in many domains.
In order to transfer this success, the dynamic FTA needs to satisfy the following generic
requirements:
• real system effects must translate into the model’s logic easily,
• the actual implementation into a fault tree needs to be possible with reasonable effort,
• qualitative as well as probabilistic calculations must be possible without changing the
analysis method,
• computing time must be reasonable,
• the fault tree as well as its results must be easily readable and comprehensible,
• scalability and possibility to detail and extend parts of the fault tree.
3.2 Concept
3.2.1 Requirements for TFTA
By taking useability and practical considerations into account the following is required from the
new TFTA method:
1. The temporal TFTA logic shall be able to model sequence dependencies between events.
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2. The temporal TFTA logic shall be a detailing (extension) of the Boolean logic.
3. The TFTA shall be similar to the conventinal FTA regarding notation, abstract concept,
workflow, work products.
4. The qualitative TFTA shall provide minimal event sequences similar to the Boolean mini-
mal cutsets. Each “minimal cutset sequence” shall consist of “temporal conjunction terms”
similar to the Boolean AND term but including event sequence information. The TOP
or system failure function shall then consist of such “minimal cutset sequences” given in
“temporal disjunctive normal form”.
5. In order to allow for probabilistic analysis the “minimal cutset sequences” shall be disjoint
(i.e. mutually exclusive); this allows for easy quantification by convolution of the failure
densities/frequencies.
6. In order to reduce calculation efforts the TFTA shall support step-wise modelling: a
first step provides only approximations; more exact calculations follow only for the most
important contributors. It shall be possible to calculate exact results if necessary.
Assumptions on TFTA
The following discussions are based on two assumptions:
1. fault trees are monotone (sometime also called coherent) and
2. all component failures are non repairable.
3.2.2 TFTA – Step by Step
Figure 3.1 shows the TFTA workflow with its multiple steps. First, there is the two step
qualitative transformation of the initial logic expression into a minimal and later disjunct form;
in a second step, this is then quantified probabilistically. This workflow is very similar to the
workflow of conventional FTA; there, too, minimal cutsets need not automatically be mutually
exclusive. The TFTA workflow is split into two steps because of the potentially very high effort
necessary for transforming a minimal temporal expression into mutually exclusive terms.
The structure of chapter 4 is influenced by this workflow steps, too; chapter 4.1 provides the
notation of the temporal logic; chapter 4.2 provides the TFTA’s (temporal) rules of transforma-
tion; chapter 4.3 describes the transformation into mutually exclusive sequences; and chapter 5
provides the probabilistic evaluation of temporal expressions.
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Figure 3.1: Step by step workflow of the TFTA with its two-step transformation of a temporal
expression into a minimal and then mutually exclusive form, and probabilistic quan-
tification. Approximations are possible, first, based on the mutually exclusive event
sequences or, second and a little more unprecise, directly from the minimal event
sequences.
4 Temporal Fault Tree Analysis (TFTA): A
New Approach to Dynamic FTA
Time is the worst place, so to speak,
to get lost in.
(Douglas Adams)
This chapter describes the temporal fault tree analysis (TFTA) which extends the Boolean FTA
and allows analysis of event sequences.
• Chapter 4.1 presents the notation of the new temporal TFTA logic. Specifically, there are
two new temporal operators corresponding to two temporal fault tree gates.
• At the heart of the new temporal logic there are several rules of transformation (“tem-
poral logic laws”) described in chapter 4.2. They allow the transformation of a temporal
expression into its temporal disjunctive normal form (TDNF).
• Chapter 4.3 discusses minimal and disjoint temporal expressions.
• There is an extended form of temporal expressions, as shown in chapter 4.4, which reduces
the effort necessary for describing and calculating complex temporal failure functions –
especially if such failure functions only include few real temporal relationships between
events.
4.1 TFTA Notation
First of all, some remarks on the terms used: In the fault tree method basic events represent
atomic failure events of real life entities (i.e. systems, components, parts, functions). Likewise,
fault tree gates represent non-atomic “higher level” failure events. The terminology is sometimes
confused so that there is no discrimination between “incidence of a real world failure event” and
“fault tree event becomes True”, where the latter represents the real life event in the fault tree
model.
4.1.1 Boolean Algebra and the FTA Failure Logic
In the context of FTA events are failure events. Contrary to uses of the Boolean algebra
for reliability calculations, the FTA therefore uses a negated logic [14, chapter 14.4.2]. In
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the following text negating all events in their written form is ommited for reasons of better
readability. For all failure events
Xi =
{
True or 1 entity i has failed
False or 0 entity i is operational
. (4.1)
For the TFTA approach most of the Boolean logic and its application on the fault tree stays
the same:
The conjunction using the AND operator and
XAND = A∧B (4.2)
is True, if and only if both events A and B are True. In fault trees the conjunction is represented
by AND gates.
The disjunction using the OR operator and
XOR = A∨B (4.3)
is True, if either only event A or only event B is True, or if both events are True. In fault trees
the disjunction is represented by OR gates.
The negation using the NOT operator and
XNOT = ¬A (4.4)
is True, if and only if event A is False. The shorter A¬B is used below instead of A∧¬B. In
fault trees the negation is represented by NOT gates.
4.1.2 Temporal Logic Operators
The TFTA uses two temporal operators and their corresponding gates in addition to the Boolean
operators and gates in order to describe temporal event relationships (see figure 4.1).
PAND: The Sequence of Events
The PAND operation (Priority AND) using the PAND operator and
XPAND = A
∧B (4.5)
is True, if and only if
• both events A and B are True and
• A has become True before B has become True.
Therefore, PAND describes a chronology of events becomming True after each other. In fault
trees the PAND operation is represented by PAND gates.
≥ 1
OR
&
AND
&
SAND
&
PANDNOT
Figure 4.1: Fault tree gates of the TFTA: Boolean gates (left) and temporal gates (right)
4.1 TFTA Notation 21
SAND: Concurrence of Events
The SAND operation (Simultaneous AND) using the SAND operator and
XSAND = A
=∧B (4.6)
is True, if and only if
• both events A and B are True and
• A and B have become True simultaneously.
Therefore, SAND describes events becomming True exactly at the same time. In fault trees the
SAND operation is represented by SAND gates.
Remark: PAND as well as SAND uses time indications relatively, i.e. no statement is made
on the absolut (real) time at which an event becomes True.
4.1.3 Boolean and Temporal Operations Visualized as Sets
Figure 4.2 shows the different operators as sets and illustrates the relationshios among them.
First, there are two event A and B symbolized as sets. If A and B are the operands to AND
and OR operators (i.e. they are inputs to Boolean AND and OR gates in a fault tree), then
two sets result: A∧B = B ∧A (intersection) and A∨B = B ∨A (union). If A and B are the
operands to PAND and SAND operators (i.e. they are inputs to temporal PAND and SAND
gates in a temporal fault tree), then three sets result: A ∧B and B ∧A and A =∧B = B =∧A.
Note, that negated events and their corresponding “sets” are not shown here. The depiction in
figure 4.2 allows a first qualitativ statement on the meaning of tempral operators/gates.
According to (4.5) and (4.6) PAND and SAND events are real subsets of the Boolean con-
junction A∧B = B ∧A (“. . . both events A and B are True . . . ”). There are three possibile
sequences how two events A and B can “both be True” (see the law of completion in chapter
4.2).
As sets this may be written as
A
∧B ⊂ A∧B , A =∧B ⊂ A∧B , B ∧A ⊂ A∧B , (4.7)
A
∧B A =∧B B ∧A
A∨B
A∧B
B
A
Figure 4.2: Temporal operations from top to bottom: events A and B; their intersection (AND)
and union (OR); the three subsets defined by distinction between the possible event
sequences (PAND and SAND).
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Figure 4.3: Temporal sequence of two events: In (a) and (c) event A becomes True before B
(upper two rows); the following rows show which events formed by A and B become
True at which time. In (b) and (d) events A and B become True simultaneously.
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of the three possible sequences of state transitions (which are mutually
exclusive) that lead to failure of both components of the example system in figure
2.1.
A∧B ⊂ A , A∧B ⊂ B . (4.8)
Events A ∧B, B ∧A, and A =∧B are pairwise mutually exclusive, i.e. there is no intersection
between them (see chapter 4.3):
A
∧B ⊥ A =∧B , A ∧B ⊥ B ∧A , A =∧B ⊥ B ∧A . (4.9)
4.1.4 Temporal Operations: Timing Behaviour
Temporal sequence diagrams illustrate (temporal) relationships between events. Figure 4.3
shows logic levels over time for Boolean and temporal operators used in the TFTA. In general,
events may become True in sequence or simultaneously (see sub-figures (a) and (c) and (b) and
(d) respectively).
The possibile failure sequences in a sytstem which result from those timings may be shown e.g.
with state diagrams. In a simple example system consisting of two redundant components (see
state diagram in figure 2.1), where events may become True after each other or simultaneously,
there are the three possible state transition sequences which were already mentioned and which
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are shown in figure 4.4. These sequences correspond to the two PAND operations A ∧B and
B
∧A on the one hand and the SAND operation A =∧B on the other hand.
From page 33 on further examples of temporal sequence diagrams are compared with other
methods of illustration.
4.1.5 Syntax of Temporal Expressions
A logic expression with at least one temporal operator is called temporal-logic expression or
shorter: temporal expression.
In conventional FTA a Boolean expression which is represented by the fault tree’s TOP event
is called Boolean failure function and is symbolized by ϕ. In the TFTA the TOP event represents
a temporal expression which is called temporal failure function and is symbolized by its own
symbol $ for better discrimination in the following text.
The next sections explain elements of a temporal logic grammar as used by TFTA. This
grammar is summarized in table 4.1. The temporal logic’s operators {∧ ,∨ , ∧ , =∧ ,¬} are used
as terminal symbols.
Atomic Events/Basic Events
Atomic events are the smallest event entities in temporal expressions, and are not further
dividable. Within the temporal fault tree they are represented by basic events which do not
differ from those basic events used in conventional FTA. Particularly, probabilistic (failure) data
like failure rates may be assigned to them.
The formal grammar of the temporal logic uses the ae token for atomic events.
Negated atomic events with toke nae are – as the name suggests – the negation of atomic
events:
nae → ¬ ae . (4.10)
Within the TFTA negated events have a special meaning, see chapter 4.2.8.
General Temporal Expressions
In general, a temporal expression either consists of a basic event, or consists of two other
temporal expressions, which are connected by a temporal (including Boolean) operator, or
consist of a negation of another temporal expression. Therefore
tt → ae | (4.11)
tt ∧ tt |
tt ∨ tt |
tt ∧ tt |
tt =∧ tt |
¬ tt .
Aside from the additional temporal operators this corresponds to the formal representation of
Boolean expressions.
This general form is not suited for direct qualitative or probabilistic analysis. From chapter
4.2 on transformation laws for temporal expressions are described that allow to transform any
temporal expression into a TDNF – which in turn allow further analysis. The following sections
explain the structure of this TDNF.
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Token Description Format Example
ae atomic event - X
(basic event) Y
Z
nae negated atomic event ¬ ae ¬X
ce core event ae see above
ce =∧ ae X =∧Y
X
=∧Y =∧Z
nce negated core event nae see above
nce∧ nae ¬X ∧¬Y = ¬X ¬Y
¬X ∧¬Y ∧¬Z = ¬X ¬Y ¬Z
es event sequence ce see above
es ∧ ce X ∧Y
(X
=∧Y )∧Z
nes event sequence with nce∧ es ¬X ∧Y
negated events ¬X ∧ (Y ∧Z)
(¬X ¬Y )∧Z
(¬X ¬Y )∧ (A∧Z)
tdnf temporal expression in TDNF es see above
nes see above
tdnf∨ tdnf X ∨Y[¬X ∧ (Y ∧Z)]∨ [(X =∧Y )∧Z]
ece extended core event ae∧ ae X ∧Y
ece∧ ae X ∧Y ∧Z
ees extended event sequence ece see above
ees ∧ ece (X ∧Y )∧ (A∧Z)
ees ∧ ce (X ∧Y )∧ (A =∧Z)
es∧ ece X ∧ (Y =∧Z)∧ (A∧B)
nees extended event sequence with nce∧ ees ¬Z ∧ (X ∧Y )
negated events ¬Z ∧ [(X ∧Y ) ∧ (A∧B)]
¬Z ∧ [(X ∧Y ) ∧ (A =∧B)]
(¬X ¬Y )∧ [X ∧Y ∧ (A∧B)]
etdnf temporal expression in ees see above
extended TDNF nees see above
etdnf∨ tdnf (X ∧Y )∨Z[¬X ∧ (Y ∧Z)]∨ [(X =∧Y )∧Z]
etdnf∨ etdnf (X ∧Y )∨ (A∧B)[¬A∧ (X ∧Y )]∨ [Z ∧ (A∧B)]
tt generic temporal expression ae see above
tt∧ tt (A∨B)∧ (C ∧D)
tt∨ tt A∨¬(C ∧D)
tt∧ tt (A∨B) ∧ (C ∨D)
tt =∧ tt (A∨B) =∧ (C ∨D)
¬ tt ¬(C ∧D)
Table 4.1: The syntax of temporal expressions: the more complex tokens are based on the
token of an atomic event (basic event) as an entity which is not further dividable;
complex tokens are: core events, event sequences and temporal expressions in TDNF;
they are composed in multiple ways. The examples given do not include all possible
combinations. The lower part of the figure shows temporal expressions in a more
generic form; those need to be transformed for further analysis.
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4.1.5.1 Temporal Disjunctive Normal Form (TDNF, Sum of Products)
Core Events
In the temporal logic core events describe that one or more events become True at a certain
point in time. Negated core events indicate that at a given time one or more events have not
(yet) become True. Many equations in this thesis use K for core events.
A core event event is represented by token ce and consists of either one atomic event, or
consists of a temporal expression (in braces), which itself consists of only SAND connected
atomic events. More formally,
ce → ae | (4.12)
ce =∧ ae .
A negated core event (token nce) consists of either one negated atomic event, or consist of a
temporal expression (in braces), which itself consists of only AND connected negated atomic
events. More formally,
nce → nae | (4.13)
nce ∧ nae .
Event Sequences
Event sequences are the temporal logic’s equivalent of Boolean cutsets. They describe a temporal
sequence of one or more core events. In analogy to the Boolean minimal cutsets, minimal event
sequences (MCSS, see chapter 4.3.2) have a special significance in the temporal logic.
Event sequences with negated events are important for transforming temporal expressions into
disjoint, i.e. mutually exclusive, terms. This is similar to the Boolean logic. Many equations in
this thesis use ES for event sequences.
Event sequences are represented by the token es and either consist of exactly one core event,
or consist of several PAND connected core events. More formally
es → ce | (4.14)
es ∧ ce .
Additionally, there are event sequences with negated events consisting of exactly one negated
core event, which is AND connected with exactly one event sequence. They are represented by
the token nes. Therefore
nes → nce ∧ es . (4.15)
Temporal Expressions in TDNF
Event sequences, connected by OR operators, provide the temporal disjunctive normal form
(TDNF):
$ =
ζ∨
j=1
ES j = ES 1 ∨ ES 2 ∨ . . . ∨ ES ζ . (4.16)
The symbol ζ indicates the number of event sequences ES of $, which themselves are not
necessarily already in a minimal form. More formally,
tdnf → es | (4.17)
nes |
tdnf ∨ tdnf .
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4.1.5.2 Extended TDNF (Sum of Products)
Temporal Expression in Extended TDNF
The extended TDNF of a temporal failure function $ is given as ζ extended event sequences
eES j which are connected by OR operators:
$ =
ζ∨
j=1
eES j = eES 1 ∨ eES 2 ∨ . . . ∨ eES ζ . (4.18)
This extended TDNF greatly simplifies the qualitative as well as probabilistic transformations
and caluclations. More formally,
etdnf → ees | (4.19)
nees |
etdnf ∨ tdnf |
etdnf ∨ etdnf .
The extended TDNF consists of extended core events and extended event sequences with and
without negated events.
Extended Core Events
An extended core event is represented by the token ece and consists of two or more AND
connected atomic events. It is identical to the conventional conjunction of atomic events in
Boolean algebra. Therefore,
ece → ae ∧ ae | (4.20)
ece ∧ ae .
Extended Event Sequences
Extended event sequences with token ees either consist of exactly one extended core event or con-
sist of only PAND connected extended core eventst or consist of a mixture of PAND connected
normal and extended event sequences. Thus,
ees → ece | (4.21)
ees ∧ ece |
ees ∧ ce |
es ∧ ece .
Extended event sequences with negated events are defined as event sequences which consist
of exactly one negated core event which is AND connected with exactly one extended event
sequence; they are represented by the token nees. Formally,
nees → nce ∧ ees . (4.22)
The following chapters at first don’t touch the subject of the extended form of temporal expres-
sions. Chapter 4.4 then explains how the qualitative analysis is simplified by using extended
event sequences. Chapter 5.4.2 discusses the probabilistic quantification of extended event se-
quences.
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4.1.6 Events the are “Part” of an Expression
For certain transformations of the temporal logic it is necessary to identify events that are
“part” of a temporal expression, and accordingly, to know whether a given expression “includes”
a certain event. Specifically, it is necessary to know whether an eventXi is part of an (extendend)
core event or of an (extended) event sequence.
For a given event Xi and a given expression $,
$ =

X1 ∧X2 ∧ . . .∧Xn ,
X1
∧X2 ∧ . . . ∧Xn ,
X1
=∧X2 =∧ . . . =∧Xn
and i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n} , (4.23)
Xi is “part” of the expression $; or in other words: expression $ “includes” Xi. We propose a
new operator to denote this relationship:
Xi A $ . (4.24)
For example,
A A A∧B , A A A ∧B , B A A ∧B , B A A ∧B ∧C .
4.1.7 Visualization Using Sequential Failure Trees
Sequential failure trees illustrate possible failure sequences within a (non-repairable) system. As
such they help understanding the exact meaning and logical statement of temporal expressions,
and they can also be used as a verification tool. For instance, two different temporal expressions
are logically identical if and only if they have identical sequential failure trees.
The explanations below for “normal” sequential failure trees (without simultaneous events,
i.e. without SAND connected events) roughly follow the findings in [79]. Chapter 4.1.7.2 then
extends these ideas to general TFTA temporal expressions that may include SAND connections
between events.
Two examples: Figure 4.5 shows sequential failure trees for the two temporal expressions
A
∧B ∧C (on the left) and A ∧C (on the right), where both are used on a system with a total
of three failure events A, B, and C.
A
B
C
ABC
AB AC BCB
B
A A
C C
BC AC AB
AA BBC C C B A
A
B
C
B BA AC C
AA BBC C
Figure 4.5: Sequential failure trees for the expressions A ∧B ∧C (left side, including SAND
connections) and A ∧C (right side, without SAND connections, and shown as a
“simplified” tree). Rectangular nodes include SAND connections; circular nodes do
not include SAND connections. Nodes that represent a system failure are filled in
black; nodes that do not represent a system failure are filled in white; non-minimal
failure nodes are crosshatched.
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4.1.7.1 Normal Sequential Failure Trees (without SAND)
The sequential failure tree for a system comprised from n elements (e.g. components) has n+ 1
levels with
(
n
i
)
· i! nodes on each level i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, see figure 4.5. Each node represents
one specific system state r and may be expressed as vector ~Kr = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn); all elements
that are not failed in this system state are written with 0 (False), and all failed elements are
written as 1, 2, . . . , i according to the failure sequence that lead to this system state.
For example, the sequence A ∧B ∧C, i.e. "‘A before B before C"’, corresponds to vector
~K = (1, 2, 3). the node on the top most level (level 0) has the zero vector ~K = (0, 0, . . . , 0).
A system’s temporal failure function $ may be expressed as function of vectors ~Kr:
$( ~Kr) =
{
1 , if the system is failed in state r.
0 , if the system is not failed in state r.
(4.25)
With the exception of the one node on level 0, every node ~K has exactly one predecessor node
~K ′. With the exception of the nodes on the lowest level n, every node has at least one successor
node ~K ′′.
Because of the definite sequence the following is always given:
~K > ~K ′ . (4.26)
According to this “vector inequation”, no element in ~K may be less than the corresponding
element in ~K ′, and at least one element in ~K must be greater than the corresponding element
in ~K ′.
Accordingly,
~K < ~K ′′ . (4.27)
Taking the property of monotony into account, the follonwing statement holds for failure func-
tions:
$( ~K) ≥ $( ~K ′) . (4.28)
Furthermore, the property of monotony yields that if $( ~K) = 0 then the system function of a
predecessor node ~K ′ of node ~K must also be $( ~K ′) = 0.
A node ~K is a minimal failure node if the failure sequence that is represented by ~K leads to
a first-time failure of the system, i.e.
$( ~K) = 1 and $( ~K ′) = 0 . (4.29)
The succesor nodes of a minimal failure node are called non-minimal failure nodes. All succesor
nodes of a non-minimal failure node are also non-minimal failure nodes. And again, with the
property of monotony the system function $( ~K ′′) of all successor nodes of a minimal (or non-
minimal) node $( ~K) = 1 must also be $( ~K ′′) = 1.
Sequential failure trees and the TFTA notation correspond to each other: Nodes (sequential
failure tree) correspond to TFTA failure sequences; minimal failure nodes correspond to MCSS ;
non-minimal failure nodes correspond to non-minimal failure sequences.
Providing all minimal failure nodes (or, respectively, all MCSS) completely describes the TOP
event of a temporal fault tree and its failure function $.
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The left side of figure 4.6 shows the simplified sequential failure tree (without SAND) of a
system with three components A, B, and C and the failure function $ = (C ∧B ∧A)∨ (B ∧C).
The sequential failure tree has n+ 1 = 4 levels. Four of the
i=n=3∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
· i! = 16 possible nodes
(without SAND) are minimal failure nodes which correspond to the four MCSS A ∧B ∧C and
¬A∧ (B ∧C) and B ∧A ∧C and C ∧B ∧A. In addition, there is a non-minimal failure node,
corresponding to the failure sequence B ∧C ∧A.
Nodes that do not represent a system failure state are filled white, minimal failure nodes are
filled black, and non-minimal failure nodes are crosshatched.
4.1.7.2 Sequential Failure Trees with Concurrent Events/SAND
The right side of figure 4.6 shows the sequential failure tree of a system with failure function $ =
(C
∧B ∧A)∨ (B ∧C); in this case SAND connections and corresponding nodes and transitions
are also shown.
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B
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C C
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AA BBC C C B A
Figure 4.6: Sequential failure tree without SAND (left side) and with SAND (right side) of a
system with failure function $ = (C ∧B ∧A)∨ (B ∧C).
For better discrimination failure nodes (system failure states) without SAND connection
are depicted as circles and failure nodes with at least one SAND connection are depicted as
rectangles.
Besides that, the notation, as introduced in chapter 4.1.7.1, stays the same. For example,
sequence (A =∧B) ∧C corresponds to vector ~K = (1, 1, 2), and sequence A ∧ (B =∧C) corresponds
to vector ~K = (1, 2, 2). Equations (4.25) to (4.29) also hold for sequential failure trees with
SAND connections.
4.1.7.3 Using Sequential Failure Trees
Sequential failure trees allow an intuitive visualization of temporal expressions and thus ease
their analysis:
• They directly illustrate temporal expressions, comparable to logic tables as illustrations
of Boolean expressions. Moreover, different temporal expressions are equivalent, if they
have identical sequential failure trees.
• They directly show if temporal expressions are minimal, or if they include each other, see
chapter 4.3.2. Temporal expressions are minimal, if each of their sequential failure trees
has at least one minimal failure node which is not a failure node in any of the other failure
trees.
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• They directly show if temporal expressions are mutually exclusive (disjoint), or if they
have intersections, see chapter 4.3.3. Temporal expressions are mutually exclusive, if their
failure trees have no failure node in common.
Two types of sequential failure trees are used below: the “explicit form” shown on the left side
of figure 4.7, as well as a “compact form” shown on the right side of figure 4.7.
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C C
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AA BBC C C B A
Figure 4.7: Explicit and compact forms of the same sequential failure tree with failure function
$ = (A
∧C)∨(B ∧C). Both forms are used in this thesis.
Based on some examples, creating and using sequential failure trees is demonstrated from
page 33 on; there, sequential failure trees are compared to other visualization methods, too.
The appendix includes further explanantions on sequential failure trees, see page 118.
Summary of Chapter 4.1:
The TFTA’s notation is based on the three Boolean operators AND, OR, and NOT, added by
two new temporal operators PAND and SAND. Temporal expressions may be reduced to their
sum of products form (OR connected event sequences), which is called TDNF and consists of
PAND connected core events; the TDNF corresponds to the Boolean disjunctive normal form.
The extended TDNF also allows AND connected core events, which reduces computing effort.
Sequential failure trees allow the visualization of temporal expressions and show if temporal
expressions are minimal or mutually exclusive (disjoint).
4.2 Laws of the TFTA Temporal Logic
The temporal logic rules of the TFTA method are an extension to conventional Boolean logic
and algebra. These rules describe temporal relationships between events, i.e. combinations and
dependencies between events, while taking into account the individual points in time at which
the events become True, and taking into account possible sequences between events. As it
includes a concept of time, the temporal logic rules are more extensive and more complex than
Boolean algebra.
There are two major differences between the application of the TFTA temporal logic and the
Boolean logic:
1. Event sequences are expressed by the order in which events and operators are positioned
in a temporal expression; therefore, the laws of commutation, laws of associativity, and
distributive laws are not fully applicable.
2. In temporal logic there are logical contradictions, i.e. temporal relationships between
events that are “not possible”. Such contradictions always yield a logic False. For instance,
an event can not become True after it has already become True, and thus X ∧X = False.
4.2 Laws of the TFTA Temporal Logic 31
4.2.1 Boolean Algebra
The conventional Boolean algebra describes Boolean relationships between events, i.e. it makes
statements on different events becoming True; but it does not take into account the timing
between those events. Boolean logic basically consists of the rules listed below [8, 14]:
laws of commutation
A∧B = B ∧A and A∨B = B ∨A . (4.30)
laws of associativity
A∧ (B ∧C) = (A∧B)∧C = A∧B ∧C and
A∨ (B ∨C) = (A∨B)∨C = A∨B ∨C . (4.31)
distributive laws
A∧ (B ∨C) = (A∧B)∨ (A∧C) and A∨ (B ∧C) = (A∨B)∧ (A∨C) . (4.32)
laws of idempotency
A∧A = A and A∨A = A . (4.33)
laws of absorption
A∧ (A∨B) = A and A∨ (A∧B) = A . (4.34)
de Morgan’s theorems
¬ (A∧B) = ¬A∨¬B and ¬ (A∨B) = ¬A∧¬B . (4.35)
operations with False and True
¬False = True ,
A∧False = False and A∧True = A ,
A∨False = A and A∨True = True .
(4.36)
4.2.2 Law of Completion
The law of completion in (4.37) describes the main relationship between Boolean and temporal
operators and fault tree gates, see figure 4.2:
A∧B = (A ∧B)∨ (A =∧B)∨ (B ∧A) . (4.37)
Terms on the right side of (4.37) are mutually exclusive (disjoint).
The SAND connection between different events expresses (structurally) dependend failures,
which may be interpreted as common cause failures (CCF). It can be shown that the expectancy
value of the failure probability/failure rate is zero for failure events which are connected by
SANDs, if independent failures are assumed. For instance, E[A =∧B] = 0, see chapter 5.3.1 for
details. The SAND operator is also very important for transformations of temporal expressions
and for qualitative analysis.
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4.2.3 Law of Contradiction
In general, it is logically contradictory if the same event becomes True after itself. This fol-
lows directly from the assumption of monotony combined with non-repairable components; see
chapter 3.2.1 for these two general assumptions of this thesis.
In the most simple case,
A
∧A = False . (4.38)
More generally, an event sequence yields False if at least one event exists more than once in it;
i.e.
X1
∧X2 ∧ . . . ∧Xn = False , (4.39)
if ∃ Xi = Xj for i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and i 6= j. In a temporal fault tree a PAND gate therefore
yields False if it has the same event as input more than once.
The law of contradiction applies to non-atomic core events analogously:
(A
=∧B) ∧A = (B =∧A) ∧A = False , (4.40)
A
∧ (A =∧B) = A ∧ (B =∧A) = False , (4.41)
or, more generally,
K1
∧K2 ∧ . . . ∧Kn = False , (4.42)
if there is at least one atomic event X which is part of two or more core events K, i.e. if
∃ (X A Ki)∧ (X A Kj) for i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and i 6= j.
An example: (A =∧B) ∧C ∧ (A =∧D =∧E) = False, as (A =∧B) and (A =∧D =∧E) both contain
the same atomic event A.
4.2.4 Temporal Law of Idempotency
A new temporal law of idempotency may be derived from the laws of completion and the law
of contradiction. The temporal law of idempotency applies only to the SAND operator. From
(4.37) and (4.38) and the Boolean law of idempotency in (4.33) follows that
A∧A = (A ∧A)∨ (A =∧A)∨ (A ∧A) = False ∨ (A =∧A)∨False and
A∧A = A , and therefore
A
=∧A = A . (4.43)
4.2.5 Temporal Law of Commutativity
A temporal law of commutativity (or commutation) applies only to the SAND operator, as
A
=∧B = B =∧A , (4.44)
but not for the PAND operator, as
A
∧B 6= B ∧A . (4.45)
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4.2.6 Temporal Law of Associativity
The SAND operator also has the property of associativity; thus
A
=∧ (B =∧C) = A =∧B =∧C = (A =∧B) =∧C . (4.46)
The PAND operator, on the other hand, is only left-associative, as in
(A
∧B) ∧C = A ∧B ∧C 6= A ∧ (B ∧C) . (4.47)
4.2.7 Further Temporal Logic Laws
There are two more temporal laws with special significance:
A
∧ (B ∧C) = (A∧B) ∧C and (4.48)
A
=∧ (B ∧C) = B ∧ (A =∧C) . (4.49)
Examples illustrating the laws of temporal TFTA logic
The correctness of these two laws is demonstrated using three different graphical methods:
• Table 4.2 (page 36) shows correctness of (4.48) and (4.49) using truth tables similar to
the ones known from Boolean logic. The main difference is, that in the temporal logic all
possible event sequences have to be taken into account.
• Figure 4.8 shows sequential failure trees for (4.48) and (4.49), see page 34, which are well
suited to verify and visualize temporal expressions.
• Finally, figure 4.9 shows the correctness of (4.48) and (4.49) using timing diagrams, see
page 35.
The number of entries, i.e. rows, in the truth table equals the number of nodes in the sequential
failure tree. Indeed, one can use sequential failure trees in order to simplify the process of
creating the truth table. Timing diagrams, on the other hand, are well suited for specific checks
of more complex temporal expressions.
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Figure 4.8: Sequential failure trees for (4.48) and (4.49), which show their correctness.
From left to right and from top to bottom: A, B, C, B ∧C, A∧B, A =∧C,
A
∧ (B ∧C) = (A∧B) ∧C, A =∧ (B ∧C) = B ∧ (A =∧C).
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Figure 4.9: Timing diagrams showing selected sequences from table 4.2, which demonstrate the
correctness of (4.48) (upper two diagrams) and (4.49) (lower diagram).
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A
∧ (B ∧C) (A∧B)∧C
¬A¬B ¬C False False
¬B ¬C ∧A False False
¬A¬C ∧B False False
¬A¬B ∧C False False
¬C ∧ (A∧B) False False
¬C ∧ (B ∧A) False False
¬C ∧ (A =∧B) False False
¬B ∧ (A∧C) False False
¬B ∧ (C ∧A) False False
¬B ∧ (A =∧C) False False
¬A∧ (B ∧C) False False
¬A∧ (C ∧B) False False
¬A∧ (B =∧C) False False
A
∧B ∧C True True
B
∧A∧C True True
A
∧C ∧B False False
C
∧A∧B False False
B
∧C ∧A False False
C
∧B ∧A False False
A
∧ (B =∧C) False False
B
∧ (A =∧C) False False
C
∧ (A =∧B) False False
(A
=∧B)∧C True True
(A
=∧C)∧B False False
(B
=∧C) ∧A False False
A
=∧B =∧C False False
A
=∧ (B ∧C) B ∧ (A =∧C)
¬A¬B ¬C False False
¬B ¬C ∧A False False
¬A¬C ∧B False False
¬A¬B ∧C False False
¬C ∧ (A∧B) False False
¬C ∧ (B ∧A) False False
¬C ∧ (A =∧B) False False
¬B ∧ (A∧C) False False
¬B ∧ (C ∧A) False False
¬B ∧ (A =∧C) False False
¬A∧ (B ∧C) False False
¬A∧ (C ∧B) False False
¬A∧ (B =∧C) False False
A
∧B ∧C False False
B
∧A∧C False False
A
∧C ∧B False False
C
∧A∧B False False
B
∧C ∧A False False
C
∧B ∧A False False
A
∧ (B =∧C) False False
B
∧ (A =∧C) True True
C
∧ (A =∧B) False False
(A
=∧B)∧C False False
(A
=∧C)∧B False False
(B
=∧C)∧A False False
A
=∧B =∧C False False
Table 4.2: Truth table which demonstrates that (4.48) (left side) and (4.49) (right side) are
correct. Including SAND connections, there are 26 possible sequences. Logical equiv-
alence of both expressions is shown as in both cases all possible sequences yield
identical results.
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4.2.8 Temporal Operations with Negated Events
Remark: The statements below exclusively relate to atomic negated events. Specialities of
non-atomic negated events are covered from page 40 on.
4.2.8.1 How to Interpret Negated Events in TFTA
In the TFTA, as well as in the conventional FTA, a non-negated event represents a failure of a
real element, e.g. a component. Therefore, a negated event represents the “not-failing” of a real
element.
There are two possible interpretations for “not-failing”:
1. An element, that has failed before, is repaired. The “not-failing” is an “un-failing”, a
transition from one state (failed) to another (repaired), and thus is an action.
2. An element has not yet failed and is still operational. The “not-failing” is a state.
The temporal logic, as discussed in this theses and applied to the TFTA, relies on the assumtions
of monotony of the temporal failure function as well as non-repairability of elements.
At first, at time t = 0, all elements (components) are operational. Failures occur at times
t > 0 and are represented in the temporal fault tree by (non-negated) failure events Xi. The
latter “switch” from False to True at times tXi > 0. Moreover, all elements are non-repairable.
Failure events that occurred (became True) at tXi stay True.
Two things follow for negated events: they are True until tXi and then become False; and
they cannot become True again after tXi . Thus, a negated event in the TFTA
¬Xi =
{
True in [0; tXi [ and
False in [tXi ;∞[ ,
(4.50)
with tXi > 0.
Therefore, the first interpretation of the meaning of negated events in the TFTA is to be
rejected; in the TFTA negated failure events represent elements, that have not yet failed.
4.2.8.2 Using Negated Events in TFTA
Negated events are used in two different ways within the TFTA; these are comparable to the
two ways of using negated events in Boolean FTA.
1. Even if there are no NOT gates used explicitly in the fault tree, the temporal failure
function may get negated events from logical transformations. For instance, the trans-
formation of temporal expressions that are not mutually exclusive (not disjoint) into a
disjoint form requires usage of negated events.
2. NOT gates in the fault tree model allow explicit modelling of negated events. Such
negations of basic events or non-atomic events (subtrees) are then input to other higher-
level fault tree gates. Accordingly, the failure function then includes negated events.
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Negated Events Resulting From Logic Replacements
In the Boolean FTA non-disjoint expressions are transformed into a disjoint form using negated
events [34, 80, 81]. Thereby, negated events only occur within conjunctions (AND connected
terms) in combination with at least one non-negated event. The assumtion of monotony is
not invalidated, because events are not substantially meshed by this transformation (the topic
of substantial meshing is discussed in [7]). Moreover, none of the transformation laws of the
Boolean logic introduce new negated events – de Morgan’s theorems only discuss transformation
of existing negated events.
The temporal logic of the TFTA also uses negated events for the transformation into a disjoint
form, see chapter 4.3. But other than the Boolean logic, there are temporal transformation laws,
specifically the temporal distributive laws in chapter 4.2.10, that do introduce negated events.
These negated events only occur within conjunctions, though, and in combination with at least
one non-negated event. In doing so, the assumption of monotony is not invalidated.
Using Negations Explicitely in Fault Trees
This kind of usage of negated events is restricted to cases where no substantially meshed negated
events are used in order to not invalidate the assumption of monotony, see [7]. Usually, this is
limited to special use cases, e.g. if the results of one of the temporal laws of transformation (see
above) shall explicitly be modelled with a temporal fault tree.
In general, TFTA statements like, e.g.,
• “A has not failed yet, before B has not failed yet”, i.e. ¬A ∧ ¬B, or
• “A and B have simultaneously not failed yet”, i.e. ¬A =∧ ¬B, or
• “A has failed, because B has not failed yet, or C has failed”, i.e. A = ¬B ∨C,
are neither logically meaningful nor allowed in TFTA. Thus there is no necessity to use negated
events explicitly as inputs to PAND or SAND gates, or to use them in combination with non-
negated events as inputs to OR gates.
On the other hand, it is indeed permitted to model logical statements like ¬A∧B explicitly
within the fault tree, if – and only if – the assumption of monotony still holds.
4.2.8.3 Rules of Replacement for Negated Events in the Temporal Logic
The law of completion from (4.37) must not be used on expressions where at least one of the
operands of the conjunction (AND connection) is a negated event.
Therefore, the application of the other temporal laws of transformation also does not lead to
negated events being input to PAND or SAND operators. In case of the temporal distributiv
laws all negated events are part of conjunction terms, see chapter 4.2.10. Furthermore, this
leads to the conclusion that the Boolean logic rules may be used for handling of negated events,
see chapter 4.2.1.
Special considerations are necessary for “mixed expressions” where negated events and tem-
poral expressions are both part of the same conjunction. There are
¬A∧ (. . . ∧A ∧ . . .) = False , (4.51)
¬A∧ (. . . ∧ (A =∧ . . .) ∧ . . .) = False , (4.52)
and
(¬A∧B)∧C = [¬A∧ (B ∧C)]∨ [(B ∧A)∧C] =
4.2 Laws of the TFTA Temporal Logic 39
=
[¬A∧ (B ∧C)]∨ [B ∧A ∧C]∨ [B ∧ (A =∧C)] , (4.53)
(¬A∧B) ∧C = [¬A∧ (B ∧C)]∨ [B ∧A ∧C]∨ [B ∧ (A =∧C)] , (4.54)
(¬A∧B) =∧C = ¬A∧ (B =∧C) , (4.55)
C
∧ (¬A∧B) = ¬A∧ (C ∧B) . (4.56)
Equation (4.53) shows the one main difference between temporal and Boolean logic with regards
to usage of negated events.
In the Boolean logic the law of associativity from equation (4.31) also applies to negated
events. But in the temporal logic negated events have a “period of validity”, which is expressed
by brackets. For instance, (¬A∧B)∧C denotes two things: first, that at the point in time, at
which event B occurs, event A has “not yet” occurred, and second, that C has occurred; but there
is no separate statement on the timing relationship between C and the others. On the other
hand, ¬A∧ (B ∧C) expresses timing relationships between all three events; this expression
denotes that at the point in time, at which “B and C” occurs, the event A has not yet occurred:
¬A︸︷︷︸ ∧ B︸︷︷︸ = ¬A∧B︸ ︷︷ ︸
(¬A∧B)︸ ︷︷ ︸ ∧ C︸︷︷︸ = (¬A∧B)∧C︸ ︷︷ ︸
B︸︷︷︸ ∧ C︸︷︷︸ = B ∧C︸ ︷︷ ︸
¬A︸︷︷︸ ∧ (B ∧C)︸ ︷︷ ︸ = ¬A∧ (B ∧C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
In particular, this also affects temporal expressions of the following type:
(¬A∧B) =∧A = ¬A∧ (B =∧A) = False , (4.57)
A
∧ (¬A∧B) = ¬A∧ (A ∧B) = False , (4.58)
(¬A∧B) ∧A = [¬A∧ (B ∧A)]∨ [B ∧A ∧A]∨ [B ∧ (A =∧A)] =
= False ∨False ∨ [B ∧A] = B ∧A . (4.59)
Chapter 4.3.2.2 discusses why and how these expressions are “temporally (non-)minimal”.
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4.2.8.4 Conjunction of Negated Events
The above discussion did not include conjunctions consisting of more than one negated event,
as e.g. in
¬A¬B = ¬A∧ ¬B . (4.60)
When applied to the TFTA, such conjunctions are interpreted as undividable entities; the rules
for transformation and handling of negated events, as given above, apply to those entities
analogously.
From this follows that
¬A∧ (¬B ∧C) = (¬A¬B)∧C . (4.61)
4.2.8.5 Temporal Laws of Negation, i.e. Negation of Non-Atomic Negated Events
So far, all statements regarding negated events have applied to atomic events (basic events)
only. Additional aspects have to be considered in case of negated non-atomic events, as e.g. in
¬(A ∧B).
The Negation of Boolean non-atomic expressions like ¬(A∧B) or ¬(A∨B) is done using
de Morgan’s theoremes in (4.35). The negation of SAND and PAND connected expressions can,
for example, be deduced from figure 4.2; it yields:
¬(A ∧B) = (¬A¬B)∨ (¬B ∧A)∨ (¬A∧B)∨ (B ∧A)∨ (A =∧B) and (4.62)
¬(A =∧B) = (¬A¬B)∨ (¬B ∧A)∨ (¬A∧B)∨ (A ∧B)∨ (B ∧A) . (4.63)
On the right hand side of the equations all terms are mutually exclusive (disjoint) and carry
explicite (temporal) statements to all events involved, see chapter 4.3.3.
In TFTA such non-atomic negated expressions can only exist as part of a conjunction ex-
pression together with non-negated events. As such, they describe a system state where at a
specific point in time a specific event sequence has “not yet” occurred. The right hand sides of
(4.35) and (4.62) and (4.63) represent the different possibilities how this specific system state
was reached.
An example: the temporal expressions ¬(A ∧B)∧C represents a state in which at the time
of occurrence of C the event sequence A ∧B has not occurred. This implies either that at the
time of occurrence of C
• neither A nor B have occurred – therefore (¬A¬B)∧C –
• or A has occurred, but B has not – therefore ¬B ∧ (A∧C) –
• or B has occurred, but A has not – therefore ¬A∧ (B ∧C) –
• or B has occurred before A has occurred – therefore (B ∧A)∧C –
• or A and B have occurred simultaneously – therefore (A =∧B)∧C .
The first temporal law of negation is thus given as
¬(A =∧B)∧C = [(¬A¬B)∧C]∨ [¬B ∧ (A∧C)]∨ [¬A∧ (B ∧C)]∨
∨ [(A ∧B)∧C]∨ [(B ∧A)∧C] . (4.64)
Analogously, the second temporal law of negation is given as
¬(A ∧B)∧C = [(¬A¬B)∧C]∨ [¬B ∧ (A∧C)]∨ [¬A∧ (B ∧C)]∨
∨ [(B ∧A)∧C]∨ [(A =∧B)∧C] . (4.65)
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4.2.9 True and False in Temporal Logics
Operations with the “timeless” expressions True and False should only be found in TFTA
expressions, if a more complex temporal expression was reduced to True or False in a preceeding
transformation step.
If X and X 6= True themselves are not negated, then
X
∧True = False , X =∧True = False , True ∧X = X , (4.66)
X
∧False = False , X =∧False = False , False ∧X = False . (4.67)
Furthermore,
True
∧True = False , True =∧True = True , False ∧True = False . (4.68)
Given these rules, consistency to the Boolean logic rules, which are, of course, still valid, is
obtained; thus,
X ∧True = (X ∧True)∨ (X =∧True)∨ (True ∧X) = True ∧X = X ,
X ∧False = (X ∧False)∨ (X =∧False)∨ (False ∧X) = False ∧X = False .
4.2.10 Temporal Distributive Laws
Boolean logic has the distributive law as given in (4.32). Combined with the Boolean operators’
property of associativity, see (4.31), this yields
(A∨B)∧C = C ∧ (B ∨A) = (A∧C)∨ (B ∧C) = (C ∧B)∨ (C ∧A) . (4.69)
This distributive law is vital to the transformation of Boolean expressions into a disjunctive
normal form (DNF).
Very similar, the SAND operator of the temporal logic also has the property of associativity;
therefore, the temporal laws of associativity and commutativity apply, see (4.44) and (4.46).
On the other hand, the PAND operator obviously lacks a law of commutativity, see (4.45);
reason for that is that this operator “transports” a great part of its logic information in the
sequence of events.
Therefore, at least the following has to be differentiated for something like a PAND’s distribu-
tive law:
A
∧ (B ∨C) , so-called type I, and (4.70)
(A∨B) ∧C , so-called type II . (4.71)
The following two sections discuss temporal distributive laws, first for PAND operators and
expressions of type I and II, followed by the temporal dísributive law for SAND operatos; for
the latter, no further discrimination of types is necessary.
4.2.10.1 Distributive Law for PAND-OR Expressions of Type I
The logic statment of expression A ∧ (B ∨C) is: “Amust occur, before the expression in brackets
(B ∨C) occurs”. This is not equivalent to the logic statement “A must occur before B, or A
must occur before C”, as proven by table 4.3 and figure 4.10:
A
∧ (B ∨C) 6= (A ∧B)∨ (A ∧C) , (4.72)
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and thus there is no simple temporal distributive law for expressions of type I.
In fact, the expression on the left hand side of (4.72) makes no explicit statement on temporal
dependencies between events B and C; but is does include an implicit temporal dependency
between B and C. This temporal dependency not so much affects the occurrence of (further)
events, but the non-occurence of A ∧ (B ∨C) if one of the events B or C occurs before A. This
implicite dependency is lost in the right hand side of (4.72).
This problem is solved by explicitely stating the temporal dependencies which are only implied
by the left side of (4.72).
The relevant expressions (B ∨C) splits into five possible sequences:
(B ∨C) = (¬C ∧B)∨ (¬B ∧C)∨ (B ∧C)∨ (C ∧B)∨ (B =∧C) .
Only three of these sequences are minimal failure sequences, see figure 4.10 (left side):
(B ∨C) = (¬C ∧B)∨ (¬B ∧C)∨ (B =∧C) . (4.73)
Inserting this into (4.70) yields for temporal expressions of type I, that
A
∧ (B ∨C) = A ∧ [(¬C ∧B)∨ (¬B ∧C)∨ (B =∧C)] . (4.74)
At this point non-minimal sequences need not be considered. The OR connected terms in
brackets are on the right hand side of the PAND operator, and thus occur “later”; all non-
minimal terms then occur “later still”. They are covered by the minimal sequences.
Now, with all temporal dependencies explicitly stated, a distribution of the expression is
possible, thus
A
∧ (B ∨C) = [A ∧ (¬C ∧B)]∨ [A ∧ (¬B ∧C)]∨ [A ∧ (B =∧C)]. (4.75)
A
∧(B∨C) (A∧B)∨(A∧C)
¬A¬B ¬C False False
¬B ¬C ∧A False False
¬A¬C ∧B False False
¬A¬B ∧C False False
¬C ∧ (A∧B) True True
¬C ∧ (B ∧A) False False
¬C ∧ (A =∧B) False False
¬B ∧ (A∧C) True True
¬B ∧ (C ∧A) False False
¬B ∧ (A =∧C) False False
¬A∧ (B ∧C) False False
¬A∧ (C ∧B) False False
¬A∧ (B =∧C) False False
A
∧(B∨C) (A∧B)∨(A∧C)
A
∧B ∧C True True
B
∧A∧C False True
A
∧C ∧B True True
C
∧A∧B False True
B
∧C ∧A False False
C
∧B ∧A False False
A
∧ (B =∧C) True True
B
∧ (A =∧C) False False
C
∧ (A =∧B) False False
(A
=∧B)∧C False True
(A
=∧C) ∧B False True
(B
=∧C)∧A False False
A
=∧B =∧C False False
Table 4.3: Truth table for expressions A ∧ (B ∨C) and (A ∧B)∨ (A ∧C). Including SANDs
there are 26 sequences, which are divided into two groups of 13 each. As both
expressions do not yield same results for all sequences (see deviations in bold), both
expressions are not equivalent.
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A
B
C
ABC
AB AC BCB
B
A A
C C
BC AC AB
AA BBC C C B A
A
B
C
ABC
AB AC BCB
B
A A
C C
BC AC AB
AA BBC C C B A
Figure 4.10: Left side: Sequential failure tree for expression A ∧ (B ∨C). Right side: Sequential
failure tree for expression (A ∧B)∨ (A ∧C). On the right side there are additional
sequences, as each of the two sub-expressions (A ∧B) and (A ∧C) does not make
any statements about the occurrence of the missing third event.
Further transformation of this according to chapter 4.2.8 then leads to the distributive law for
temporal expression of type I:
A
∧ (B ∨C) = [¬C ∧ (A ∧B)]∨ [¬B ∧ (A ∧C)]∨ [A ∧ (B =∧C)] . (4.76)
The distributive law for temporal expression of type I therefore requires explicit statements on
the (non-)occurrence of all of the relevant events, and requires such statements in every sub-
expression which is OR connected. Statements with that property are called temporal minterms
in analogy to Boolean minterms.
If the temporal laws of negation are applied, (4.76) holds for the case of non-atomic events
A, B, C, too.
Terms on the right side of (4.76) are mutually exclusive (disjoint). This simplifies later
probabilistic quantification, see chapter 5.
Simplification if Terms are Disjoint
The relationship in (4.76) also holds for the special case of disjoint events B and C, i.e. B ⊥ C.
But B ⊥ C implies that each of the events B or C occurs only if the other event does not occur
and has not yet occurred. Then, (4.76) may be simplified to
A
∧ (B ∨C) = [A ∧B]∨ [A ∧C] , (4.77)
if B ⊥ C.
4.2.10.2 Distributive Law for PAND-OR Expressions of Type II
The logic statment of expression (A∨B) ∧C is: “the expression in brackets (A∨B) must occur
before C occurs”. This is equivalent to the logic statement “A must occur before C, or B must
occur before C”, as proven by the sequential failure trees in figure 4.11, which correspond to the
three expressions (A∨B) ∧C, (A ∧C), and (B ∧C).
Therefore, the distributive law for temporal expressions of type II is given as
(A∨B) ∧C = (A ∧C)∨ (B ∧C) . (4.78)
On the other hand, figure 4.11 also shows that (A ∧C) and (B ∧C) are not mutually exclu-
sive. The joint sequences, which are part of both expressions, are easily found by building the
intersection, thus
(A
∧C)∧ (B ∧C) = (A∧B) ∧C = [A ∧B ∧C]∨ [B ∧A ∧C]∨ [(A =∧B) ∧C] .
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Figure 4.11 denotes these sequences with ?.
A
B
C
ABC
AB AC BCB
B
A A
C C
BC AC AB
AA BBC C C B A
? ? ?
(A
∧C)
A
B
C
ABC
AB AC BCB
B
A A
C C
BC AC AB
AA BBC C C B A
? ? ?
(B
∧C)
A
B
C
ABC
AB AC BCB
B
A A
C C
BC AC AB
AA BBC C C B A
(A∨B) ∧C = (A ∧C)∨ (B ∧C)
Figure 4.11: Distributive law for temporal expressions of type II: the sequential failure trees of
(A∨B) ∧C, (A ∧C), and (B ∧C) show that (A ∧C) and (B ∧C) are minimal but
not mutually exclusive (disjoint); joint sequences are marked with ?.
4.2.10.3 Distributive Law for SAND-OR Expressions
The logic statment of expression A =∧ (B ∨C) is: “A must occur simultaneously with the expres-
sion in brackets (B ∨C)”. In analogy to the distributive law for temporal expressions of type
I it is easily shown that this is not equivalent to the logic statement “A occurs simultaneously
with B, or A occurs simultaneously with C”, as proven by figure 4.12. In consequence, there is
also no simple temporal distributive law for SAND-OR expressions.
Instead, the temporal distributive law for SAND-OR expressions looks similar to (4.76) and
is given as
A
=∧ (B ∨C) = [¬C ∧ (A =∧B)]∨ [¬B ∧ (A =∧C)]∨ [A =∧B =∧C] . (4.79)
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A
B
C
ABC
AB AC BCB
B
A A
C C
BC AC AB
AA BBC C C B A
A
B
C
ABC
AB AC BCB
B
A A
C C
BC AC AB
AA BBC C C B A
Figure 4.12: Left side: Sequential failure tree for expression A =∧ (B ∨C). Right side: Sequential
failure tree for expression (A =∧B)∨ (A =∧C). On the right side there are additional
sequences, as each of the two sub-expressions (A =∧B) and (A =∧C) does not make
any statements about the occurrence of the missing third event.
Simplification if Terms are Disjunct
The relationship in (4.79) also holds for the special case of disjoint events B and C, i.e. B ⊥ C.
But B ⊥ C implies that each of the events B or C occurs only if the other event does not occur
and has not yet occurred. Then, (4.79) may be simplified to
A
=∧ (B ∨C) = [A =∧B]∨ [A =∧C] . (4.80)
if B ⊥ C.
4.2.11 Temporal Laws of Absorption
In analogy to the Boolean laws of absorption in (4.34), there are temporal laws of absorption,
as well. Initially, it may seem that there are several temporal laws of absorption for different
numbers of events involved; this intuition come mainly from the permutations that need to be
taken into account when analysing event sequences. On the other hand, it can be shown that
the temporal laws of absorption really are specializations of the Boolean laws of absorption in
(4.34):
Starting with the most simple case with only two events involved, the temporal laws of
absorption may be derived from (4.34) by using the law of completion in (4.37); this yields
A∨ (A∧B) = A = A∨ [(A ∧B)∨ (A =∧B)∨ (B ∧A)] , (4.81)
which may then be further transformed into
A∨ (A ∧B) = A , (4.82)
A∨ (B ∧A) = A , (4.83)
A∨ (A =∧B) = A . (4.84)
The more “general” event A absorbs the more “concrete” event, if the latter is a subset of A; this
is the same for Boolean and temporal logic. In general, if ES is an (extended) event sequence,
then
A∨ES = A , if A A ES , i.e. ES ⊆ A . (4.85)
This relation also holds for non-atomic events A. Other than in the Boolean logic, with more
complex temporal expressions it is increasingly difficult to spot subsets. There are two major
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reasons for that: the PAND operator has no law of commutativity; and the invention of core
events allows for nested events.
For instance, temporal law of absorption for three events are given as
(A
∧B)∨ (A ∧B ∧C) = A ∧B , (4.86)
(A
∧B)∨ (A ∧C ∧B) = A ∧B , (4.87)
(A
∧B)∨ (C ∧A ∧B) = A ∧B , (4.88)
(A
∧B)∨ ((A =∧C) ∧B) = A ∧B, (4.89)
(A
∧B)∨ ((A ∧B) =∧C) = (A ∧B)∨ (A ∧ (B =∧C)) = A ∧B . (4.90)
Indeed, (4.86) to (4.90) are simple reformulations of
(A
∧B)∨ ((A ∧B)∧C) = (A ∧B) , (4.91)
as demonstrated by the following transformation:
(A
∧B)∧C = [(A ∧B) ∧C]∨ [(A ∧B) =∧C]∨ [C ∧ (A ∧B)] = (4.92)
=
[
A
∧B ∧C]∨ [A ∧ (B =∧C)]∨ [A ∧C ∧B]∨ [C ∧A ∧B]∨ [(A =∧C) ∧B] .
Taking this concept one step further, the general temporal laws of absorption may then be given
in complete analogy to its Boolean counterpart as
ES i ∨ES j = ESi for ES j ⊆ ES i . (4.93)
The same holds true for the second Boolean law of absorption from (4.34); its temporal version
reads as
A
∧ (A∨B) = [¬B ∧ (A ∧A)]∨ [¬A∧ (A ∧B)]∨ [A ∧ (A =∧B)] = False , (4.94)
(A∨B) ∧A = (A ∧A)∨ (B ∧A) = B ∧A , (4.95)
A
=∧ (A∨B) = [¬B ∧ (A =∧A)]∨ [¬A∧ (A =∧B)]∨ [A =∧ (A =∧B)] =
= (¬B ∧A)∨ (A =∧B) . (4.96)
Allthough initially not very intuitive, these results are correct, as demonstrated by the following
transformation: On the one hand,[
A
∧ (A∨B)]∨ [(A∨B) ∧A]∨ [A =∧ (A∨B)] = A∧ (A∨B) = A .
And on the other hand, (4.94) to (4.96) yield[
A
∧ (A∨B)]∨ [(A∨B) ∧A]∨ [A =∧ (A∨B)] = (B ∧A)∨ (¬B ∧A)∨ (A =∧B) .
Furthermore, ¬B ∧A covers the non-minimal sequence A ∧B, thus providing[
A
∧ (A∨B)]∨ [(A∨B) ∧A]∨ [A =∧ (A∨B)] = (B ∧A)∨ (¬B ∧A)∨ (A =∧B) =
= (¬B ∧A)∨ (A ∧B)∨ (A =∧B)∨ (B ∧A) = (¬B ∧A)∨ (A∧B) = A .
These transformations illustrate that (4.94) to (4.96) really are only specializations of the
Boolean laws of absorption.
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4.2.12 Temporal Law for Intersections
The introduction of PAND and SAND operators into the temporal TFTA logic leads to expres-
sions like A∧ (A ∧B), B ∧ (A ∧B), or A∧ (A =∧B). Such expressions are not easily covered by
the temporal laws of absorption, as in their case, and other than in case of the laws of absorp-
tion, see above, the more “general” expression does not absorb the more “concrete” expression.
Therefore, a new temporal law for intersections is proposed.
The temporal law for intersections describes conjunctions of two expression, one of which is
an intersection of the other. In the Boolean case, this can be solved by applying the laws of
associativity and idempotency:
A∧ (A∧B) = A∧A∧B = A∧B . (4.97)
In the temporal case, three different settings have to be considered:
A∧ (A ∧B) = (A ∧B)∧A = A ∧B , (4.98)
B ∧ (A ∧B) = (A ∧B)∧B = A ∧B , (4.99)
A∧ (A =∧B) = (A =∧B)∧A = (B =∧A)∧A = A∧ (B =∧A) = A =∧B . (4.100)
Correctness may be easily demonstrated using the temporal logic laws provided above. For
instance,
A∧ (A ∧B) = [A ∧ (A ∧B)]∨ [A =∧ (A ∧B)]∨ [(A ∧B) ∧A] =
= (A∧A) ∧B ∨False ∨False = A ∧B .
The same holds true for more general cases with more complex expressions, as in
Xi ∧ . . .∧Xj ∧ (. . . ∧Xi ∧ . . .) = Xj ∧ (. . . ∧Xi ∧ . . .) and (4.101)
Xi ∧ . . .∧Xj ∧ (. . . =∧Xi =∧ . . .) = Xj ∧ (. . . =∧Xi =∧ . . .) , (4.102)
as well as for expressions that include intersections with non-atomic core events, i.e.
Xi ∧ . . .∧Xj ∧ (. . . ∧ (Xi =∧ . . .) ∧ . . .) = (. . . ∧Xj ∧ (Xi =∧ . . .) ∧ . . .) . (4.103)
In general, the temporal law for intersections is therefore given as:
ES i ∧ES j = ESj for ES j ⊆ ES i . (4.104)
4.3 Minimal and Disjoint Forms of TFTA Temporal Expressions
4.3.1 Minimal and Disjoint Forms of Boolean Expressions
This chapter discusses two properties that TFTA temporal expressions may have. Temporal
expressions which are minimal or mutually exclusive (disjoint) have special meaning and impor-
tance within the TFTA’s temporal logic; in this they are similar to the Boolean FTA. In both
cases, the Boolean as well as the temporal, any logic expression can be transformed into “sum
of product” forms, i.e. DNF or TDNF, respecively, by using the laws of transformation given in
chapter 4.2.
In general, these cutsets (Boolean case) or event sequences (temporal logic) still include
redundant information. Therefore, further transformation into a minimal sum of products form,
i.e. minimal cutsets and MCSS, respectively, is necessary and provides an even more useful
representation of the (temporal) failure function.
For further probabilistic calculation it is then helpful to transform this minimal form into a
minterm form, where all minterms are mutually exclusive (disjoint), see chapter 4.3.3.
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Disjunctive Normal Form (Sum of Products)
Boolean expressions ϕ are transformed into a DNF by applying the laws of Boolean algebra; in
DNF
ϕ =
ζ∨
j= 1
Sj =
ζ∨
j= 1
( nj∧
i= 1
Xj,i
)
, (4.105)
where ζ denotes the number of cutsets S of ϕ, which are not necessarily already minimal, and
nj denotes the number of events X which constitute Sj .
Minimal DNF
In a next step, the cutsets S of Boolean expressions ϕ are minimal, if none of the cutsets
“includes” another. If so, they are called minimal cutsets and are denoted with MS for better
discrimination. Using the laws of Boolean algebra from chapter 4.2.1, (monotone) Boolean
expressions as in (4.105) can be transformed into a minimal form, where
ϕ =
ξ∨
j= 1
MS j =
ξ∨
j= 1
( nj∧
i= 1
Xj,i
)
, (4.106)
where ξ ≤ ζ.
Each of these ξ minimal cutsets MS j and MS j′ with j, j′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ξ} and j′ 6= j are
pairwise mutually exclusive:
MS j ∧MS j′ 6= MS j und MS j ∧MS j′ 6= MS j′ . (4.107)
Simplifying Quantification By Using Disjoint Terms
In many cases it is helpful to transform logic functions into a equivalent form which is specifically
well suited for a certain task. For conventional fault trees the minimal cutset form of a system’s
failure function according to (4.106) is, for example, especially illustrative and well suited for
qualitative analyses; on the other hand, the form below is equivalent but much less easy to
understand:
ϕ =
ξ∨
j= 1
(
MS j ·
j−1∧
i= 1
¬ (MS i)
)
. (4.108)
This form aids probabilistic analyses because of its mutually exclusive (disjoint) OR connected
terms; see chapter 5 for details.
In general, two Boolean expressions ϕ1 and ϕ2 are mutually exclusive (disjoint), if their
conjunction yields False:
ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 = False ⇐⇒ ϕ1 ⊥ ϕ2 . (4.109)
4.3.2 Minimal Temporal Expressions
Minimalism of temporal logic expressions parallels the Boolean case. Temporal logic expres-
sions are minimal, if they “do not include each other”. In the temporal logic special care is
necessary, though, because of three differences compared to the Boolean case: first, their are
other and additional logic operators; second, negated events have special meaning; third, prop-
erties of commutativity and associativity are restricted. Moreover, temporal expressions can be
structurally non-minimal as well as temporally non-minimal, see chapters 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2,
respectively. First some groundwork has to be laid, though.
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Minimal Temporal Failure Function
Using the temporal transformation laws from above, temporal expressions $ may be trans-
formed into a TDNF, which is similar to the Boolean DNF. For readability, (4.16) is repeated
here:
$ =
ζ∨
j=1
ES j = ES 1 ∨ ES 2 ∨ . . . ∨ ES ζ . (4.110)
ζ denotes the number of event sequences ES in $, which need not to be minimal at this stage.
Then, the corresponding minimal form consists of ξ minimal cutset sequences (MCSS), which
are OR connected:
$ =
ξ∨
j=1
MCSS j = MCSS 1 ∨MCSS 2 ∨ . . . ∨MCSS ξ , withξ ≤ ζ . (4.111)
Condition of Minimality
In the temporal logic “minimal” also means, that none of the MCSS j “covers” or “includes” any
other MCSS j′ (where j, j′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ξ} and j′ 6= j).
The sections below show that the criterion for temporal expressions being minimal is very
similar to the Boolean criterion in (4.107).
Event sequences are minimal, if all pairs of MCSS j and MCSS j′ with j, j′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ξ} and
j′ 6= j follow
MCSS j′ * MCSS j ⇐⇒ MCSS j ∧MCSS j′ 6= MCSS j′ and (4.112)
MCSS j * MCSS j′ ⇐⇒ MCSS j ∧MCSS j′ 6= MCSS j . (4.113)
For this relation a new operator is introduced:
MCSS j
⊇⊂upslopeMCSS j′ (4.114)
implies that MCSS j and MCSS j′ are minimal.
One difference to the Boolean case is that writing temporal expressions in their TDNF form
usually requires the use of negated events; this comes from the temporal distributive laws, see
chapter 4.2.10, and requires a discussion on minimal temporal expressions with negated events.
4.3.2.1 Structurally Non-Minimal Temporal Expressions
Temporal expressions are structurally non-minimal, if one of them is a special case of the other
expression. Structurally non-minimal expressions may be transformed into a minimal form by
applying the temporal laws of absorption (chapter 4.2.11) and the temporal law for intersections
(chapter 4.2.12).
4.3.2.2 Temporally Non-Minimal Temporal Expressions
Beyond the structural aspect of non-minimality there is the question of minimality in temporal
expressions like
(¬B ∧A)∨ (A ∧B) . (4.115)
Checking for minimality according to (4.113) shows that these two terms are not minimal.
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From
(¬B ∧A)∧ (A ∧B) (4.116)
follows with (4.53), that
(¬B ∧A)∧ (A ∧B) =
=
[¬B ∧ (A∧ (A ∧B))]∨ [(A ∧B) ∧ (A ∧B)]∨ [A ∧ (B =∧ (A ∧B))] . (4.117)
The first sub-expression on the right side is then reduced by applying (4.51), which yields
¬B ∧ (A∧ (A ∧B)) = ¬B ∧ (A ∧B) = False . (4.118)
The second sub-expression is then also reduced to False by applying the temporal law of con-
tradiction, see (4.38). Then, the remaining
(¬B ∧A)∧ (A ∧B) = A ∧ (B =∧ (A ∧B)) = A ∧ (A ∧B) = A ∧B (4.119)
¬B ∧A︸ ︷︷ ︸ ∧ A ∧B︸ ︷︷ ︸ = A ∧B︸ ︷︷ ︸
does not satisfy the minimality condition from (4.113). Therefore, (4.115) is not minimal, which
is also shown by the sequential failure trees, as the sub-expression A ∧B consists only of such
expressions that are non-minimal with regard to ¬B ∧A. Thus, the minimal form ist given as
¬B ∧A, which “covers” the second term A ∧B.
Generalization
The example from above may be generalized with the laws of transformation for negated events
from chapter 4.2.8.3. From (4.59) follows ¬X ∧ES with X 6A ES is temporally minimal to all
temporal expressions with ES occuring before X, i.e. ES ∧X.
As (¬X ∧ES )∨ (ES ∧X) with X 6A ES is non-minimal because of the temporal sequence of
the events, this effect is called temporal non-minimality.
Two More Examples
(¬B ∧A)∨ (C ∧A) is already given in minimal form, as (4.53) and (4.113) hold:
¬B ∧A︸ ︷︷ ︸ ∧ C ∧A︸ ︷︷ ︸ = ¬B ∧ (C ∧A)︸ ︷︷ ︸ . (4.120)
The sequential failure trees prove that each of the expressions includes failure nodes, which are
unique to this expression and not part of the other.
However, ¬B ∧A is the minimal form of all such event sequences that include A but not
B
∧A, i.e. (without SAND) ¬B ∧ (A ∧C), ¬C ∧ (A ∧B), A ∧B ∧C, A ∧C ∧B, and C ∧A ∧B.
Exemplarily, this is shown with one of these expressions:
(¬B ∧A)∧ (A ∧C ∧B) = [¬B(∧A∧ (A ∧C ∧B))]∨
∨ [A ∧B ∧ ((A ∧C ∧B) ∧A)]∨
∨ [A ∧ (B =∧ (A ∧C ∧B))] =
= False ∨False ∨A ∧ (A ∧C ∧B) = A ∧C ∧B .
(4.121)
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As the sequential failure trees show, (4.113) is not complied with; and (¬B ∧A)∨ (A ∧C ∧B)
is, thus, non-minimal.
4.3.3 Disjoint Temporal Expressions
Minimal temporal expressions are not necessarily also mutually exclusive (disjoint). For ex-
ample, the failure function $ = (¬B ∧A)∨ (C ∧A) is given in minimal form. But the two
event sequences ¬B ∧A and C ∧A are not mutually exclusive; instead, ¬B ∧ (C ∧A) is an
intersection, see (4.120).
The sections below discuss mutually exclusive temporal expressions and a method for trans-
forming them into mutually exclusive temporal expressions.
4.3.3.1 Condition for Disjointness
In analogy to chapter 4.3.1, two temporal expressions are mutually exclusive (disjoint), if their
conjunction (AND connection) yields False, i.e. if there is no intersection between them. When
illustrated by sequential failure trees, disjoint temporal expressions do not have any failure nodes
in common. In the following example, a temporal expression has three disjoint sub-expressions:
(A
∧B ∧C)︸ ︷︷ ︸ ∨ (B ∧A ∧C)︸ ︷︷ ︸ ∨ (C ∧A)︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
Thereby,
(A
∧B ∧C)∧ (B ∧A ∧C) = False ,
(A
∧B ∧C)∧ (C ∧A) = False ,
(B
∧A ∧C)∧ (C ∧A) = False .
On the other hand, there are intersections in the following example:
(A
∧B)︸ ︷︷ ︸ ∧ (A ∧C)︸ ︷︷ ︸ = . . .︸︷︷︸ 6= False ,
as
(A
∧B)∧ (A ∧C) = [(A ∧B) ∧ (A ∧C)]∨ [(A ∧B) =∧ (A ∧C)]∨ [(A ∧C) ∧ (A ∧B)] =
=
[
A
∧B ∧C]∨ [A ∧ (B =∧C)]∨ [A ∧C ∧B] .
4.3.3.2 Structurally and Temporally Disjoint Temporal Expressions
In the TFTA’s temporal logic there are two types of disjointness:
1. An event can not be True and False at the same time. Therefore and in analogy to the
Boolean logic, two expressions are disjoint, if one of them includes a non-negated event and
the other expression includes the negation of the same event. For instance, ¬A∧B and
A
∧B are mutually exclusive (disjoint). In general, this type of disjointness is expressed
in (4.51) and (4.52).
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2. Other than Boolean expressions, temporal expressions can be mutually exclusive because
of the possibility of temporal contradictions. Following from the temporal laws of comple-
tion and the temporal law of contradiction (see chapter 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, respectively), two
temporal expressions are disjoint, if the same events are included in both, but in different
sequences. Therefore, B ∧A und A ∧B are, e.g., disjoint without any negated events.
In both cases the lack of any intersections indicates that the expressions are mutually exclusive.
Therefore, the condition for disjointness from chapter 4.3.3.1 is applicable for temporal as well
as Boolean expressions, see (4.109). And in consequence, temporal and Boolean expressions do
not differ significantly regarding being mutually exclusive.
4.3.3.3 Disjoint Separation Using Temporal Minterms
Temporal minterms are event sequences, which consists of all u parameters of a temporal logic
function of size u, and each parameter is included exactly once.
Temporal minterms are used in order to split a temporal expression into disjoint event se-
quences. In this form they are especially well suited for later probabilistic quantification. See
chapter 4.3.1 for further background.
These expressions may be deduced using a method which is similar to Shannon’s segmentation
for Boolean expressions:
1. The relevant temporal function $ with u different parameters has to be given as TDNF.
If not, $ is transformed into a TDNF using the temporal logic laws from above.
2. The first event sequence is chosen: ES = ES 1.
3. If ES consists of all u parameters, goto step seven.
4. Choose the first parameter X which is missing in ES .
5. ES is then transformed into its disjoint form by using
ES =⇒ ES ∧ (¬X ∨X) = (¬X ∧ES )∨ (X ∧ES ) (4.122)
6. Repeat step five for each of the other parameters that are missing in ES .
7. If the chosen ES is not the last event sequence in $, choose the next event sequence ES
and goto step three.
8. Check whether the resulting expressions are minimal by applying the transformation laws
of the temporal logic and specifically the temporal laws of absorption.
This method and workflow are shown on two examples in appendix A.3, see page 120.
4.4 Simplification Using Extended Event Sequences and
Extended TDNF and Extended MCSS
Chapter 4.1.5.1 discussed “normal” temporal expressions and the temporal logic, which allows
to transform temporal expressions $ into their – possibly minimal and mutually exclusive
(disjoint) – TDNF. The TDNF describes all the event sequences that lead to the occurrence of
the TOP event; it is well suited for further qualitative cutset analyses, and it provides the basis
for probabilistic quantification of the failure function.
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4.4.1 Motivation and Requirements
Allthough both of the TFTA’s goals from chapter 3.2 are met with these “normal” temporal
expressions, their practical useability is limited because of the high number of resulting event
sequences. For instance, the relatively simple temporal expressionA ∧ (B ∧C) ∧ (D∧E) already
provides 32 different temporal minterms (chapter 5.5.2) – and that is without even taking SANDs
into account. This combinatorial blow-up of the number of event sequences mainly stems from
applying the temporal law of completion (see chapter 4.2.2).
On the one hand, transformations according to the temporal logic are necessary for trans-
forming complex expressions into manageable ones. On the other hand, clarity and readability
of the results depend very much on the (low) number of such sub-expressions.
It is, therefore, sensible to simplify a complex temporal expression only so far, as to obtain
useable, and especially minimal, sub-expressions, while at the same time keep the number of
such sub-expressions as small as possible.
Thus, there are certain requirements on such a simplified temporal form:
1. The simplified form shall also allow qualitative as well as probabilistic analyses.
2. The simplified form shall also be able to provide temporal expressions in a normal form.
3. Each of the event sequences of this normal form shall be minimal.
4. Each of the event sequences of this normal form shall be directly quantifiable.
5. For probabilistic quantification, the event sequences shall be mutually exclusive.
The extended TDNF, as introduced in chapter 4.1.5.2, is one possibility to meet this require-
ments.
In extended TDNF temporal expressions consist of normal (atomic and non-atomic) core
events as well as extended core events, such as
eK = X1 ∧X2 ∧ . . . . (4.123)
Event sequences with extended core events are called extended event sequences, see the grammar
of temporal logics in chapter 4.1.5.
Using this form is useful, if all sequences of specific events contribute equally to the TOP
event. The extended form combines these “real” events and reduces modelling effort, and allows
concise presentation of temporal expressions.
Without the extended form, temporal expressions are transformed in order to generate their
TDNF consisting of event sequences only, which themselves consist of core events. Each core
event stands for events which occur at a specific, though relative, point in time. An expression
A
∧ (B =∧C), for example, indicates, that an atomic core event A occurred before later both
events B and C happened simultaneously. The event sequences indicates clearly, which event
occurs when.
Now, with the extended form, temporal expressions are transformed in order to generate their
extended TDNF. The latter includes both, normal event sequences, consisting of normal core
events, and extended event sequences, consisting of normal and extended core events.
Extended core events indicate, that at a given point in time certain events have happend. An
expression A ∧ (B ∧C), for example, indicates, that an atomic event core event A has occurred
before later events B and C have occurred. No statement is made on the real times at which
the events B and C occurred that form the extended core event. The extended form neither
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defines nor restricts the sequence between B and C; it solely describes a “latest possible” time
for occurrence.
Extended event sequences may contain more than one extended event sequence, as e.g. in
(A∧B) ∧ (C ∧D). If events are included within the same extended event sequence more than
once, then they need further transformation/simplification.
On the other hand, it disagrees with the extended TDNF to combine several (extended) event
sequences with an AND. Instead, further transformation/simplification is necessary first. For
example, only the simplification of (A ∧B)∧C according to the laws of temporal logic provides
a correct extended TDNF:
(A
∧B)∧C = [(A∧C) ∧B]∨ [A ∧ (B =∧C)]∨ [A ∧B ∧C] . (4.124)
4.4.2 Using Extended Temporal Expressions
The decision for using the extended form is taken during qualitative transformation of the
temporal failure function:
• The Boolean distributive law gets priority over the temporal law of completion.
• AND connections are not broken up, if the AND connected events
– are event sequences without negated events and
– are pairwise coprime as well as coprime to the rest of the (extended) event sequence
which is currently looked at.
In general, the temporal logic rules from chapter 4.2 and 4.3 apply to extended core events
and extended event sequences, too. Extended core events are handled as entities, i.e. they are
handled in analogy to normal non-atomic core events like X1
=∧X2 =∧ . . ..
There are additional transformation laws specifically for the extended form. These laws are
discussed in the following sections.
Laws of Contradiction for Extended Event Sequences
The law of contradiction for normal temporal expressions (chapter 4.2.3) does not directly
apply to extended event sequences. An example: the expression (A∧B) ∧ (B ∧C) consists of
two extended core events, which both include the same basic event B. This does not yield False,
though. Instead, it may be further transformed using (4.48), which yields
(A∧B) ∧ (B ∧C) = (A∧B ∧B) ∧C = (A∧B) ∧C . (4.125)
On the other hand, extended event sequences may, of course, result in contradictions. The
following three cases differ from each other, and together they form the law of contradiction for
extended event sequences:
First and in analogy to (4.39), for extended event sequences with normal and extended core
events eK there is
eK1
∧ eK2 ∧ . . . ∧ eKn = False , (4.126)
if ∃ eKi = eKj for i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and i 6= j. This may be shown by transforamtion of the
extended form using (4.37) and (4.77). For example,
(A∧B) ∧ (A∧B) = (A∧B) ∧ [(A ∧B)∨ (B ∧A)∨ (A =∧B)] =
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=
[
(A∧B ∧A) ∧B]∨ [(A∧B ∧B) ∧A]∨ [(A∧B) ∧ (A =∧B)] =
= False . (4.127)
Second, an extended event sequences yields False because of a contradiction if it has an
extended core event eK together with a normal core event K, which must occur later in the
event sequence, and if there is at least one event X which apperas in K as well as in eK :
eK1
∧ eK2 ∧ . . . ∧Kj ∧ . . . = False , (4.128)
if ∃ (X A eKi)∧ (X A Kj) for i < j. K may be an atomic or non-atomic core event. For
example, expression (A∧B) ∧B yields a contradiction, as it requires that A as well as B have
occurred before B occurs. The expression (A∧B) ∧ (A =∧C) also yields a contradiction, as it
requires that A as well as B have occurred before A and C occur simultaneously. In both cases,
though, there is no contradiction, if the normal core event occurs before the extended core event:
For instance, A ∧ (A∧B) = A ∧B and (A =∧C) ∧ (A∧B) = (A =∧C) ∧B.
Third, an extended event sequences yields False because of a contradiction if it contains more
than one normal core event, and the normal law of contradiction from (4.42) applies to these
core events.
Using Negated Events in Extended Event Sequences and Extended Core Events
Handling of negated events is also quite similar to the discussions from chapter 4.2.8. But there
are certain additions for extended event sequences and extended core events.
Negation of extended event sequences is the same as in (4.65), but extended core events are
treated as entities.
Extended core events are negated by using de Morgan’s theoremes:
¬ eK = ¬(X1 ∧X2 ∧ . . .) = ¬X1 ∨¬X2 ∨ . . . . (4.129)
Negated extended core events are negated events, and as such are included into (extended) event
sequences with negated events; see chapter 4.2.8 for details. Additionally to (4.51) and (4.52),
¬A∧ (. . . ∧ (A∧ . . .) ∧ . . .) = False . (4.130)
Temporal Laws for Intersections of Extended Event Sequences and Extended Core Events
There is a special law for intersections of extended event sequences and extended core events,
which provides
A
∧ (A∧B ∧ . . .) = A ∧B ∧ . . . . (4.131)
Its correctness is easily demonstrated by breaking up the extended core event.
4.5 Summary
The TFTA’s temporal logic described in this chapter extends the conventional Boolean FTA
for non-repairable components/failures; it allows to model and analyze event sequences.
The TFTA is an extension to Boolean algebra and logic and does not rely on state-based mod-
elling techniques. Apart from Boolean operators for the conventional conjunction, disjunction,
and negation, the TFTA has two additional operators PAND and SAND; these are “specialized
conjunctions” which differentiate between event sequences and simultaneous events.
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Using conventional Boolean logic transformations and aditional laws of transformation for
temporal expressions, it is possible to transform complex temporal expressions into a temporal
disjunctive normal form (TDNF). The TDNF consists of separated event sequences. The latter
may be reduced into their minimal form, so called MCSS. The TFTA thus allows efficient and
meaningful qualitative analyses, just as the conventional FTA does.
As an extension to the Boolean algebra, the TFTA’s temporal logic is universally applicable
and not at all restriced to certain failure rate distributions.
In another step MCSS may be transformed into mutually exclusive expressions. The latter are
especially well suited for direct probabilistic quantification and thus allow probabilistic analyses
of temporal expressions, see the next chapter 5.
The TFTA follows the conventional FTA in notation, expressions, workflow-steps, and work
products. When compared to state based dynamic methods, the TFTA, therefore, has similar
positive characteristics: its logic expressions and results are similarly intuitive in use, similarly
readable and comprehensible, and it has good scalability.
Simplification of temporal expressions into a minimal form (and if necessary: mutually ex-
clusive, disjoint form, too) requires heavy effort, which is an additional cost when compared to
Boolean FTA. This, on the other hand is no problem specific to the TFTA, and instead is, in
principle, the same for all dynamic models.
The TFTA allows for an efficient reduction of effort, though, by means of an “extended logic
form”. If several sequences may be combined into a normal, i.e. Boolean, conjunction, then the
extended form does not explicitely break them down. This alone highly improves the calculatory
effort, which otherwise grows exponentially.
5 Probabilistic Quantification of the TFTA
Method
Probable impossibilities are to be
preferred to improbable possibilities.
(Aristoteles)
The quantification of the TFTA method extends the qualitative analysis. Allocation of failure
rates and probabilities to basic events allows the calculation of the TOP event’s failure param-
eters. These are then used in order to assess system charateristics like its safety integrity or
expected reliability.
On the one hand, additional effort is necessary for the probabilistic quantification of the
TOP event’s parameters with consideration of event sequences. On the other hand, the TFTA’s
quantification yields smaller values than the conventional Boolean FTA.
This chapter is structured in four sections:
• Chapter 5.1 starts with the basics of probabilistic quantification of the Boolean FTA.
• Chapter 5.2 describes the concept behind the quantification of the TFTA, which is based
on failure densities.
• Chapter 5.3 discusses direct quantification of the PAND and SAND operations.
• Using these, chapter 5.4 then describes the quantification of entire temporal failure func-
tions, i.e. the calculation of the TOP event’s failure probability, failure density, and failure
rate.
• As these caluclations require exponentially increasing calculatory effort, chapter 5.5 in-
troduces a simplification which provides approximated failure characteristics for temporal
expressions.
Note: In chapter 4 the qualitative TFTA was discussed for non-repairable components and their
failures, only. This restriction also applies to the concept of quantification including chapter
5.3.1. Chapter 5.3.2 then focusses on the special case where failure parameters are distributed
exponentially.
5.1 Quantification of the Boolean FTA
In the Boolean as well as the temporal FTA the probabilistic analysis of the TOP event is based
on the system’s TOP failure function as provided by a preceding qualitative analysis. Usually,
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this logic expression is then transformed (using the transformation laws of Boolean or temporal
logic) into a form, which is well suited for the task at hand (in this case: quantification).
For example, the minimal cutset form of the Boolean failure function of the system described
in (4.106) is given as
ϕ =
ξ∨
j= 1
MS j =
ξ∨
j= 1
( nj∧
i= 1
Xj,i
)
.
This form is very clear and well suited for qualitative analysis. On the other hand, there is an
equivalent but less clear form of the same failure function, as given in (4.108):
ϕ =
ξ∨
j= 1
(
MS j ·
j−1∧
i= 1
¬ (MS i)
)
.
Here, the minimal cutsets are mutually exclusive (disjoint), which is less easily readable but
simplifies probabilistic analyses.
The quantification of minimal cutsets of the conventional FTA, with Boolean AND and OR
and NOT, is well known; it is mentioned here only for completeness.
Assuming n mutually independent events, there are
FAND(t) =
n∏
i= 1
Fi(t) , (5.1)
FOR(t) = 1−
n∏
i= 1
(1− Fi(t)) , (5.2)
fAND(t) =
d
dt
FAND(t) =
n∑
i= 1
fi(t) · n∏
j= 1;j 6=i
Fj(t)
 , (5.3)
fOR(t) =
d
dt
FOR(t) =
n∑
i= 1
fi(t) · n∏
j= 1;j 6=i
(1− Fj(t))
 . (5.4)
Failure functions of fault trees are usually complex expressions with non-independent events and
sub-expressions. It is, thus, convenient to reduce such failure functions into their minimal cutset
form before quantification, as well as to further transform the minimal cutsets into a mutually
exclusive (disjoint) form. This is, for example, described in [80, 81] (and for non-monotonous
functions in [82, 83]). Disjoint events simplify quantification; instead of the generic (5.2) and
(5.4), the much more simple
FOR(t) =
n∑
i= 1
Fi(t) , (5.5)
fOR(t) =
n∑
i= 1
fi(t) (5.6)
may be used.
In monotonous fault trees with non-repairable failure events, negated events are used exclu-
sively as conditional events; and as such, there is no failure density of negated events. This is
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also true in case of TFTA, as shown by the discussions in chapter 4.2.8: negated events occur
only prior to other (non-negated) events.
The probability of occurrence of a negated event ¬Xi is then given by
F¬Xi(t) = 1− FXi(t) = RXi(t) . (5.7)
5.2 Quantification of the TFTA: Temporal Concept and Failure
Frequencies
Other than the Boolean FTA, the temporal logic of the TFTA permits restrictions on the
sequence of event occurrence in conjunctions. Any quantification of the TFTA, therefore, must
also take only specific event sequences into account. This chapter explains in general, how this
may be accomplished. Chapter 5.3 then uses these basics and derives specific rules for the
quantification of the temporal operators PAND and SAND, respectively.
In general, failure probabilities, failure densities, and failure rates are given as [14]
fX(t) =
d
dt
FX(t) and (5.8)
fX(t) = λX(t) · (1− FX(t)) = λX(t) ·RX(t) . (5.9)
In case of constant failure rates the failure probabilities and failure densities are then given as
FX(t) = 1− e−λX t and fX(t) = λX · e−λX t . (5.10)
5.2.1 Sequences with Two Events
In a concunction with independent inputs (basic events) A and B there is
FA∧B(t) = FA(t) ·FB(t) . (5.11)
This is the probability, that at time t both fault tree events A and B are True. This is also the
probability, that the failures represented by A and B have both occurred at some time during
interval ]0; t]. It is not possible, though, to make specific statements on either the sequence of
these failures, nor on the absolute point in time at which the failures occurred.
Other than the failure probability F (t), the failure density f(t) does consider event sequences,
as
fA∧B(t) =
d
dt
FA∧B(t) = fB(t)FA(t) + fA(t)FB(t) (5.12)
and thus, using (5.9),
fA∧B(t) = FA(t)RB(t)λB(t) + FB(t)RA(t)λA(t) . (5.13)
Equation (5.13) may be interpreted as the probability per time, that [84]
• either: A has occurred at some time in interval ]0; t], i.e. FA(t), and B has not occurred in
interval ]0; t], i.e. RB(t), and B will occur in the (infinitesimally) short period ]t; t + ∆t]
after t, i.e. λB(t);
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• or: B has occurred at some time in interval ]0; t], i.e. FB(t), and A has not occurred in
interval ]0; t], i.e. RA(t), and A will occur in the (infinitesimally) short period ]t; t + ∆t]
after t, i.e. λA(t).
These two possibilites represent the two sequences “A first, and then B” and “B first, and then
A”, which are mutually exclusive. Therefore, their probabilities may simply be added.
This makes it possible to quantify specific event sequences. If, for example, only the event
sequence “A first, and then B” is relevant, then
f“A first, and then B”(t) = FA(t) ·
d
dt
FB(t) = fB(t)FA(t) = λB(t)RB(t)FA(t) . (5.14)
The corresponding failure probability is given by integration over the density:
F“A first, and then B”(t) =
t∫
0
f“A first, and then B”(τ) ·dτ =
t∫
0
fB(τ)FA(τ) ·dτ . (5.15)
5.2.2 Sequences with More Than Two Events
In case of more than two events, the sequence(s) of those events must also be considered that
are not the “last occurring” events. For an AND gate with three inputs A, B, and C, where
event sequence “A first, and then B, and then C” is relevant, it is thus not sufficient to simply
take the derivative of FA∧B ∧C(t), as
fA∧B ∧C(t) = fA(t)FB(t)FC(t) + fB(t)FA(t)FC(t) + fC(t)FA(t)FB(t) . (5.16)
None of the expressions on the right side of (5.16) represents the relevant event sequence “A
first, and then B, and then C”. E.g., fC(t)FA(t)FB(t) is the density contribution of “A and B
first, and then C”; it thus represents both event sequences “A first, and then B, and then C”
and “B first, and then A, and then C”.
On the other hand, it is possible to correctly take the “not-last-occurring” events (here: A
and B) into account. It is necessary to treat “A first, and then B” as an entity by itself, thus
f“A first, and then B, and then C”(t) =
= f“(A first, and then B) first, and then C”(t) = fC(t)F“A first, and then B”(t) .
Using (5.15) the failure density is then given as
f“A first, and then B, and then C”(t) = fC(t)
t∫
0
fB(τ)FA(τ) ·dτ . (5.17)
Finally, the failure probability is obtained by intergation:
F“A first, and then B, and then C”(t) =
t∫
0
fC(τ)
τ∫
0
fB(τ
′)FA(τ ′) ·dτ ′ ·dτ . (5.18)
This method allows quantification of arbitrarily complex sequences with more than two events.
5.3 Quantification of the PAND and SAND Operators 61
5.2.3 What Parameter to Use in Probabilistic Analyses?
Safety standards, as e.g. IEC61508 or ISO26262, require verification that systems meet specific
failure rates λ(t) [85]; evidence to verify that may be provided using probabilistic FTA. If the
failure probability F (t) and failure frequency f(t) are given, then the failure rate is derived from
(5.9).
In most cases it is not necessary to provide the failure rate, though. In the safety domain,
the absolute probabilities of failure events occurring is usually so small that F (t) 1, and thus
with (5.9)
f(t) ≈ λ(t) . (5.19)
In such cases, the failure frequency is a good approximation of the failure rate, and may be
directly used as target value.
5.3 Quantification of the PAND and SAND Operators
Based on the generic method of quantification of event sequences in chapter 5.2, the TFTA’s
temporal operations may now be quantified.
But first it is helpful to grasp the temporal meaning of PAND and SAND operations prob-
abilistically; this is accomplished in chapter 5.3.1. Chapter 5.3.2 compares the TFTA with a
state-based model as reference, and thereby demonstrates the correctness of the TFTA’s quan-
tification.
5.3.1 Quantification Using Logic Functions
The failure probability is defined as the expectancy value for the occurrence of a failure [14],
and thus
Fi(t) = E
[
Xi(t) = True
]
= E
[
Xi(t)
]
. (5.20)
Accordingly, the failure frequency is defined as [59]
fi(t) = lim
∆t→0
1
∆t
E
[
(Xi(t) = False)∧ (Xi(t+ ∆t) = True)
]
=
= lim
∆t→0
1
∆t
E
[¬Xi(t)∧Xi(t+ ∆t)] . (5.21)
By simple transformation an equivalent form is provided, which is specifically helpful for the
further discussion:
fi(t)∆t+ o(∆t) = E
[¬Xi(t)∧Xi(t+ ∆t)] where lim
∆t→0
o(∆t)
∆t
= 0 . (5.22)
PAND Operation
The PAND operator in A ∧B describes the occurrence of B at time t after A has already
occurred. Non-infinitesimally, this implies that
• at time t event A has already occurred, and event B has not yet occurred, and
• at t+ ∆t both, event A as well as event B, have occurred.
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Therefore,
A(t) ∧ ¬B(t) ∧ A(t+ ∆t) ∧ B(t+ ∆t) , (5.23)
from which with (5.22) follows (assuming independent events A and B), that
fA∧B(t)∆t+ o(∆t) = E[A(t)∧¬B(t)∧A(t+ ∆t)∧B(t+ ∆t)] =
= E
[
A(t)∧A(t+ ∆t)] · E[¬B(t)∧B(t+ ∆t)] . (5.24)
The expectancy value E
[¬B(t)∧B(t+∆t)] may be directly replaced by (5.22). The expectancy
value E
[
A(t)∧A(t+∆t)], on the other hand, is not equal to the simple product of the expectancy
values of events A(t) und A(t+ ∆t), as they are not independent from each other. Instead,
E
[
A(t)∧A(t+ ∆t)] = E[A(t+ ∆t) | A(t)] · E[A(t)] = E[A(t)] , (5.25)
as a failure, that has occurred at time t, “is still occurred” at t+ ∆t. Thus,
fA∧B(t)∆t+ o(∆t) = FA(t) · [fB(t)∆t+ o(∆t)] . (5.26)
Division by ∆t, and ∆t→ 0, yields
fA∧B(t) = lim
∆t→0
(
FA(t) ·
[
fB(t) +
o(∆t)
∆t
]
− o(∆t)
∆t
)
, (5.27)
and finally
fA∧B(t) = FA(t) · fB(t) . (5.28)
Obviously, A ∧B from (5.28) is therefore equal to the sequence “A first, and then B” from
(5.14). This allows to state the failure probability function of the PAND operator:
FA∧B(t) =
t∫
0
FA(τ)fB(τ) ·dτ . (5.29)
SAND Operation
The SAND operator in A =∧B describes the exact simultaneous occurrence of A and B at time
t. Non-infinitesimally, this implies that
• at time t neither event A nor event B has already occurred, and
• at t+ ∆t both, event A as well as event B, have occurred.
Therefore,
¬A(t) ∧ ¬B(t) ∧ A(t+ ∆t) ∧ B(t+ ∆t) , (5.30)
from which follows (assuming independent events A and B), that
fA=∧B(t)∆t+ o(∆t) = E
[¬A(t)∧A(t+ ∆t)] · E[¬B(t)∧B(t+ ∆t)] =
=
[
fA(t)∆t+ o(∆t)
]
·
[
fB(t)∆t+ o(∆t)
]
=
= fA(t) ·∆t · fB(t)∆t+ o(∆t) ·
[
. . .
]
.
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Division by ∆t, and ∆t→ 0, yields
fA=∧B(t) = lim
∆t→0
(
fA(t)fB(t)∆t+
o(∆t)
∆t
[
. . .
]− o(∆t)
∆t
)
, (5.31)
and finally
fA=∧B(t) = 0 . (5.32)
This implies that the probability of exact simultaneous occurrence of two independent events
is always 0; every small deviation from simultaneousness is already covered – probabilistically –
by the two PAND sequences of these events. Therefore,
FA=∧B(t) = 0 , (5.33)
λA=∧B(t) = 0 . (5.34)
Allthough the SAND operator may seem unnecessary from this probabilistic point of view, it
is essential for the qualitative transformation of temporal expressions, as well as for qualitative
analyses. Specifically, it provides the temporal law of idempotency in (4.43), which serves as an
important filter for the simplification of temporal expressions.
5.3.2 Quantification Using Comparison with State Diagrams
Note: The statements up to (5.34) apply universally. After that, the further statements discuss
exponentially distributed parameters, only.
Looking back, chapter 5.2 approaches the question of quantification of the PAND operation
from the definitions of the relevant parameters. Chapter 5.3 then demonstrates, that the logical
meaning of PAND and SAND operations yields identical results, respectively.
In this chapter these results are compared to a reference model in order to confirm them
absolutely.
This comparison is split into two parts. First, the Boolean AND and OR operations are
quantified, then the quantification is extended to the temporal PAND and SAND operations
using the law of completion from chapter 4.2.2.
Boolean Operations
Figure 5.1 shows the state diagram of an example system consisting of two non-repairable
components A and B which have constant transition- and failure rates λi,j ; this diagram is the
same as in figure 2.1.
The state probabilities Pi(t) are given by the following system of differential equations:
P˙1(t)
P˙2(t)
P˙3(t)
P˙4(t)
 =

−(λ1,2 + λ1,3 + λ1,4) 0 0 0
λ1,2 −λ2,4 0 0
λ1,3 0 −λ3,4 0
λ1,4 λ2,4 λ3,4 0
 ·

P1(t)
P2(t)
P3(t)
P4(t)
 . (5.35)
Assuming markov conditions are valid, event A and B have constant failure rates, and thus
λA = λ1,2 = λ3,4 und λB = λ1,3 = λ2,4 . (5.36)
Solving the system of differential equations (5.35) provides four state probabilities P1(t) to
P4(t). Looking from a reliability and safety point of view, these probabilities may be interpreted,
depending on how components A and B interact:
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• In case of parallel connection (redundant components) the system fails, if both components,
A and B, fail. The system’s failure function is ϕ = A∧B, and thus state 4 represents
the system failure. As a consequence, Fϕ(t) = P4(t) und Rϕ(t) = 1 − P4(t) = P1(t) +
P2(t) + P3(t).
• In case of series connection the system fails, if either A or B or both, A and B, fail. The
system’s failure function is ϕ = A∨B, and thus states 2 and 3 and 4 represent the system
failure. As a consequence, Fϕ(t) = P2(t) +P3(t) +P4(t) und Rϕ(t) = 1−P4(t) = P1(t).
1
2 3
4
λ1,2 λ1,3
λ2,4 λ3,4
λ
1
,4
failure states:
1: ¬A¬B
2: A¬B
3: B ¬A
4: A∧B
Figure 5.1: State diagram of a system consisting of two non-repairable components A and B
which have constant transition- and failure rates λi,j .
Simplification
As a first step and using chapter 5.3.1, the transition representing the SAND is discarded, i.e.
λ1,4 = 0. This is done assuming structural independence between A and B.
For the example system in (5.35) and with (5.36) this yields
FA∧B(t) = P4(t) = (1− e−λAt)(1− e−λBt) = FA(t)FB(t) (5.37)
and
FA∨B(t) = P2(t) + P3(t) + P4(t) = 1− e−(λA+λB)t = 1−
[
1− FA(t)
][
1− FB(t)
]
. (5.38)
Generalization of these ideas again leads to the rules for quantification of Boolean operators, as
already mentioned in (5.1) to (5.6).
PAND and SAND Operations
Temporal fault trees are quantified using their MCSS the same way as conventional fault trees
are quantified using their minimal cutsets. State-transition diagrams show the correctness of
the laws of completition, and they allow to derive an approach to quantification of temporal
operations.
Figure 5.2 shows the example system from chapter 5.3.2 with its different event sequences.
Other than figure 5.1, state 4 (“A and B failed”) is now divided into three substates. State 4a
describes the system, where A has occurred first, and then B has occurred. State 4b describes
the system, where B has occurred first, and then A has occurred. State 4c describes the system,
where A and B have occurred simultaneously. These state diagrams are really sequential failure
trees, see page 27.
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1
2 3
4a 4b
4c
4
λ1,2 λ1,3
λ
1
,4
c
λ2,4a λ3,4b
failure states:
1: ¬A¬B
2: A¬B
3: B ¬A
4: A∧B
4a: A ∧B
4b: B ∧A
4c: A =∧B
Figure 5.2: Markov model of the example system from figure 5.1 with division of state 4 “A and
B have occurred” into three substates 4a, 4b, and 4c.
These three possibilites are mutually exclusive (disjoint) and they are complete, i.e. there are
no more possible ways for “A and B have occurred”. The probability for “superstate” 4 is then
given as
P4(t) = P4a(t) + P4b(t) + P4c(t) . (5.39)
The corresponding differential equation system of the states’ probabilites may be given as the
following matrix:
P˙1(t)
P˙2(t)
P˙3(t)
P˙4(t)
˙P4a(t)
˙P4b(t)
˙P4c(t)

=

−(λ1,2 + λ1,3 + λ1,4c) 0 0 0 0 0 0
λ1,2 −λ2,4a 0 0 0 0 0
λ1,3 0 −λ3,4b 0 0 0 0
λ1,4c λ2,4a λ3,4b 0 0 0 0
0 λ2,4a 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 λ3,4b 0 0 0 0
λ1,4c 0 0 0 0 0 0


P1(t)
P2(t)
P3(t)
P4(t)
P4a(t)
P4b(t)
P4c(t)

. (5.40)
Figure 5.3 shows the markov modells corresponding to the example system’s A∧B and A∨B.
Assuming markovian conditions yields
λA = λ1,2 = λ3,4b and λB = λ1,3 = λ2,4a . (5.41)
The solution of the set of differential equations in (5.40) for λ1,4c = 0 yields the two equations
known from (5.37) and (5.38):
FA∧B(t) = P4(t) = (1− e−λAt)(1− e−λBt) = FA(t)FB(t) (5.42)
and
FA∨B(t) = P2(t) + P3(t) + P4(t) = 1− e−(λA+λB)t = 1−
[
1− FA(t)
][
1− FB(t)
]
. (5.43)
The law of completeness from chapter 4.2.2 allows representing an AND operation by PAND
and SAND operations. Figure 5.4 shows the relevant state diagrams and failure functions.
Solving the set of differential equations in (5.40) then yields
FA∧B(t) = P4a(t) =
t∫
0
fB(τ)FA(τ) ·dτ , (5.44)
66 5 Probabilistic Quantification of the TFTA Method
1
2 3
4a 4b
4c
4
λ1,2 λ1,3
λ
1
,4
c
λ2,4a λ3,4b
Failure function A∧B :
states 4a, 4b, 4c are relevant →
FA∧B(t) = P4(t)
1
2 3
4a 4b
4c
4
λ1,2 λ1,3
λ
1
,4
c
λ2,4a λ3,4b
Failure function A∨B :
states 2, 3, 4 are relevant →
FA∨B(t) = P2(t)+P3(t)+P4(t)
Figure 5.3: Markov model of the example system corresponding to failure functions A∧B and
A∨B and the set of differential equations in (5.40). System failure states are marked
in bold.
FB ∧A(t) = P4b(t) =
t∫
0
fA(τ)FB(τ) ·dτ , (5.45)
FA=∧B(t) = P4c(t) = 0 . (5.46)
Insertion of (5.44), (5.45), and (5.46) in (5.39) provides
FA∧B(t) = FA∧B(t) + FB ∧A(t) + FA=∧B(t) =
=
t∫
0
(
fB(τ)FA(τ) + fA(τ)FB(τ)
)
·dτ + 0 = FA(t) ·FB(t) .
(5.47)
This demonstrates that the law of completition holds also from a probabilistic point of view,
and shows the correctness of the calculations in chapter 5.3.
The corresponding failure frequencies and failure rates are then given by (5.8) and (5.9),
respectively.
5.4 Quantification of the Temporal Failure Function
Chapter 5.2 shows the basic concept of quantifing event sequences. Applying this concept to
arbitrary temporal expressions in TDNF allows the quantification of temporal fault trees, i.e.
calculation of their events’ – and especially their TOP event’s – failure probabilities and failure
rates.
5.4.1 Quantification of Event Sequences and MCSS
The probabilistic quantification of a fault tree requires, firstly, to determin its MCSS, i.e. all the
critical event combinations (including their sequences) in minimal form. This is done using the
rules for qualitative transformations from chapter 4.2 and 4.3. In a next step, the probabilistic
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1
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4a 4b
4c
4
λ1,2 λ1,3
λ
1
,4
c
λ2,4a λ3,4b
failure function A ∧B :
state 4a is relevant →
FA∧B(t) = P4a(t)
1
2 3
4a 4b
4c
4
λ1,2 λ1,3
λ
1
,4
c
λ2,4a λ3,4b
failure function B ∧A :
state 4b is relevant →
FB ∧A(t) = P4b(t)
1
2 3
4a 4b
4c
4
λ1,2 λ1,3
λ
1
,4
c
λ2,4a λ3,4b
failure function A =∧B :
state 4c is relevant →
FA=∧B(t) = P4c(t)
Figure 5.4: Markov model of the example system corresponding to failure functions A ∧B,
B
∧A, and A =∧B and the set of differential equations in (5.40). System failure
states are marked in bold.
parameters are determined for each of the MCSS; these parameters are then used to calculate
the TOP event’s parameters.
Simplification for Independent Failure Events
In case of independent failure events an essential simplification is possible: According to chapter
5.3 all MCSS may be omitted that include at least one SAND. They are omitted after trans-
forming the temporal expression into its MCSS but before the MCSS are quantified. MCSS
including SANDs are only relevant for the qualitative analysis and provide no probabilistic con-
tribution to the failure rates, failure frequencies, and failure probabilities of the temporal failure
function. Only MCSS without SAND are then quantified. Thus, the quantification is carried
out for MCSS of the following type:
X1
∧X2 ∧ . . . ∧Xn , (5.48)
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possibly also in conjunction with negated events
(¬XI ∧¬XII · · · )∧ (X1 ∧X2 ∧ . . . ∧Xn) . (5.49)
MCSS according to (5.48) may be directly quantified using convolutions of the failure frequencies,
see (5.28) and (5.29), thus
fMCSS (t) = fX1
∧X2 ∧ ...∧Xn(t) = (5.50)
= fXn(t)
t∫
0
fXn−1(τ
{1})
τ{1}∫
0
fXn−2(τ
{2}) · · ·
τ{n−2}∫
0
fX2(τ
{n−1})
τ{n−1}∫
0
fX1(τ
{n}) ·
·dτ{n} ·dτ{n−1} · · · dτ{2} ·dτ{1} .
MCSS with Negated Events
The probabilities of negated events, which are part of MCSS, are multiplied to these results.
Therefore, the MCSS’ quantification according to (5.49) is given as
fMCSS (t) = f(¬XI ∧¬XII ··· )∧ (X1 ∧X2 ∧ ...∧Xn)(t) =
= fX1
∧X2 ∧ ...∧Xn(t) ·RXI (t) ·RXII (t) · · · ,
(5.51)
where fX1 ∧X2 ∧ ...∧Xn(t) comes from (5.50).
Failure Probability and Failure Rate
The failure probabilities and failure rates corresponding to (5.50) and (5.51) are then given by
using the generic equations (5.8) and (5.9).
5.4.2 Quantification of Extended Event Sequences
Extended event sequences and extended MCSS include at least one extended core event. They
are, therefore, a mixture of a Boolean and a temporal logic expression. In their logical statement
extended MCSS combine several real MCSS and thus cover several event sequences, see chapter
4.4.
All extended MCSS may be omitted that include at least one SAND connection; for indepen-
dent events, these do not contribute probabilistically to the event probabilities.
Extended MCSS with One Extended Core Event
Let
X1
∧ . . . ∧Xk−1 ∧Xk ∧Xk+1 ∧ . . . ∧Xn−1 ∧Xn with
Xk = Xk,1 ∧Xk,2 ∧ . . . Xk,r
(5.52)
be an extended MCSS with one extended core event (w = 1) at position k within the PAND
chain, and let the extended core event consist of r basic events that are AND connected.
Using (5.3), the failure frequency for Xk(t) is then given as
fXk(t) =
r∑
i= 1
fk,i(t) · r∏
j= 1;j 6=i
(Fk,j(t))
 . (5.53)
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Event sequences (and thus MCSS, too) must not include the same basic event more than once,
as stated by the laws of contradiction in (4.42) for normal and (4.126) for extended temporal
expressions.
All events in an (extended) MCSS are thus mutually independent; therefore, the failure
frequency of an extended core event may be calculated independently from the rest of the
expression and using (5.53). It is then inserted into the overall failure frequency of the extended
MCSS:
fMCSS (t) = fX1
∧ ...∧Xk−1 ∧Xk ∧Xk+1 ∧ ...∧Xn−1 ∧Xn(t) =
= fXn(t)
t∫
0
fXn−1(τ
{1}) · · ·
τ{n−(k+1)}∫
0
fXk+1(τ
{n−k}) ·
·
τ{n−k}∫
0
fXk(τ
{n−(k−1)})︸ ︷︷ ︸
from (5.53)
τ{n−(k−1)}∫
0
fX(k−1)(τ
{n−(k−2)}) · · ·
τ{n−1}∫
0
fX1(τ
{n}) ·
·dτ{n} ·dτ{n−1)} · · · dτ{n−(k−1)} · · · dτ{n−(k+1))} · · · dτ{1} .
(5.54)
Extended MCSS with Several Extended Core Events
In case of extended MCSS with more than one extended core event, thus w > 1,
1. the fXk(t) are calculated according to (5.53) for each k ∈ {1,2, . . . ,w}, and
2. the resulting w failure frequencies are then inserted into the overall failure frequency of
the extended MCSS; this is the same as in case of w = 1 from (5.54).
MCSS with Negated Events
The probabilities of negated events that are part of extended MCSS are considered in analogy
to (5.51).
Failure Probability and Failure Rate
An extended MCSS’ failure probability is given using (5.8) by integrating over (5.54); the
corresponding failure rate is then given by (5.9).
5.4.3 Quantification of the Temporal Failure Function on TOP Level
MCSS resulting from the method in chapter 4.3 are mutually exclusive (disjoint).
Therefore, the TOP event’s failure probability and failure frequency is given by (5.5) and
(5.6) and is the simple sum of the probabilistic contributions of the disjoint MCSS:
FTOP (t) =
ξ∑
i= 1
FMCSS i(t) , (5.55)
fTOP (t) =
ξ∑
i= 1
fMCSS i(t) . (5.56)
The parameters of the disjoint MCSS come
• from chapter 5.4.1 in case of normal MCSS and
• from chapter 5.4.2 in case of extended MCSS.
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5.5 Reducing the Computing Time
The calculatory effort necessary for the multiple integrals in (5.50), (5.51), and (5.54) is high;
this is especially true for complex temporal fault trees and their complex failure functions. This
is not helpful to the TFTA’s declared goal to faciliate modelling of event sequences for large
and complex systems
The following chapter therefore presents an approximatory approach to the calculaion of fail-
ure probabilities, failure frequencies, and MCSS in order to significantly reduce the calculatory
effort. Essential prerequesites to this approximation are
• constant failure rates of all basic events, i.e. exponentially distributed failure probabilities,
and
• “small enough” failure probabilities and failure rates, i.e. the “small value assumption”
from (5.19) must be valid that λ t  1 and thus f(t) ≈ λ(t); in a safety context this is
usually a given.
5.5.1 Temporal Terms in MCSS Format
First, temporal expressions in MCSS form are discussed; they result e.g. from qualitative trans-
formations of a TFTA according to chapter 4.3.
MCSS Without Negated Events
The failure probability and failure rate of MCSS without negated events, which include at least
one SAND, is always zero according to the discussion following page 67.
Therefore, the quantification is again based on MCSS without negated events as shown in
(5.48). The corresponding failure probability is given by integration over (5.50) which yields
FMCSS (t) = FX1
∧X2 ∧ ...∧Xn(t) =
t∫
0
fX1
∧X2 ∧ ...∧Xn(τ) ·dτ =
=
t∫
0
fXn(τ) ·
τ∫
0
fXn−1(τ
{1}) · · ·
τ{n−2}∫
0
fX2(τ
{n−1}) ·
τ{n−1}∫
0
fX1(τ
{n}) · (5.57)
·dτ{n} ·dτ{n−1} · · · dτ{1} ·dτ .
With a total of n basic events that constitute an MCSS, each MCSS represents exactly one
event sequence of the n! possible permutations. The probability that all n events included in
an MCSS have occurred at time t is given by (5.1) for the case that no event sequences are
distinguished; this yields
FX1 ∧X2 ∧ ...∧Xn(t) = FX1(t) ·FX2(t) · · ·FXn(t) =
n∏
i= 1
FXi(t) . (5.58)
For exponentially distributed and very small failure rates equation (5.19) then allows the ap-
proximation that
f(t) ≈ λ(t) = λ and therefore (5.59)
F (t) ≈ λ · t for λ · t 1 . (5.60)
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Then,
FX1 ∧X2 ∧ ...∧Xn(t) ≈ λX1 t ·λX2 t · · ·λXn t =
n∏
i= 1
(λXi t) . (5.61)
If all n failure rates λX = λX1 = . . . = λXn are equal, all n! possible permutations of the
event sequences occur with the same probability; thus, for each MCSS
FMCSS (t) =
1
n!
n∏
i= 1
FXi(t) ≈
1
n!
n∏
i= 1
(λXi t) . (5.62)
Equation (5.62) is also a generic approximation in case of different failure rates, if the highest
of the n failure rates satisfies the condition that
max
(
λX1 ;λX2 ; · · · ;λXn
)
· t 1 . (5.63)
Thus,
FMCSS (t) ≈ 1
n!
n∏
i= 1
(λXi t) . (5.64)
The approximation for an MCSS’ failure frequency is provided accordingly. Let, without
restriction to the general case, be Xn the last occurring event in a MCSS w´ith n involved
events; then
fMCSS (t) = fX1
∧X2 ∧ ...∧Xn(t) = fXn(t) ·FX1 ∧X2 ∧ ...∧Xn−1(t) ; (5.65)
from this follows with (5.59) and (5.60) that
fMCSS (t) ≈ 1
(n− 1)! ·λXn ·
n−1∏
i= 1
(λXi t) . (5.66)
MCSS with Negated Events
An approximation for MCSS with negated events combines the procedure of chapter 5.4.1 –
with the probability of negated events from (5.7) – and the quantification approach to MCSS
without negated events, as discussed above. Using (5.64) and (5.66) this yields
FMCSS (t) = F(¬XI ∧ ¬XII ··· )∧ (X1 ∧X2 ∧ ...∧Xn)(t) · · · ≈
≈ 1
n!
·
n∏
i= 1
(λXi t) ·RXI (t) ·RXII (t) · · · ,
(5.67)
fMCSS (t) = fX1
∧X2 ∧ ...∧Xn(t) ·RXI (t) ·RXII (t) · · · ≈
≈ 1
(n− 1)! ·λXn ·
n−1∏
i= 1
(λXi t) ·RXI (t) ·RXII (t) · · · .
(5.68)
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5.5.2 Temporal Terms in an Extended MCSS Format
The assumptions from chapter 5.5.1 still hold; specifically, no SAND connections are considered,
as they do not contribute probabilistically.
Extending the method with minimized computational effort to extended MCSS requires dis-
cussing how many normal MCSS are covered by an extended MCSS.
In a very simple example, the extended MCSS (X1 ∧X2) ∧X3 covers two normal MCSS,
X1
∧X2 ∧X3 and X2 ∧X1 ∧X3, which are disjoint. Using (5.62), each of these two normal
MCSS has a probability of
FX1
∧X2 ∧X3(t) = FX2 ∧X1 ∧X3(t) ≈ 16FX1FX2FX3 . (5.69)
Accordingly,
F(X1 ∧X2)∧X3(t) ≈ 2 · 16FX1FX2FX3 =
1
3
FX1FX2FX3 . (5.70)
All normal MCSS that are covered by an extended MCSS are mutually exclusive (disjoint)
because of the temporal law of completition. An extended MCSS’ failure probability and failure
frequency is therefore given as simple sum of the failure probabilities and failure frequencies of
the normal MCSS that are covered by the extended MCSS.
In general and withouth SAND connections, the number Υ of normal MCSS that are covered
by an extended MCSS dependes
• on w, which is the number of extended core events in the extended MCSS, and
• on ri for each extended core event i ∈ {1, . . . ,w}, which is the number of its AND connected
basic events, and
• on ki, which is the corresponding extended core event’s position in the MCSS.
Some examples:
(X1 ∧X2) ∧X3 → w = 1 ; r = 2 ; k = 1 ,
X1
∧ (X2 ∧X3) → w = 1 ; r = 2 ; k = 2 ,
(X1 ∧X2) ∧ (X3 ∧X4) → w = 2 ; r1 = r2 = 2 ; k1 = 1 ; k2 = 3 ,
X1
∧ (X2 ∧X3 ∧X4) → w = 1 ; r = 3 ; k = 2 .
In the third example it is noteworthy, that k2 = 3. The position of the i ∈ {2, . . . ,w}-th
core event is calculated including all events; even those events in “preceding” core events are
considered, i.e. events on the left side of the i-th extended core event in the MCSS. SAND
connections are omitted, though:
(X1 ∧X2) ∧ (X3 ∧X4) = [X1 ∧X2 ∧ (X3 ∧X4)]∨ [X2 ∧X1 ∧ (X3 ∧X4)] . (5.71)
The position of the second extended core event is therefore k2 = 3.
In general, each extended core event i with ri basic events and standing at position ki covers
Υi =
(
(ki − 1) + (ri − 1)
(ki − 1)
)
· ri! (5.72)
normal MCSS. This follows from ri! possible permutations within the extended core event. For
each permutation (ki − 1) preceding events (left of the extended core event) may then hold
(ki − 1) + (ri − 1) possible positions, as described in (4.48).
Some examples:
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• (X1 ∧X2) ∧X3 → w = 1 ; r = 2 ; k = 1 → Υ = 2 :
→ X1 ∧X2 ∧X3 , X2 ∧X1 ∧X3 .
• X1
∧ (X2 ∧X3) → w = 1 ; r = 2 ; k = 2 → Υ = 4 :
→ X1 ∧X2 ∧X3 , X1 ∧X3 ∧X2 , X2 ∧X1 ∧X3 , X3 ∧X1 ∧X2 .
• X1
∧X2 ∧ (X3 ∧X4) → w = 1 ; r = 2 ; k = 3 → Υ = 6 :
→ X1 ∧X2 ∧X3 ∧X4 , X1 ∧X2 ∧X4 ∧X3 , X1 ∧X3 ∧X2 ∧X4 ,
X1
∧X4 ∧X2 ∧X3 , X3 ∧X1 ∧X2 ∧X4 , X4 ∧X1 ∧X2 ∧X3 .
With w > 1 extended core events the total number of covered permutations is then given as
Υ =
w∏
i= 1
Υi . (5.73)
For example, the extended MCSS (X1 ∧X2) ∧ (X3 ∧X4) with w = 2, r1 = r2 = 2, k1 = 1, k2 = 3
covers a total of Υ = Υ1 ·Υ2 = 2 · 6 = 12 permutations.
X1
∧X2 ∧X3 ∧X4 , X1 ∧X2 ∧X4 ∧X3 , X1 ∧X3 ∧X2 ∧X4 ,
X1
∧X4 ∧X2 ∧X3 , X3 ∧X1 ∧X2 ∧X4 , X4 ∧X1 ∧X2 ∧X3 ,
X2
∧X1 ∧X3 ∧X4 , X2 ∧X1 ∧X4 ∧X3 , X2 ∧X3 ∧X1 ∧X4 ,
X2
∧X4 ∧X1 ∧X3 , X3 ∧X2 ∧X1 ∧X4 , X4 ∧X2 ∧X1 ∧X3 .
In analogy to (5.67), the failure probability of an extended MCSS is approximated as
FMCSS (t) ≈ Υ · 1
n!
·
n∏
i= 1
(λXi t) ·RXI (t) ·RXII (t) · · · . (5.74)
In analogy to (5.68), the approximated failure frequency is then given by
fMCSS (t) ≈ Υ · 1
(n− 1)! ·λXn ·
n−1∏
i= 1
(λXi t) ·RXI (t) ·RXII (t) · · · . (5.75)
Summary of Chapter 5.5 Reducing the Computing Time
For constant failure rates and “small enough” failure probabilities the probabilities and rates of
occurrence of each possible permutation of the events in an MCSS do not significantly differ
among each other. The calculation of FMCSS (t) and fMCSS (t) is therefore almost independent
of the exact event sequence information. This is beneficial, as the quantification with exact
sequence information requires calculation of multiply nested integrals (see chapter 5.3) which
is very costly. On the other hand, the approximation method provided in this chapter allows
an estimation of FMCSS (t) and fMCSS (t) solely based on the number of events in an MCSS and
their respective failure rates, see (5.67) and (5.68). It is not necessary to explicitely take the
exact sequence information into consideration. Extended MCSS may also be quantified using
this approximation, as shown in (5.74) and (5.75).

6 Comparing TFTA to Other Dynamic
Modelling Approaches
Much may be said on both sides.
(Henry Fielding)
In this chapter the advantages of using the TFTA method are demonstrated and discussed; in
order to do so, an example system (see chapter 6.1) is modelled and analyzed
• as conventional Boolean FTA in chapter 6.2,
• as dynamic fault tree (DFT) in chapter 2.3, and
• as markov model in chapter 6.4,
and these are then compared with the new TFTA approach, see chapter 6.5. The comparison
models are created and analyzed using the Isograph FaultTree+ tool [50].
6.1 An Example System
An example system from [79] is shown in figure 6.1.
System Description
The relevant system function of the system under consideration is to supply point X with power.
The power supply E delivers energy via switch U and two redundant paths A and B. First, U
is switched to allow energy flow via path A. In case of a fault in A, switch U will redirect the
energy flow via path B in order to sustain the system function.
The following component faults are considered here:
E
A
B
U X
Figure 6.1: An example system used for comparing the Boolean FTA, the DFT, the markov
model, and the TFTA.
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E: E fails to supply energy; the corresponding failure rate is λE = 1 · 10−9 1h .
U: U fails to switch from A to B; the corresponding failure rate is λU = 5 · 10−6 1h .
A: Internal fault of A inhibiting energy flow; the corresponding failure rate is λA = 1 · 10−6 1h .
B: Internal fault of B inhibiting energy flow; the corresponding failure rate is λB = 1 · 10−6 1h .
All components are non-repairable; all failure rates are constant; the mission time is TM = 400h.
The failure sequence is relevant because the failure of U before failure of A leads to a system
failure, but the failure of U after switching from A, i.e. after failure of A, does not lead to a
system failure. The qualitative and probabilistic results of modelling this example system using
the different modelling techniques are listed in tables 6.1 and 6.2 on page 82.
6.2 Comparison with the Boolean FTA
The Boolean model is not able to take sequence information into account as relevant for this
example system’s failure behaviour. As an approximation to the real system diagram from
figure 6.1, one of the versions from figure 6.2 must be chosen as basis for the Boolean fault tree
model [79]. Figure 6.3 shows the Boolean fault trees corresponding to these two versions, which
are called “Bool 1” and “Bool 2”.
Qualitative and Probabilistic Calculation
The components’ failure probabilites and failure frequencies at the end of the mission time are
calculated using (5.10); this yields
FA(TM ) = 3,9992 · 10−4 , fA(TM ) = 9,9960 · 10−7 1h , (6.1)
FB(TM ) = 3,9992 · 10−4 , fB(TM ) = 9,9960 · 10−7 1h , (6.2)
FU (TM ) = 1,9960 · 10−3 , fU (TM ) = 4,9900 · 10−6 1h , (6.3)
FE(TM ) = 4,0000 · 10−7 , fE(TM ) = 1,0000 · 10−9 1h . (6.4)
The failure function ϕ is
ϕBool 1 = (A∨E)∧ (B ∨U ∨E) =
[
A∧B]∨ [A∧U]∨ [E] and (6.5)
ϕBool 2 = (A∨U ∨E)∧ (B ∨U ∨E) =
[
A∧B]∨ [U]∨ [E] . (6.6)
It may be transformed into a disjunctive normal form of mutually exclusive expressions:
ϕBool 1 =
[
A∧B ∧ ¬E ∧ ¬U]∨ [A∧U ∧ ¬E]∨ [E] and (6.7)
E
A
BU
X E
A
B
U X
Figure 6.2: Two possible versions of Boolean approximations of the example system from figure
6.1 as basis for a conventional Boolean FTA. The left side is called “Bool 1”, and the
right side is called “Bool 2”.
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Figure 6.3: Boolean fault trees corresponding to “Bool 1” (top) and “Bool 2” (bottom).
ϕBool 2 =
[
A∧B ∧ ¬E ∧ ¬U]∨ [U ∧ ¬E]∨ [E] . (6.8)
Using the failure data from above for quantification, the TOP event provides
FBool 1(TM ) = 1,3587 · 10−6 , fBool 1(TM ) = 5,7899 · 10−9 1h and (6.9)
FBool 2(TM ) = 1,9986 · 10−3 , fBool 2(TM ) = 4,9918 · 10−6 1h . (6.10)
These results were verified using the FaultTree+ tool.
Discussion on Creating the Fault Trees
In both cases the fault tree is derived systematically from the system diagrams by following the
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energy flow backwards through the system, i.e. from output X to input E. The modeller needs
not think about possible event duplications, as the Boolean logic correctly eliminates those.
Discussion on Results
Qualitative analysis of the minimal cutsets shows that both cases provide system failures where
no real system failure are occurring. In case of “Bool 1” the inaccuracy lies in minimal cutset[
A∧U], and in case of “Bool 2” the inaccuracy lies in minimal cutset [U]. Therefore, “Bool 2”
is an especially conservative approximation: qualitatively, the fault tree has one additional and
unnecessary single point failure; probabilistically, the fault tree yields much higher values for
the TOP level failure paramters. Comparing both Boolean versions it appears clear that “Bool
1” is the more realistic model.
6.3 Comparison with Dynamic FTA (DFT Method)
Other than the Boolean modell, the DFT fault tree uses PAND gates to consider event sequences,
that are relevant to the system failure behaviour.
Figure 6.4 shows two versions “DFT 1” and “DFT 2” which include a dynamic module, i.e.
the gate “U fails before A”; this module represents a markov model, see figure 2.3. For better
understanding, in these figures the PAND gate is shown with its original DFT symbol from the
DFT [37], i.e. an AND gate with double bars, instead of the TFTA PAND gate symbol (an
AND gate with horizontal left-to-right arrow).
In “DFT 1” basic event A is meshed between the dynamic module and the Boolean part of
the fault tree. Basic event A has a set sequence flag, and because of the meshing this flag is also
set where A is input to the Boolean AND gate “Internal failure of A and B”. But this sequence
information is errornous with regard to event B; it provides prababilistically optimistic results,
i.e. to small failure values.
In “DFT 2” this meshing is broken up. In order to do so, the identical failure of the one
componentA has to be represented by two different basic eventsA andA?. In complex fault trees
this method is not feasible, is costly, and complicates clear analysis. Moreover, the probabilistic
results are conservativ as possible intersections between these events are not taken into account.
Qualitative and Probabilistic Calculation
At the end of the mission time each component’s failure probability and failure frequency equals
those of the Boolean model from page 76.
One feature of the DFT approach is that the qualitative calculation of the failure function
interprets the PAND gate as conventional AND gate. This certainly is a sensible conserva-
tive approach; as a consequence, though, the event sequence information is not present in the
qualitative results. The failure function ϕ yields
ϕDFT 1 =
[
A∧B]∨ [U ∧A]∨ [E] and (6.11)
ϕDFT 2 =
[
A? ∧B]∨ [U ∧A]∨ [E] . (6.12)
Isograph FaultTree+ provides the following results:
FDFT 1(TM ) = 8,7933 · 10−7 , fDFT 1(TM ) = 3,3946 · 10−9 1h and (6.13)
FDFT 2(TM ) = 9,5962 · 10−7 , fDFT 2(TM ) = 3,7967 · 10−9 1h . (6.14)
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Figure 6.4: DFT fault trees in two versions, “DFT 1” (top) and “DFT 2” (bottom). In “DFT
1” event A is illegally meshed between the Boolean part of the fault tree and the
dynamic module. In “DFT 2” the same real world failure of component A is rep-
resented by two different basic events A and A?, which breaks the meshing. Both
versions provide only approximative probabilistic results, though, and do not provide
a qualitative analysis that also includes sequence information.
6.4 Comparison with Markov Diagrams
The example system’s markov model in this chapter is used as a reference for probabilistic
calculations. Figure 6.5 shows the corresponding markov diagram, where all system failure
states “no energy at X” are denoted in bold. Event sequence information between U and A is
taken into account.
Using TM = 400h, Isograph FaultTree+ provides the following results:
FMAR(TM ) = 9,5940 · 10−7 , fMAR(TM ) = 3,7955 · 10−9 1h . (6.15)
This modelling method does not allow for qualitative analysis like the analysis of minimal
cutsets.
In comparison to the fault tree modelling methods from above the higher complexity of the
markov method is apparent, which in real life inhibits the use of markov methods for analysis
of many systems.
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Figure 6.5: Markov Diagram (and also sequential failure tree) of the example system. System
failure states “no energy at X” are denoted in bold.
6.5 Dynamic FTA According to the TFTA Method
Figure 6.6 shows the temporal TFTA fault tree corresponding to the example system. One
main benefit of the TFTA over the DFT approach is the way in which the fault tree structure
is built. Just like the conventional Boolean FTA, it is possible to apply a “schematic-driven
built-process”; i.e. to proceed backwards through the system, from its outputs to its inputs,
and following the signal paths. This method is very intuitive as well as very systematic, thus
reducing modelling errors. If there are meshings in the TFTA fault tree, they are broken up
and resolved by the temporal logic. The same approach is generally not possible with the DFT
because of its separated modules.
Qualitative and Probabilistic Calculation
The temporal system function of the temporal fault tree shown in figure 6.6 is given as
$ = (A∨E)∧ (B ∨E ∨ (U ∧A)) =
=
[
A∧B]∨ [A∧E]∨ [A∧ (U ∧A)]∨ [E ∧B]∨ [E]∨ [E ∧ (U ∧A)] =
=
[
A∧B]∨ [U ∧A]∨ [E] . (6.16)
Its three event sequences are already minimal according to chapter 4.3.2, as[
A∧B] ⊇⊂upslope [U ∧A] arnd [A∧B] ⊇⊂upslope [E] and [E] ⊇⊂upslope [U ∧A] .
These event sequences are also MCSS and thus starting point for further qualitative evaluation.
Qualitative analysis of the MCSS shows that the MCSS are indeed correctly calculated and
do include the sequence information between events U and A. Further qualitative analysis
then requires the transformation of the MCSS into a mutually exclusive (disjoint) form. The
transformation according to chapter 4.3.3 yields an extended TDNF with mutually exclusive
expressions:
$ =
[¬E ∧ (A∧B)]∨ [¬B ¬E ∧ (U ∧A)]∨ [E] . (6.17)
Using the components’ failure data from page 76, direct quantification is then possible:
FTFTA(t) =
(
1− FE(t)
)
·FA(t) ·FB(t) +
+
(
1− FE(t)
)(
1− FB(t)
)
·
∫ t
0
FU (τ) · fA(τ) ·d τ + FE(t) ,
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Figure 6.6: TFTA fault tree of the example system. It correctly takes the meshing of event
A into account, as well as the sequence information between events U and A, and
allows for a “schematic-driven built-process”. Probabilistically, the correct results
are calculated, too.
FTFTA(TM ) = 9,5940 · 10−7 , (6.18)
fTFTA(t) =
(
1− FE(t)
)
· fA(t) ·FB(t) +
(
1− FE(t)
)
·FA(t) · fB(t) +
+
(
1− FE(t)
)(
1− FB(t)
)
·FU (t) · fA(t) + fE(t)
fTFTA(TM ) = 3,7955 · 10−9 1h . (6.19)
Comparison with the reference results from the markov model (see chapter 6.4) shows that the
TFTA provides exact probabilistic results, too.
Approximation
Instead of using this exact calculation method, the TOP event’s failure parameters may also be
approximated using the approach with reduced calculatory effort from chapter 5.5.
First, this approach is used on the extended TDNF of the temporal failure function from
(6.17); TM = 400h then yields
FTFTA(t) ≈ (1− λE t) ·λA t ·λB t+ 1
2
(1− λE t)(1− λB t) ·λU t ·λA t+ λE t ,
FTFTA(TM ) = 9,5984 · 10−7 , (6.20)
fTFTA(t) ≈ 2(1− λE t) ·λA ·λB t+ 1
2
(1− λE t)(1− λB t) ·λU ·λA t+ λE ,
fTFTA(TM ) = 3,7988 · 10−7 1h . (6.21)
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Further significant simplification is possible using (6.16) instead of the temporal failure function
from (6.17). The quantification of (6.16) yields
FTFTA(t) ≈ λA t ·λB t+ 1
2
λU t ·λA t+ λE t ,
FTFTA(TM ) ≈ 9,6000 · 10−7 , (6.22)
fTFTA(t) ≈ 2λA ·λB t+ 1
2
λU ·λA t+ λE ,
fTFTA(TM ) ≈ 3,8000 · 10−7 1h . (6.23)
On the one hand, it is no longer necessary to carry out the - possibly very costly - transformation
into a disjoint form. On the other hand, the results are conservative approximations, usually
good enough for at least a first assessment during a multi-step analysis.
Cutsets/Sequ. Bool 1 Bool 2 DFT 1 DFT 2 Markov TFTA
1. E E E E – E
2. A∧U U U ∧A U ∧A – U ∧A
3. A∧B A∧B A∧B A? ∧B – A∧B
Table 6.1: Comparison of the qualitative results of the different modelling methods for the ex-
ample system from chapter 6.1. Minimal cutsets of the “Bool . . . ” and the “DFT
. . . ” methods do not include event sequence information. As a consequence, there
are failure combinations, that do not lead to a real life system failure, but are taken
for system failures. The results of “Bool 2” and “DFT 2” deviate the most from the
correct results represented by the MCSS of the TFTA. The markov model does not
provide comparable qualitative results at all.
6.6 Summarizing the Results
The side-by-side comparision of Boolean FTA, DFT approach, markov model, and the new
TFTA approach shows that the TFTA combines and surpasses the benefits of the other more
conventional methods.
The TFTA adopts the basic steps of creating fault trees from the Boolean FTA. Most notably,
it allows for a “schematic-driven built-process”; this assures a very systematic design and few
modelling errors. The basic steps of the fault tree’s qualitative and probabilistic evaluation are
also very similar between both methods. The failure function is qualitatively simplified into a
minimal DNF; in a next step, this is then further qualitatively analysed, as well as transformed
into mutually exclusive (disjoint) sub-expressions; these are then quantified. Other than the
Boolean FTA, the TFTA takes relevant event sequence information into account qualitatively
as well as probabilistically.
Looking at the qualitative results, only the TFTA provides minimal combinations of compo-
nent failures that lead to a system failure, which include event sequence information, see table
6.1. The DFT and the conventional FTA provide minimal cutsets without event sequence infor-
mation instead. Furthermore, the necessity of modules in the DFT is noteworthy: Meshing of
events between Boolean and dynamic modules may lead to modelling errors which are difficult
to discern and thus distort the qualitative results. It is possible to break such meshing up by
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Method F (TM ) [.] = 1 f(TM ) [.] = 1h λ(TM ) [.] =
1
h
Bool 1 1,3587 · 10−6 5,7899 · 10−9 5,7899 · 10−9
Bool 2 1,9986 · 10−3 4,9918 · 10−6 5,0019 · 10−6
dynamic fault tree (DFT) 1 8,7933 · 10−7 3,3946 · 10−9 3,3946 · 10−9
DFT 2 9,5962 · 10−7 3,7967 · 10−9 3,7967 · 10−9
Markov 9,5940 · 10−7 3,7955 · 10−9 3,7955 · 10−9
temporal fault tree analysis (TFTA) 9,5940 · 10−7 3,7955 · 10−9 3,7955 · 10−9
TFTA (Approx. 1) 9,5984 · 10−7 3,7988 · 10−9 3,7988 · 10−9
TFTA (Approx. 2) 9,6000 · 10−7 3,8000 · 10−9 3,8000 · 10−9
Table 6.2: Comparison of the probabilistic results of the different modelling methods from chap-
ters 6.2 to 6.5; the mission time is set to TM = 400h. Obviously, the Boolean results
are comparably conservative. The markov model is used as reference. The TFTA
provides identical and therefore correct results, too. The last two rows show the re-
sults of the approximations of the probabilistic TFTA. “Approx 1” corresponds to the
temporal failure function after it is transformed into a mutually exclusive (disjoint)
form; “Approx 2” corresponds to the temporal failure function in a TDNF before
being transformed into disjoint minterms, see (6.20) to (6.23).
using several “copied” events for one real world failure event; this provides good probabilistic
approximations, but it reduces the significance and reliability of the qualitative results, as they
contain nonsensical or even impossible event combinations.
The TFTA also provides correct probabilistic failure parameters at TOP event level; this
is shown by comparison with the morkov referrence, see table 6.2. The Boolean models are
comparatively conservative. The DFT provides correct results only for those fault trees that do
not have events meshed between Boolean and dynamic modules. If such meshings are necessary,
then the DFT usually provides optimistic (i.e. too small) probabilistic results.
The TFTA is also well suited for a multi-step approach of modelling, where the results’
accuracy is improved step by step. The TFTA’s approach with reduced calculatory effort
provides conservative probabilistic approximations as well as, qualitatively, the minimal failure
sequences.

7 TFTA Analysis of an Automotive ECU
Architecture
Insight separated from practice
remains ineffective.
(Erich Fromm)
This chapter uses the TFTA method on a more complex example and shows how TFTA may
be applied to more than academic minimal examples.
7.1 The Example System
The example system in figure 7.1 is an abstraction of a system architecture typically used in the
automotive domain for safety critical systems up to SIL 3 according to IEC61508 or ASIL D
according to ISO26262.
ASIC
µC
S1
S2 A
K1
K2
WD
≥ 1
OR
L
T1
AMP
T2
T3
SW
POW
U+
SAF
OFF
EN1 {1}
{2}
Figure 7.1: A real world example systems which is analyzed using the TFTA method.
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The structure of this chapter: In chapter 7.2 the temporal fault tree corresponding to the
example system is shown. The qualitative analysis in chapter 7.3 and the probabilistic evaluation
in chapter 7.4 are followed by a discussion of the results in chapter 7.5.
7.1.1 System Description, Safety Goal and Safe State
Scope
The example system consists of the components and signals wlisted in table 7.1.
Component Subcomponent Description
S1 sensor 1
S2 sensor 2
µC microcontroller
ASIC system-ASIC
WD watchdog for µC
K1 comparator 1
K2 comparator 2
OR OR gate
POW power switch
SW emergency switch
T3 power transistor
AMP driver IC
L logic
T1 high side power stage
T2 low side power stage
A actuator
Signal Description
EN enable signal for the logic in the driver IC
SAF enable signal for power transistor and driver IC
OFF disable/cutoff signal from watchdog
Table 7.1: Components and signals of the example system in figure 7.1
Functional Description and Safety Concept
The example system is used to safely activate actuator A based on some sensor information.
The actuator shall be activated, if (and only if) the sensor input shows that some threshold
level is exceeded. If the sensor input is below this threshold, the actuator shall be deactivated.
The system includes several redundancy measures in order to increase its functional safety.
Both sensors S1 and S2 record some physical parameters from the surrounding. Each sensor
sends its data over a separate serial port to microcontroller µC as well as the system ASIC. The
transmission is protected using CRC and alive counters.
Microcontroller µC evaluates the sensor data of both sensors S1 and S2. If at least one of the
sensors’ data is below the threshold, output SAF of the µC is deactivated. If both of the sensors’
data are above the threshold, µC activates the power transistor T3 via the SAF signal. At the
same time, µC activates the power stages T1 and T2 in the AMP driver via AMP’s enabler
input {2}. Meanwhile, the microcontroller serves the intelligent watchdog in the system ASIC
via an additional bidirectional port.
The system ASIC evaluates the same sensor data as the microcontroller. It has two hardware
comparators K1 and K2. Comparator K1 evaluates data from sensor S1. Comparator K2
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evaluates data from sensor S2. If at least one of the hardware comparators detects that the
corresponding threshold is exceeded, it activates its output EN. Additionally, the system ASIC
includes an intelligent watchdog WD. Using several mechanisms, the watchdog monitors that
the µC hardware is operable and the operating system and the application software on µC run
correctly. This is accomplished, first, using a window watchdog triggered by special waypoints
within the program software; second, WD queries µC and monitors the provided answers. If
µC answers too early or too late or provides a wrong answer, WD activates (opens) a separate
emergency switch SW via the OFF signal. If SW is open, T3 is deactivated independently of
SAF; the power supply to the power stages and thus to the actuator is interrupted.
Driver AMP consists of the two power stages T1 and T2 as well as an internal logic L. L
activates the power stages, if (and only if) enable input {1} is activated first, and then enable
input {2} is activated second. Every other sequence does not activate the power stages.
Normally, the activation abides the sequence {1}, {2}: on the one hand, data from S1 and S2
do not occur at exactly the same time, e.g. because S1 and S2 are spatially separated. Then,
signal EN will always be activated first, when the first sensor data indicates an exceeding of the
threshold. On the other hand, the software in µC also carries some latency to EN, which leads
to an internally delayed activation of SAF.
Safety Goal, Safe State, and Fault Tolerance Time Span
The system’s hazard and risk analysis yields the following safety goal: “prevent errornous current
feed through the actuator”. The corresponding safety state is “no current feed through actuator”.
The fault tolerant time span is 0 seconds, i.e. current feeds are considered immediately dangerous
and are thus not allowed even for very short times.
7.1.2 Failures
Using the simplification that all connections between components S1, S2, µC, K1, K2, WD, SW,
T1, T2, T3, L, and A are ideal and have no faults, the components’ failures listed in table 7.2
remain. The failures’ dangerousness depends on their potential to contribute to an infraction of
the safety goal. The listed safety measures prevent a direct infraction of the safety goal by the
failures. For a dynamic failure analysis two areas of the system are specifically interesting. First,
there is a sequence logic in L, and second the are dangerous failures of WD and SW (numbers
18 and 27 in table 7.2, respectively) in combination with a failure of the microcontroller. These
failures of the watchdog or switch SW are relevant, if (and only if) at least one of them occurs
before failures of µC. But if µC fails first, while WD as well as SW are operational, i.e. have
not failed, or have failed, but “in a safe direction”, it is assumed, that this was detected and
thus the system is disabled. Further dangerous consequences are then ruled out. Furthermore,
dependent failures, and especially common cause failures (CCF), are not considered in this
example.
Failures of µC may not be easily attributed to specific hardware faults, as µC’s functionality
is largely realised in software. It is assumed, that the different failures of µC – numbers 9 to 17
in table 7.2 – occur independent from each other.
7.2 Temporal Fault Tree
A temporal fault tree for the example system is to be created. It shall provide evidence that no
dangerous single failure leads to a direct infraction of the safety goal; this is called “single failure
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resistance”. Furthermore, an MCSS analysis shall provide the most relevant combinations of
dangerous failures. A probabilistic quantification shall then provide evidence that the system’s
failure rate stays below the threshold as defined for ASIL D in ISO26262.
The TOP event of the fault tree is the “infraction of the safety goal”, i.e. the “errornous current
feed through the actuator”. As the system has time-dependencies between its components’
failures, it is necessary to use temporal fault tree gates. Figures 7.2 bis 7.4 show the temporal
fault tree for the example system, split into three parts. The basic events’ numbers correspond
to those in table 7.2.
In total the temporal fault tree consists of 32 gates and 34 basic events. There are 16 meshed
gates and 18 meshed basic events. Two of the gates are PAND gates, which appear three times
because of meshings. These temporal gates represent sub fault trees with ten different basic
events and ten different gates.
&
err. current feed
through A
≥ 1
T1 wrongly
switched on
≥ 1
T2 wrongly
switched on
≥ 1
T3 wrongly
switched on
30
T1
internal failure
≥ 1
L wrongly
activates T1
32
T2
internal failure
≥ 1
L wrongly
activates T2
28
T3
internal failure
commanded
failure T3
see next fig.s
≥ 1
L internal failure
activates T1
34
L internal failure
activates only T1
38
L internal failure
activates T1+T2
L commanded
failure
see next fig.s
≥ 1
L internal failure
activates T2
36
L internal failure
activates only T2
38
L internal failure
activates T1+T2
L commanded
failure
see next fig.s
Figure 7.2: Fault tree of the example system from figure 7.1, part 1. The basic events’ numbers
correspond to those in table 7.2.
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&
L commanded
failure
≥ 1
OR wrongly
activates EN
≥ 1
SAF failure
(indep. of SW)
10
µC generic fail.
activ. SAF
µC
signal failure
see next fig.s
24
OR
internal failure
≥ 1
OR commanded
failure
≥ 1
K1 wrongly
data > threshold
20
K1
internal failure
1
Wrongly S1
data > threshold
≥ 1
K2 wrongly
data > threshold
22
K2
internal failure
5
Wrongly S2
data > threshold
Figure 7.3: Fault tree of the example system from figure 7.1, part 2.
≥ 1
T3 commanded
failure
&
SAF faulty &
SW closed
≥ 1
SW wrongly
stays closed
27
SW
internal failure
18
WD wrongly not
activate OFF
10
µC generic fail.
activ. SAF
&
µC
signal failure
≥ 1
S1
signal failure
1
Wrongly S1
data > threshold
13
µC wrong
evaluation S1
≥ 1
S2
signal failure
5
Wrongly S2
data > threshold
15
µC wrong
evaluation S2
Figure 7.4: Fault tree of the example system from figure 7.1, part 3.
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7.3 Qualitative Analysis of the Temporal Fault Tree
7.3.1 Temporal Failure Function
The failure function for the TOP event is directly read from the fault tree in figures 7.2 to 7.4:
$ =
(
X30 ∨X34 ∨X38 ∨
[(
X24 ∨X20 ∨X1 ∨X22 ∨X5︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
) ∧
∧(X10 ∨ [(X1 ∨X13)∧ (X5 ∨X15)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
)])
∧
∧
(
X32 ∨X36 ∨X38 ∨
[
A
∧B
])
∧
∧
(
X28 ∨ [(X1 ∨X13)∧ (X5 ∨X15)]∨
[
(X27 ∨X18) ∧X10]︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
)
. (7.1)
Substitutions A, B, and C facilitate further simplification:
$ =
(
X30 ∨X34 ∨X38 ∨
[
A
∧B])∧(X32 ∨X36 ∨X38 ∨ [A ∧B])∧(C) =
=
[
X30 ∧X32 ∧C
]∨ [X30 ∧X36 ∧C]∨ [X30 ∧X38 ∧C]∨ [X30 ∧ (A ∧B)∧C]∨
∨ [X34 ∧X32 ∧C]∨ [X34 ∧X36 ∧C]∨ [X34 ∧X38 ∧C]∨ [X34 ∧ (A ∧B)∧C]∨
∨ [X38 ∧X32 ∧C]∨ [X38 ∧X36 ∧C]∨ [X38 ∧X38 ∧C]∨ [X38 ∧ (A ∧B)∧C]∨
∨ [(A ∧B)∧X32 ∧C]∨ [(A ∧B)∧X36 ∧C]∨ [(A ∧B)∧X38 ∧C]∨
∨ [(A ∧B)∧ (A ∧B)∧C] . (7.2)
Applying the laws of absorption and idempotency yields
$ =
[
X30 ∧X32 ∧C
]∨ [X30 ∧X36 ∧C]∨ [X34 ∧X32 ∧C]∨
∨ [X34 ∧X36 ∧C]∨ [X38 ∧C]∨ [(A ∧B)∧C] . (7.3)
The next chapter transforms the temporal failure function from (7.3) according to the laws
of temporal logic. The analysis of the resulting MCSS of $ follows in chapter 7.3.3.
7.3.2 Transformation According to the Temporal Logic Rules
MCSS of the First Five Terms in (7.3):
The temporal failure function in (7.3) has five parts[
X30 ∧X32 ∧C
]
,
[
X30 ∧X36 ∧C
]
,
[
X34 ∧X32 ∧C
]
,
[
X34 ∧X36 ∧C
]
,
[
X38 ∧C
]
(7.4)
that have no reference to event A. Basic events X30, X32, X34, X36, X38 are not also included in
C. If each of these five expressions is combined with the TDNF of C, i.e.
C = X28 ∨ (X1X5)∨ (X1X15)∨ (X5X13)∨ (X13X15)∨ (X27 ∧X10)∨ (X18 ∧X10) , (7.5)
They provide nine different event sequences each, as shown here for the one example with
X38 ∧C:
X38 ∧C = X38 ∧
[
X28 ∨ (X1X5)∨ (X1X15)∨ (X5X13)∨ (X13X15)∨
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∨ (X27 ∧X10)∨ (X18 ∧X10)] . (7.6)
Next, this provides five event sequences each, like in[
X38X1X5
]
,
[
X38X1X15
]
,
[
X38X5X13
]
,
[
X38X13X15
]
,
[
X28X38
]
. (7.7)
Furthermore, there are four additional event sequences (without SAND) from X38 ∧ (X18 ∧X10)
und X38 ∧ (X27 ∧X10):[
(X18X38)
∧X10], [X18 ∧X10 ∧X38], [(X27X38) ∧X10], [X27 ∧X10 ∧X38] . (7.8)
In total there are 45 event sequences, as shown in table 7.3.
(extended) MCSS of rank two:
1: X28X38
(extended) MCSS of rank three:
1: X28X30X32 7: X28X30X36
2: X28X32X34 8: X28X34X36
3: X18
∧X10 ∧X38 9: X27 ∧X10 ∧X38
4: (X18X38)
∧X10 10: (X27X38) ∧X10
5: X38X1X5 11:X38X1X15
6: X38X5X13 12:X38X13X15
(extended) MCSS of rank four:
1: X1X5X30X32 17:X1X5X30X36
2: X1X15X30X32 18:X1X15X30X36
3: X13X5X30X32 19:X13X5X30X36
4: X13X15X30X32 20:X13X15X30X36
5: X1X5X32X34 21:X1X5X34X36
6: X1X15X32X34 22:X1X15X34X36
7: X13X5X32X34 23:X13X5X34X36
8: X13X15X32X34 24:X13X15X34X36
9: X18
∧X10 ∧ (X30X32) 25:X27 ∧X10 ∧ (X30X32)
10:X18
∧X10 ∧ (X30X36) 26:X27 ∧X10 ∧ (X30X36)
11:X18
∧X10 ∧ (X32X34) 27:X27 ∧X10 ∧ (X32X34)
12:X18
∧X10 ∧ (X34X36) 28:X27 ∧X10 ∧ (X34X36)
13: (X18X30X32)
∧X10 29: (X27X30X32)∧X10
14: (X18X30X32)
∧X10 30: (X27X30X32)∧X10
15: (X18X32X34)
∧X10 31: (X27X32X34)∧X10
16: (X18X34X36)
∧X10 32: (X27X34X36)∧X10
Table 7.3: MCSS of ranks two, three, and four, resulting from the first five expressions in (7.3).
Simplification of A ∧B:
First, A ∧B has to be broken apart. Because of limited space in this thesis, only the first
transformational steps are shown, as relevant for understanding the basic concept. B may be
transformed into the following DNF:
B = X10 ∨ (X1X5)∨ (X1X15)∨ (X5X13)∨ (X13X15) = X10 ∨ η . (7.9)
According to the temporal distributive law for temporal expressions of type I – see (4.76) –,
A
∧B = [¬ η ∧ (A ∧X10)]∨ [¬X10 ∧ (A ∧ η)]∨ [A ∧ (X10 =∧ η)] =
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=
[¬(X1X5 ∨X1X15 ∨X5X13 ∨X13X15)∧ (A ∧X10)]∨
∨ [¬X10 ∧ (A ∧ (X1X5 ∨X1X15 ∨X5X13 ∨X13X15))]∨
∨ [A ∧ (X10 =∧ (X1X5 ∨X1X15 ∨X5X13 ∨X13X15))] =
= η1 ∨ η2 ∨ η3 . (7.10)
Expression η1 may then easily be transformed into a TDNF:
η1 = ¬(X1X5 ∨X1X15 ∨X5X13 ∨X13X15)∧ (A ∧X10) =
=
[
(¬X1 ¬X13)∧ (A ∧X10)]∨ [(¬X5 ¬X15)∧ (A ∧X10)] . (7.11)
Expression η2 is more complex and thus is transformed step by step:
η2 = ¬X10 ∧
(
¬(X1X15 ∨X5X13 ∨X13X15)∧ (A ∧ (X1X5)))∨
∨ ¬X10 ∧
(
¬(X1X5)∧ (A ∧ (X1X15 ∨X5X13 ∨X13X15)))∨
∨ ¬X10 ∧
(
A
∧ ((X1X5) =∧ (X1X15 ∨X5X13 ∨X13X15))) =
= η2a ∨ η2b ∨ η2c . (7.12)
The first expression in (7.12) provides three event sequences –
η2a = ¬X10 ∧
[
([¬X1 ¬X13]∨ [¬X5 ¬X15]∨ [¬X13 ¬X15])∧ (A ∧ (X1X5))] =
=
[
(¬X1 ¬X10 ¬X13)∧ (A ∧ (X1X5))]∨
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X10 ¬X15)∧ (A ∧ (X1X5))]∨
∨ [(¬X10 ¬X13 ¬X15)∧ (A ∧ (X1X5))] – (7.13)
but only the third of these does not yield False, if rules (4.51) and (4.52) are applied.
Therefore,
η2a =
[
(¬X10 ¬X13 ¬X15)∧ (A ∧ (X1X5))] . (7.14)
The second expression in (7.12) itself provides three expressions:
η2b = (¬X10 ¬(X1X5))∧
(
¬(X5X13 ∨X13X15)∧ (A ∧ (X1X15)))∨
∨ (¬X10 ¬(X1X5))∧
(
¬(X1X15)∧ (A ∧ (X5X13 ∨X13X15)))∨
∨ (¬X10 ¬(X1X5))∧
(
A
∧ ((X1X15) =∧ (X5X13 ∨X13X15))) =
= η2b1 ∨ η2b2 ∨ η2b3 . (7.15)
Using the rules in (4.51) and (4.52) on
η2b1 = (¬X10 ¬(X1X5))∧
[
(¬X13 ∨ [¬X5 ¬X15])∧ (A ∧ (X1X15))] =
=
[
(¬X1 ¬X10 ¬X13)∧ (A ∧ (X1X15))]∨
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X10 ¬X13)∧ (A ∧ (X1X15))]∨
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X5 ¬X10 ¬X15)∧ (A ∧ (X1X15))]∨
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X10 ¬X15)∧ (A ∧ (X1X15))] (7.16)
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leaves only
η2b1 =
[
(¬X5 ¬X10 ¬X13)∧ (A ∧ (X1X15))] . (7.17)
The second part of (7.15) again provides three expressions, i.e.
η2b2 = (¬X10 ∧ (¬X1 ∨ [¬X5 ¬X15]))∧
(
¬(X13X15)∧ (A ∧ (X5X13)))∨
∨ (¬X10 ∧ (¬X1 ∨ [¬X5 ¬X15]))∧
(
¬(X5X13)∧ (A ∧ (X13X15)))∨
∨ (¬X10 ∧ (¬X1 ∨ [¬X5 ¬X15]))∧
(
A
∧ ((X5X13) =∧ (X13X15))) =
= η2b2a ∨ η2b2b ∨ η2b2c . (7.18)
Because of rules (4.51) and (4.52), the first of these expressions may be simplified to
η2b2a =
[¬X10 ∧ (¬X1 ∨ [¬X5 ¬X15])∧ ¬(X13X15)]∧ (A ∧ (X5X13)) =
= (¬X1 ¬X10 ¬X13)∧ (A ∧ (X5X13))∨
∨ (¬X1 ¬X10 ¬X15)∧ (A ∧ (X5X13))∨
∨ (¬X5 ¬X10 ¬X15)∧ (A ∧ (X5X13))∨ =
=
[
(¬X1 ¬X10 ¬X15)∧ (A ∧ (X5X13))] . (7.19)
The same steps repeated for the second expression yield
η2b2b =
[¬X10 ∧ (¬X1 ∨ [¬X5 ¬X15])∧ ¬(X5X13)]∧ (A ∧ (X13X15)) =
=
[
(¬X1 ¬X5 ¬X10)∧ (A ∧ (X13X15))] . (7.20)
Because of
(X5X13)
=∧ (X13X15) =
[
(X5X15)
∧X13]∨ [X13 ∧ (X5 =∧X15)]∨ [X15 ∧ (X5 =∧X13)]∨
∨ [X5 ∧ (X13 =∧X15)]∨ [X5 =∧X13 =∧X15] (7.21)
the third expression in (7.18) provides
η2b2c = (¬X1 ¬X10)∧
(
A
∧ [(X5X15) ∧X13]∨A ∧ [X13 ∧ (X5 =∧X15)]∨ (7.22)
∨A ∧ [X15 ∧ (X5 =∧X13)]∨A ∧ [X5 ∧ (X13 =∧X15)]∨A ∧ [X5 =∧X13 =∧X15]) ,
but only event sequence (¬X1 ¬X10)∧
[
(A∧X5 ∧X15) ∧X13] is free of SANDs. Therefore,
only this one event sequence is taken into account, as in this example dependent failures are
not considered, see chapter 7.1.2.
Inserting (7.22) and (7.20) and (7.19) into (7.18) provieds three event sequences
η2b2 =
[
(¬X1 ¬X10 ¬X15)∧ (A ∧ (X5X13))]∨
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X5 ¬X10)∧ (A ∧ (X13X15))]∨
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X10)∧ ((A∧X5 ∧X15) ∧X13)] . (7.23)
The third expression from (7.15) is still open. Using the same steps, it may be simplified to
η2b3 = (¬X10 ¬(X1X5))∧
(
A
∧ ((X1X15) =∧ (X5X13 ∨X13X15))) =
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= (¬X10 ¬(X1X5))∧
(
¬(X13X15)∧ (A ∧ ((X1X15) =∧ (X5X13))))∨
∨ (¬X10 ¬(X1X5))∧
(
¬(X5X13)∧ (A ∧ ((X1X15) =∧ (X13X15))))∨
∨ (¬X10 ¬(X1X5))∧
(
A
∧ ((X1X15) =∧ (X5X13) =∧ (X13X15))).
Applying rules (4.51) and (4.52) provides a simplified η2b3:
η2b3 = False ∨
[
(¬X10 ¬(X1X5)¬(X5X13))∧ ((A∧X1 ∧X13) ∧X15)]∨False =
=
[
(¬X5 ¬X10)∧ ((A∧X1 ∧X13) ∧X15)] . (7.24)
The results in (7.24) and (7.23) and (7.17) are inserted into (7.15), which provides the five
event sequences (again withouth SANDs) of η2b.
Transformation of expressions η2c and η2 and η3 is carried out analogously to the detailled
steps from above. This is not described explicitely.
Expression η2c from (7.12) provides two expressions (again without SAND):
η2c =
[
(¬X10 ¬X15)∧ ((A∧X1 ∧X13) ∧X5)]∨
∨ [(¬X10 ¬X13)∧ ((A∧X5 ∧X15) ∧X1)] . (7.25)
Together with (7.14) and (7.15) η2 therefore yields eigth event sequences (without SAND).
Then, expression η3 provides only event sequences with at least one SAND and is therefore
not considered further.
In total, A ∧B therefore yields two event sequences without SAND from η1, see (7.11), and
eigth event sequences from η2:
A
∧B = [(¬X1 ¬X13)∧ (A ∧X10)]∨ 〈ES1〉
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X15)∧ (A ∧X10)]∨ 〈ES2〉
∨ [(¬X10 ¬X13 ¬X15)∧ (A ∧ (X1X5))]∨ 〈ES3〉
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X10 ¬X13)∧ (A ∧ (X1X15))]∨ 〈ES4〉
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X10 ¬X15)∧ (A ∧ (X5X13))]∨ 〈ES5〉
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X5 ¬X10)∧ (A ∧ (X13X15))]∨ 〈ES6〉
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X10)∧ ((A∧X5 ∧X15) ∧X13)]∨ 〈ES7〉
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X10)∧ ((A∧X1 ∧X13) ∧X15)]∨ 〈ES8〉
∨ [(¬X10 ¬X15)∧ ((A∧X1 ∧X13) ∧X5)]∨ 〈ES9〉
∨ [(¬X10 ¬X13)∧ ((A∧X5 ∧X15) ∧X1)] . 〈ES10〉 (7.26)
Below, identifiers 〈ES1〉 to 〈ES10〉 are used as a reference to the respective event sequence. The
transformation of A is done using the temporal distributive law for temporal expressions of type
II according to (4.78). Applying (7.26) and further simplification then yields 28 different event
sequences for A ∧B.
(X1 ∨X5 ∨X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧B = . . . =
=
[
(¬X1 ¬X13)∧ ((X5 ∨X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧X10)]∨ 〈from ES1〉
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X15)∧ ((X1 ∨X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧X10)]∨ 〈from ES2〉
∨ [(¬X10 ¬X13 ¬X15)∧ ((X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧ (X1X5))]∨ 〈from ES3〉
∨ [(¬X10 ¬X13 ¬X15)∧ (X1 ∧X5)]∨ 〈from ES3〉
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∨ [(¬X10 ¬X13 ¬X15)∧ (X5 ∧X1)]∨ 〈from ES3〉
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X10 ¬X13)∧ ((X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧ (X1X15))]∨ 〈from ES4〉
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X10 ¬X13)∧ (X1 ∧X15)]∨ 〈from ES4〉
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X10 ¬X15)∧ ((X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧ (X5X13))]∨ 〈from ES5〉
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X10 ¬X15)∧ (X5 ∧X13)]∨ 〈from ES5〉
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X5 ¬X10)∧ ((X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧ (X13X15))]∨ 〈from ES6〉
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X10)∧ ((X5 ∧X15) ∧X13)]∨ 〈from ES7〉
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X10)∧ ((X1 ∧X13) ∧X15)]∨ 〈from ES8〉
∨ [(¬X10 ¬X15)∧ ((X1 ∧X13) ∧X5)]∨ 〈from ES9〉
∨ [(¬X10 ¬X13)∧ ((X5 ∧X15) ∧X1)] . 〈from ES10〉 (7.27)
Thus, A ∧B alone provides 12 event sequences of rank two and 16 event sequences of rank three.
Simplification of (A ∧B)∧C:
Using the TFTA’s temporal logic, the meshing between event B and C in the sixth and last
sub-expression of (7.3) may be solved.
According to (7.1) B and C are given as
B = X10 ∨ [(X1 ∨X13)∧ (X5 ∨X15)] and (7.28)
C = X28 ∨ [(X1 ∨X13)∧ (X5 ∨X15)]∨ [(X27 ∨X18) ∧X10] . (7.29)
Further substitution with
D = (X1 ∨X13)∧ (X5 ∨X15) = X1X5 ∨X1X15 ∨X5X13 ∨X13X15 (7.30)
uncovers the relationship between B and C:
B = X10 ∨D and (7.31)
C = X28 ∨D∨ ((X27 ∨X18) ∧X10) . (7.32)
Applying (7.31) and (7.32) provides
(A
∧B)∧C = (A ∧B)∧ (X28 ∨D∨ ((X27 ∨X18) ∧X10)) =
=
[
(A
∧B)∧X28]∨ [(A ∧B)∧D]∨ [(A ∧B)∧ ((X27 ∨X18) ∧X10)] . (7.33)
The first expression yields (without SAND)
(A
∧B)∧X28 = [A ∧B ∧X28]∨ [(A∧X28) ∧B] . (7.34)
The TDNF of (A ∧B)∧X28 consists of 56 MCSS in total. [A ∧B ∧X28] provides 28 MCSS,
each similar to those in (7.27) but extended by an additional X28.
[
(A∧X28) ∧B] also provides
28 MCSS similar to those in (7.27). Instead of A the expression A∧X28 is used, respectively.
24 of the MCSS are of rank three and 32 of the MCSS are of rank four.
The second expression in (7.33) provides (without SAND)
(A
∧B)∧D = (A ∧ (X10 ∨D))∧D = . . . =
=
[¬X10 ∧ (A ∧D)]∨ [A ∧X10 ∧D] . (7.35)
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[¬X10 ∧ (A ∧D)] provides 20 MCSS similar to those in (7.27). As D does not include event
X10 (other than B), the first eight event sequences may be dropped, i.e. the first two rows in
(7.27). In the other rows the ¬X10 are also dropped. Therefore,
A
∧D = A ∧B|
X10 =False
. (7.36)
For expression
[¬X10 ∧ (A ∧D)] only four MCSS of rank two and 16 MCSS of rank three
remain, see (7.37).
¬X10 ∧ (A ∧D) = [(¬X10 ¬X13 ¬X15)∧ ((X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧ (X1X5))]∨
∨ [(¬X10 ¬X13 ¬X15)∧ (X1 ∧X5)]∨
∨ [(¬X10 ¬X13 ¬X15)∧ (X5 ∧X1)]∨
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X10 ¬X13)∧ ((X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧ (X1X15))]∨
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X10 ¬X13)∧ (X1 ∧X15)]∨
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X10 ¬X15)∧ ((X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧ (X5X13))]∨
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X10 ¬X15)∧ (X5 ∧X13)]∨
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X5 ¬X10)∧ ((X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧ (X13X15))]∨
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X10)∧ ((X5 ∧X15) ∧X13)]∨
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X10)∧ ((X1 ∧X13) ∧X15)]∨
∨ [(¬X10 ¬X15)∧ ((X1 ∧X13) ∧X5)]∨
∨ [(¬X10 ¬X13)∧ ((X5 ∧X15) ∧X1)] . (7.37)
The expression in (7.37) provides 20 MCSS. Because of the additional X10, four of those MCSS
are of rank three and 16 are of rank four, see (7.38).
¬X10 ∧ (A ∧D) = [(¬X13 ¬X15)∧ ((X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧X10 ∧ (X1X5))]∨
∨ [(¬X13 ¬X15)∧ (X1 ∧X10 ∧X5)]∨
∨ [(¬X10 ¬X13 ¬X15)∧ (X5 ∧X10 ∧X1)]∨
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X13)∧ ((X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧X10 ∧ (X1X15))]∨
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X10 ¬X13)∧ (X1 ∧X10 ∧X15)]∨
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X15)∧ ((X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧X10 ∧ (X5X13))]∨
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X10 ¬X15)∧ (X5 ∧X10 ∧X13)]∨
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X5)∧ ((X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧X10 ∧ (X13X15))]∨
∨ [¬X1 ∧ ((X5 ∧X15) ∧X10 ∧X13)]∨
∨ [¬X5 ∧ ((X1 ∧X13) ∧X10 ∧X15)]∨
∨ [¬X15 ∧ ((X1 ∧X13) ∧X10 ∧X5)]∨
∨ [¬X13 ∧ ((X5 ∧X15) ∧X10 ∧X1)] . (7.38)
The transformation of the third expression
[
(A
∧B)∧ ((X27 ∨X18) ∧X10)], see (7.33), is best
demonstrated separately for each of the event sequences 〈ES1〉 to 〈ES10〉 in (7.26).
〈ES1〉 and 〈ES2〉 differ in the relevant events; therefore
〈ES1〉 : [(¬X1 ¬X13)∧ ((X5 ∨X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧X10)]∧ ((X27 ∨X18) ∧X10) =
= (¬X1 ¬X13)∧
(
(X5X18)∨ (X20X18)∨ (X22X18)∨ (X24X18)∨
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∨ (X5X27)∨ (X20X27)∨ (X22X27)∨ (X24X27)
) ∧X10 and
〈ES2〉 : (¬X5 ¬X15)∧
(
(X1X18)∨ (X20X18)∨ (X22X18)∨ (X24X18)∨
∨ (X1X27)∨ (X20X27)∨ (X22X27)∨ (X24X27)
) ∧X10 . (7.39)
The first part of 〈ES3〉 provides
〈ES3〉 : [(¬X10 ¬X13 ¬X15)∧ ((X20 ∨X22 ∨X24) ∧ (X1X5))]∧ ((X27 ∨X18) ∧X10) .
(7.40)
Further simplification yields only event sequences of rank five and higher. These are not further
considered, as they are far more improbable than the other MCSS, which contribute significantly
more. Such a reduction of the necessary effort is state of the art in conventional FTA, too. The
same is true for the simplification of the first part of 〈ES4〉 and 〈ES5〉, as well as for all of 〈ES6〉
to 〈ES10〉.
The second part of 〈ES3〉 provides four MCSS of rank four:
〈ES3〉 : [(¬X10 ¬X13 ¬X15)∧ (X1 ∧X5)]∧ ((X27 ∨X18) ∧X10) =
=
[
(¬X13 ¬X15 ¬X27)∧ (X1 ∧X5 ∧X18 ∧X10)]∨
∨ [(¬X13 ¬X15 ¬X18)∧ (X1 ∧X5 ∧X27 ∧X10)]∨
∨ [(¬X13 ¬X15 ¬X27)∧ ((X1X18) ∧X5 ∧X10)]∨
∨ [(¬X13 ¬X15 ¬X18)∧ ((X1X27) ∧X5 ∧X10)] . (7.41)
Analogously, the third part of 〈ES3〉 and the second parts of 〈ES4〉 and 〈ES5〉 also provide
four MCSS of rank four, respectively:
〈ES3〉 : [(¬X10 ¬X13 ¬X15)∧ (X5 ∧X1)]∧ ((X27 ∨X18) ∧X10) =
=
[
(¬X13 ¬X15 ¬X27)∧ (X5 ∧X1 ∧X18 ∧X10)]∨
∨ [(¬X13 ¬X15 ¬X18)∧ (X5 ∧X1 ∧X27 ∧X10)]∨
∨ [(¬X13 ¬X15 ¬X27)∧ ((X5X18) ∧X1 ∧X10)]∨
∨ [(¬X13 ¬X15 ¬X18)∧ ((X5X27) ∧X1 ∧X10)] . (7.42)
〈ES4〉 : [(¬X5 ¬X10 ¬X13)∧ (X1 ∧X15)]∧ ((X27 ∨X18) ∧X10) =
=
[
(¬X5 ¬X13 ¬X27)∧ (X1 ∧X15 ∧X18 ∧X10)]∨
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X13 ¬X18)∧ (X1 ∧X15 ∧X27 ∧X10)]∨
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X13 ¬X27)∧ ((X1X18) ∧X15 ∧X10)]∨
∨ [(¬X5 ¬X13 ¬X18)∧ ((X1X27) ∧X15 ∧X10)] . (7.43)
〈ES5〉 : [(¬X1 ¬X10 ¬X15)∧ (X5 ∧X13)]∧ ((X27 ∨X18) ∧X10) =
=
[
(¬X1 ¬X15 ¬X27)∧ (X5 ∧X13 ∧X18 ∧X10)]∨
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X15 ¬X18)∧ (X5 ∧X13 ∧X27 ∧X10)]∨
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X15 ¬X27)∧ ((X5X18) ∧X13 ∧X10)]∨
∨ [(¬X1 ¬X15 ¬X18)∧ ((X5X27) ∧X13 ∧X10)] . (7.44)
7.3.3 Analyis of the MCSS
The MCSS of the temporal failure function $ are derived from the event sequences of the sub-
expressions in (7.3), which are not necessarily already MCSS, i.e. there could be intersections
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and overlaps between these individual expressions. In general, MCSS of smaller rank are those
with higher importance. Therefore, the following discussion focusses on MCSS of rank two and
three.
Event Sequences of the Resulting Expressions
The expresions’ event sequences of rank two and three are listed in table 7.4. They are derived
from table 7.3 on page 92 as well as the equations (7.34), (7.37), (7.38), and (7.39).
(extended) event sequences of rank two:
1: X1
∧X5 3: X1 ∧X15 5: X28 ∧X38
2: X5
∧X1 4: X5 ∧X13
(extended) event sequences of rank three:
1: X28 ∧X30 ∧X32 25: (X5 ∧X28)∧X10 49: X1 ∧X10 ∧X5
2: X28 ∧X30 ∧X36 26: (X20 ∧X28)∧X10 50: X5 ∧X10 ∧X1
3: X28 ∧X32 ∧X34 27: (X22 ∧X28)∧X10 51: X1 ∧X10 ∧X15
4: X28 ∧X34 ∧X36 28: (X24 ∧X28)∧X10 52: X5 ∧X10 ∧X13
5: X18
∧X10 ∧X38 29: (X1 ∧X28)∧X10 53: (X5 ∧X18) ∧X10
6: (X18 ∧X38)∧X10 30: ::::::::::::::::(X20 ∧X28)∧X10 54: (X18 ∧X20)∧X10
7: X1 ∧X5 ∧X38 31: ::::::::::::::::(X22 ∧X28)
∧X10 55: (X18 ∧X22)∧X10
8: X1 ∧X15 ∧X38 ♦ 32: ::::::::::::::::(X24 ∧X28)
∧X10 56: (X18 ∧X24)∧X10
9: X5 ∧X13 ∧X38 ♦ 33: (X1 ∧X28)∧X5 57: (X1 ∧X18) ∧X10
10: X13 ∧X15 ∧X38 34: (X5 ∧X28)∧X1 58: ::::::::::::::::(X18 ∧X20)∧X10
11: X27
∧X10 ∧X38 35: (X1 ∧X28)∧X15 59: ::::::::::::::::(X18 ∧X22)∧X10
12: (X27 ∧X38)∧X10 36: (X5 ∧X28)∧X13 60: ::::::::::::::::(X18 ∧X24)∧X10
13: X5
∧X10 ∧X28 37: X20 ∧ (X1 ∧X5) 61: (X5 ∧X27) ∧X10
14: X20
∧X10 ∧X28 38: X22 ∧ (X1 ∧X5) 62: (X20 ∧X27) ∧X10
15: X22
∧X10 ∧X28 39: X24 ∧ (X1 ∧X5) 63: (X22 ∧X27) ∧X10
16: X24
∧X10 ∧X28 40: X20 ∧ (X1 ∧X15) ♦ 64: (X24 ∧X27) ∧X10
17: X1
∧X10 ∧X28 41: X22 ∧ (X1 ∧X15) ♦ 65: (X1 ∧X27)∧X10
18:
::::::::::::::
X20
∧X10 ∧X28 42: X24 ∧ (X1 ∧X15) ♦ 66: ::::::::::::::::(X20 ∧X27) ∧X10
19:
::::::::::::::
X22
∧X10 ∧X28 43: X20 ∧ (X5 ∧X13) ♦ 67: ::::::::::::::::(X22 ∧X27) ∧X10
20:
::::::::::::::
X24
∧X10 ∧X28 44: X22 ∧ (X5 ∧X13) ♦ 68: ::::::::::::::::(X24 ∧X27) ∧X10
21: X1
∧X5 ∧X28 45: X24 ∧ (X5 ∧X13) ♦ 69: (X5 ∧X15) ∧X13
22: X5
∧X1 ∧X28 46: X20 ∧ (X13 ∧X15) 70: (X1 ∧X13) ∧X15
23: X1
∧X15 ∧X28 47: X22 ∧ (X13 ∧X15) 71: (X1 ∧X13) ∧X5
24: X5
∧X13 ∧X28 48: X24 ∧ (X13 ∧X15) 72: (X5 ∧X15) ∧X1
Table 7.4: Event sequences of rank two and three. Event sequences which are included more
than once have an
::::::::::::
“underwave”, non-minimal event sequences are striked through,
“partly” non-minimal event sequences are marked with ♦.
Minimal Form and MCSS of the Failure Funktion
A total of 12 of the 77 event sequences in table 7.4 are included at least twice and may be
omitted using the law of idempotency. A further 20 event sequences are non-minimal and also
omitted. The extended event sequences number 8 and 9 and 40 to 45, i.e.[
X1 ∧X15 ∧X38
]
,
[
X5 ∧X13 ∧X38
]
,[
X20
∧ (X1 ∧X15)], [X22 ∧ (X1 ∧X15)], [X24 ∧ (X1 ∧X15)],[
X20
∧ (X5 ∧X13)], [X22 ∧ (X5 ∧X13)], [X24 ∧ (X5 ∧X13)], (7.45)
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are “partly” non-minimal with respect to the MCSS of rank two, i.e.[
X1
∧X15] and [X5 ∧X13] . (7.46)
Therefore, it is necessary to break up the extended event sequences in order to separate their
minimal and non-minimal parts.
For example, the event sequenceX20
∧ (X1 ∧X15) provides (without SAND) two non-extended
(normal) event sequences, i.e.
X20
∧ (X1 ∧X15) = [(X1X20) ∧X15]∨ [(X15X20) ∧X1] , (7.47)
where the first is non-minimal with respect to X1
∧X15.
In analogy to that,
X1 ∧X15 ∧X38 =
[
(X1
∧X15)∧X38]∨ [(X15 ∧X1)∧X38] . (7.48)
Only the second event sequence is minimal. It is first transformed into a TDNF, thus
(X15
∧X1)∧X38 = [X15 ∧X1 ∧X38]∨ [(X15 ∧X38) ∧X1] . (7.49)
Therefore, the two partly minimal event sequences number 8 and 9 provide four minimal MCSS.
Table 7.5 shows a cleaned up list, in which only MCSS of rank two and three of the failure
function $ are shown.
(extended) MCSS of rank two:
1: X1
∧X5 3: X1 ∧X15 5: X28 ∧X38
2: X5
∧X1 4: X5 ∧X13
(extended) MCSS of rank three:
1: X28 ∧X30 ∧X32 15: (X5 ∧X28)∧X10 29: X20 ∧X10 ∧X28
2: X28 ∧X30 ∧X36 16: (X20 ∧X28)∧X10 30: X22 ∧X10 ∧X28
3: X28 ∧X32 ∧X34 17: (X22 ∧X28)∧X10 31: X24 ∧X10 ∧X28
4: X28 ∧X34 ∧X36 18: (X24 ∧X28)∧X10 32: X1 ∧X10 ∧X28
5: X18
∧X10 ∧X38 19: (X1 ∧X28)∧X10 33: (X5 ∧X18)∧X10
6: (X18 ∧X38)∧X10 20: (X15 ∧X20)∧X1 34: (X18 ∧X20)∧X10
7: X15
∧X1 ∧X38 21: (X15 ∧X22)∧X1 35: (X18 ∧X22)∧X10
8: (X15 ∧X38)∧X1 22: (X15 ∧X24)∧X1 36: (X18 ∧X24)∧X10
9: X13
∧X5 ∧X38 23: (X13 ∧X20)∧X5 37: (X1 ∧X18) ∧X10
10: (X13 ∧X38)∧X5 24: (X13 ∧X22)∧X5 38: (X5 ∧X27) ∧X10
11: X13 ∧X15 ∧X38 25: (X13 ∧X24)∧X5 39: (X20 ∧X27)∧X10
12: X27
∧X10 ∧X38 26: X20 ∧ (X13 ∧X15) 40: (X22 ∧X27)∧X10
13: (X27 ∧X38)∧X10 27: X22 ∧ (X13 ∧X15) 41: (X24 ∧X27)∧X10
14: X5
∧X10 ∧X28 28: X24 ∧ (X13 ∧X15) 42: (X1 ∧X27) ∧X10
Table 7.5: MCSS of rank two and three. This table is a version of table 7.4, but stripped of
non-minimal event sequences and duplicates.
Results
The MCSS of the failure function are all of ranks two and higher. Therefore, no single failure
within the system as modelled leads directly to an infraction of the safety goal. The example
system thus satisfies the requirement of single-failure-resistance, as described in chapter 7.2.
The most important combinations of dangerous failures, that lead to an infraction of the
safety goal, are MCSS of rank two and three. The five MCSS of rank two are
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1. either failures of the two sensors following each other. In this case EN1 would be activated
by the first sensor failure, and SAF would be activated by the second sensor failure. These
two failures may occur in arbitrary sequence.
2. or one sensor failure in combination with a failure of µC. The sensor failure needs to occur
before the failure of the µC, otherwise the sequence logic in L would not be activated.
3. or am failure of T3 in combination with a failure of L, which activates both power stages.
These two failures may occur in arbitrary sequence.
MCSS of rank three are e.g.
1. a double failure of the high side and the low side of the driver in combination with an
internal failure in T3. No sequence logic has to be respected here. Specifically, numbers
1 to 4 in table 7.5 are combinations of this type.
2. failures of the system ASIC in combination with failures of the µC and/or sensor failures.
Specifically, numbers 20 to 28 in table 7.5 are combinations of this type.
3. a failure of the watchdog or of the emergency switch in combination with an ASIC failure,
where both occur before an additional failure of the µC, see, for instance, numbers 34 to
36 and 39 to 41 in table 7.5.
4. a failure in one of the sensors in combination with a failure of the watchdog or the emer-
gency switch, where both occur before an additional failure of the µC, see, for instance,
numbers 33, 37, 38, and 42 in table 7.5.
7.4 Probabilistic Analysis of the TOP Failure Parameters
The qualitative analysis of the temporal fault tree is used as evidence that the system stays below
the threshold for failure rates as required by ISO26262 for ASIL D systems. This threshold is
given as ≤ 1 · 10−8 1h for any operating hour during the whole mission time.
In order to do so, it has to be demonstrated, that the failure rate of the TOP event λTOP
stays below this threshold.
Because of fTOP (TM ) ≈ λTOP , see (5.59), it is sufficient to use the TOP event’s failure
frequency as a good approximation.
Furthermore, an iterative multi-step approach is chosen, that reduces effort and is used in
similar fashion in many real world FTA analyses. First, an approximation with conservative
estimations of the failure rates is used that allows for a first overview.
The evidence is sufficiently produced if, using this approach, the thresholds, as required by
the safety standard, are not exceeded. If this can not be shown, the next step is to determine
the failure rates more exactly and/or use exact calculations instead of approximations – and to
possibly restrict the further analysis to the most important contributors as identified in the first
step’s overview. The termination condition for these steps is that the thresholds, as required
by the safety standard, are no longer exceeded.
Because of this, in the following discussion the MCSS are not transformed into a mutually
exclusive (disjoint) form. Instead, the approximation approach from chapter 5.5 is used. This
corresponds to the bottom most path in figure 3.1 on page 18.
Quantification of the failure function $ is carried out using its MCSS from table 7.5. All
basic events are allocated the same failure rate of λ = 10−6 1h .
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Table 7.6 shows failure probabilities and failure frequencies according to (5.74) and (5.75) for
each MCSS from table 7.5. The mission time is given as TM = 1000h.
MCSS of rank two:
1: F =5·10−7; f=1·10−9 1h 3: F =5·10
−7; f=1·10−9 1h 5: F =1·10
−6; f=2·10−9 1h
2: F =5·10−7; f=1·10−9 1h 4: F =5·10
−7; f=1·10−9 1h
MCSS of rank three:
1: F =1·10−9; f=3·10−12 1h 15: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 29: F =
1
6
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h
2: F =1·10−9; f=3·10−12 1h 16: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 30: F =
1
6
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h
3: F =1·10−9; f=3·10−12 1h 17: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 31: F =
1
6
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h
4: F =1·10−9; f=3·10−12 1h 18: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 32: F =
1
6
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h
5: F = 1
6
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 19: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 33: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h
6: F = 1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 20: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 34: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h
7: F = 1
6
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 21: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 35: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h
8: F = 1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 22: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 36: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h
9: F = 1
6
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 23: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 37: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h
10: F = 1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 24: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 38: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h
11: F =1·10−9; f=3·10−12 1h 25: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 39: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h
12: F = 1
6
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 26: F =
2
3
·10−9; f=2·10−12 1h 40: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h
13: F = 1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 27: F =
2
3
·10−9; f=2·10−12 1h 41: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h
14: F = 1
6
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h 28: F =
2
3
·10−9; f=2·10−12 1h 42: F =
1
3
·10−9; f=1·10−12 1h
Table 7.6: Failure probabilites and failure frequencies according to (5.74) and (5.75) for each
MCSS from table 7.5.
Failure characteristics at TOP event level are then calculated using (5.55) and (5.56), respec-
tively, as sum of the individual MCSS’ contributions. Using the values from table 7.6 yields
FTOP (TM ) ≈ 3,017 · 10−6 and (7.50)
fTOP (TM ) ≈ 6,055 · 10−9 1h . (7.51)
This first approximation already provides the evidence for meeting the ISO26262 standard’s
requirements for ASIL D; the TOP event’s failure frequency in (7.51) stays well below the
threshold of 1 · 10−8 1h .
Remark: With conventional FTA the PAND gate would have to be replaced by normal AND
gates. This would affect the failure frequencies of minimal cutsets of rank two the most. These
minimal cutsets would be the same as the MCSS of rank two, only using AND operators instead
of the PANDs. Accordingly, in an Boolean FTA the TOP event’s failure frequency would nearly
double compared to the TFTA’s result, yielding > 1 · 10−8 1h and, thus, exceeding the threshold
limit.
7.5 Discussion
The analysis of this real world example system in chapter 7.1 demonstrates that the TFTA
method is not limited to modelling only very small examples. Chapter 7 thereby extends the
theoretical discussions on the TFTA approach in chapters 4 and 5, as well as the statements on
basic application of the TFTA in chapter 6.
The analogy to the conventional FTA is shown during the creation of the temporal fault
tree in figures 7.2 to 7.4. In this process no additional effort is necessary in comparison to the
Boolean FTA apart from choosing temporal fault tree gates.
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In this temporal fault tree there are several meshings of basic events as well as of whole sub
trees. For instance, events beneath “µC signal failure” are found beneath a temporal gate (“L
commanded failure”). The same events are also found in the purely Boolean part of the fault
tree below of “commanded failure T3”. Additionally, the basic event “10 – µC generic failure
activates SAF” is found in different and otherwise separated subtrees beneath different PAND
gates.
Using such meshing in e.g. an DFT approach would dramatically increase the effort; the
necessary separation into different dynamic and non-dynamic modules would require that almost
the whole fault tree had to be modelled as a dynamic module, i.e. in case of the DFT it had to
be modelled using markov methods.
The detailed qualitative analysis of the temporal fault tree in chapter 7.3 demonstrates that
the TFTA is able to solve these meshings by use of its temporal transformation laws.
On the one hand it is true that the calculatory effort for these transformations increases
rapidly, specifically because of the temporal distributive laws. On the other hand, the required
calculations are mostly limited to string-manipulations. As a general rule, these are less costly
than solving exponentially growing markov models or simulating big petri nets, as necessary for
the other methods.
The analysis of the MCSS in chapter 7.3.3 is, then, very similar to the Boolean FTA. Among
others, it is demonstrated that the TFTA is well suited for real qualitative analysis. As described
in chapter 6, this is one of the main advantages of the TFTA.
The probabilistic quantification, as demonstrated in chapter 7.4, is based on a step-by-step
approach, as is best praxis. This allows adjusting modelling precision to the issue at hand –
which implies adjustable effort –, as well as concentrating all ressources on the most important
contributors. Both is not possible to the same extend when using the DFT.

8 Summary and Outlook
I want electricity to become so cheap
that only the rich can afford candles.
(Thomas Alva Edison)
The new approach to temporal fault tree analysis presented in this thesis is called TFTA; it
extends the Boolean FTA in order to include event sequences. In comparison to the conventional
FTA this allows a more realistic model of the failure behaviour of complex and dynamic systems.
The new TFTA uses a new temporal logic described in this thesis. With this logic it differs
significantly from most existing approaches with similar aims. These transform the FTA model
completely or partially into a state based model; temporal effects are then handled in the state
space, and the results are then transfered back into the fault tree. TFTA contrasts with such
state based methods in that
• it uses an extension to Boolean algebra and logic,
• its notation, terms, and its workflow and work products are taken from the conventional
FTA,
• it allows qualitative as well as probabilistic analyses and calculations including event
sequence information.
In comparison to other known approaches that also use a “temporal logic” to include temporal
information into the fault tree the TFTA is significantly leaner.
Specifically, TFTA is not another attempt to create a formal FTA logic for modelling of
software systems. Instead, TFTA emphasises practise-oriented characteristics like intuitive ap-
plicability, readability, comprehensible logic expressions and results, transferability of real world
failure effects into the model, and scalability.
The temporal logic of the TFTA uses the Boolean operations of conjunction, disjunction, and
negation. Additionally, two new temporal operations (PAND and SAND) represent two “special
conjunctions” that describe event sequences and simultaneous events, respectively.
Using the well known Boolean algebra and a set of new temporal transformation laws, it is
possible to transform complex temporal expressions into their temporal disjunctive normal form
(TDNF) which consists of separate event sequences. In analogy to the Boolean fault tree cutsets
these event sequences are reduced to a minimal form, the so-called minimal cutset sequences
(MCSS).
Then, MCSS are made mutually exclusive (i.e. disjoint). This disjoint form is especially well
suited for direct quantification and makes probabilistic analysis possible.
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Other than conventional FTA, probabilistic TFTA allows to calculate reliability characteris-
tics like failure probability, failure frequency, and failure rate of a fault tree TOP event with
consideration of event sequence information, and without the need to change into the state
space.
Evaluation of this Thesis
Originally, the development of an own temporal logic aimed primarily at solving some of the
problems that arise with the known dynamic extensions of the FTA which are based on markov
methods. The DFT method [37] is a well known representative of such dynamic extensions, and
thus it is an obvious choice to compare what this thesis achieved with the DFT method.
With regard to the calculatory effort, the consideration of event sequences always implies
additional cost when compared to the Boolean FTA. This is true for state based extensions, as
well as for extended logics covering temporal effects. This additional cost is a concern, even more
so, as the determination of disjoint minimal cutsets in Boolean FTA already carries exponentially
growing complexity. On the other hand, the TFTA method does not aim at solving this.
Some of the TFTA’s problems are fundamentally connected to the kind of temporal logic
that is used. Event sequence statements only cover the points in time at which events occur.
Therefore, “time-limited” failure events, i.e. events with a defined time span of being True,
can not be represented by PAND and SAND. Instead, such effects need to be represented by
conventional AND gates. This, however, is no deterioration in comparison to the DFT method.
The markov chains that the DFT uses are also only able of capturing state transitions resulting
from “initiating” failure events; it is not able to capture “time-limited” failure events. The
DFT only hides this shortcoming better, because of the necessary modularization and because
meshing is impossible.
One major shortcoming of the DFT is modularization. In some cases, it makes it impossible
to mesh events beyond single dynamic fault tree gates logically correctly. Compared to that,
TFTA allows for such meshing. It, thus, is possible to consider more event sequence effects.
Another major shortcoming of the DFT concerns qualitative evaluation of minimal cutsets.
The transformation into the state space either forces the use of “meta events” in addition to
basic events; these meta event represent complete markov models. As an alternative, qualita-
tive analysis is restricted to not include event sequence information. Compared to that, the
(extended) event sequences in TFTA show exact event sequence information of all basic events
that contribute to the TOP failure. As such, the TFTA permits more meaningful and efficient
qualitative analyses than the DFT.
Both, the TFTA as well as the DFT allow for probabilistic evaluation of the TOP event’s
failure rate and failure probability. On the one hand, with this quantification it is possible to
determine the precise TOP event’s failure characteristics at comparably high calculatory costs.
On the other hand, an approximation for the TFTA is provided, which reduces the necessary
effort significantly.
Three more arguments support the TFTA with regard to calculatory costs: first, the size of
the differential equations system, necessary for solving the DFT, grows exponentially with the
number of component failures that are within a dynamic module. Therefore, the overhead of
TFTA (compared to Boolean FTA) is at least comparable with the DFT’s overhead – and the
TFTA provides more meaningful results, as discussed above. Second, calculations in the TFTA
are mainly string-manipulations. These usually require less effort than solving exponentially
growing state models. Third, the TFTA offers approximation methods, which provide a real
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possibility to reduce overhead effectively, while accepting a certain degree of impreciseness; this
may be used e.g. as a first step within a multi-step analysis.
Therefore, the TFTA is a capable replacement for the DFT’s PAND gates, and furthermore
provides some advantages methodology-wise, as well as for its useability.
Possible Further Research
During this theses several additional topics were discovered that could not be completely cov-
ered and solved within this work. For instance, SAND connections are defined as (structural)
dependencies between failure events, and they are considered qualitatively, but they are not
taken into account probabilistically. Because of the significance of dependent failures, which
are sometime just called common cause failures (CCF), it seems promising to extend the TFTA
method, as described in this thesis, by such dependencies. Furthermore, this thesis restricts
itself to non-repairable failures. It seems possible that the TFTA’s temporal logic, as well as
the probabilistic aspects of the TFTA, may be extended to repairable failures. It could also be
interesting to develop advanced methods to determine mutually exclusive (disjoint) expressions
from a given TDNF. One possible way could be to follow segmentation-methods, like Abraham
[80] or Heidtmann [81] proposed for Boolean algebra. Furthermore, it seems promising to inves-
tigate possible synergies between the TFTA logic and the BDD method in [86]. In general, there
certainly is a demand for improved algorithms for using the TFTA in practise. In this regard,
contributing to open source fault tree tools (like e.g. OpenFTA [87]) could be an interesting
possibility.
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Appendix

A Further Explanations on Selected Topics
A.1 Reliability Characteristics
The probabilistic description of the failure behaviour of systems is done using characteristics,
see table A.1. These are stochastic or probabilistic values, as the deterministic failure behaviour
of an individual component or an individual system is usually not known in advance. Taking
the probability distributions into account that result from such values is difficult in many real
applications, in particular because of the effort necessary to assemble knowlegde on the kind of
distribution. In many cases constant or mean values are thus used instead of distributed values.
This thesis uses the terms failure probability, failure frequency and failure rate, even if it
originates in a safety backgound, as
• the essential statements apply to the field of general reliability analogously and
• the use of such terms, that originally come from general reliability, is very common in the
context of safety; see e.g. the relevant safety standards ISO26262 [3] and IEC61508 [4].
non repairable systems
reliability safety
charact. symbol charact. symbol
failure probability F (t) hazard-probability G(t)
reliability R(t) safety-probability S(t)
failure frequency f(t) hazard-density g(t)
failure rate h(t) hazard-rate δ(t)
if constant: λ
repairable systems
reliability safety
charact. symbol charact. symbol
repair rate µ(t) safety-restoration rate ν(t)
probability of restoration M(t) probability of safety- W (t)
restoration
repair frequency m(t) frequency of safety- w(t)
restoration
availability V (t) safety-availability VS(t)
unavailability U(t) “safety-unavailability“ US(t)
Table A.1: Characteristics of reliability and safety analysis according to [14]
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A.2 Creating and Using Sequential Failure Trees in the TFTA
Sequential failure trees allow visualization of temporal-logical expressions, as well as manual
verification of transformations according to the laws of TFTA’s temporal logic. Creating a
sequential failure tree corresponding to a complex temporal expression requires some effort, but
it is based on only a few basic steps.
Choosing the Right Failure Tree
The number of basic events within a temporal expression determines what kind of sequential
failure tree needs to be chosen. The failure tree must at least support the number of basic events,
but it may be bigger, too. Depending on the particular application, the simplified sequential
failure tree without SAND may be sufficient.
An example: the following figure shows two sequential failure trees, that are both suited for
the expression $ = A∧B and are not yet filled in.
A
B
B
AB
A
A
B
C
ABC
AB AC BCB
B
A A
C C
BC AC AB
AA BBC C C B A
Transforming the Temporal Expression
If the temporal expression is too complex, then, in a first step, simple sub-expressions need to
be identified, and for these sequential fault trees are then created. As an extreme example, the
basic events of the temporal expression are chosen. The following steps are then repeated for
all these sub-expressions.
For instance, the two sub-expressions A and B are chosen for the expression $ = A∧B.
Minimal Failure Nodes
Starting with the top-node all branches of the sequential failure tree are walked along, until in
each branch the currently chosen sub-expression has occurred (or the branch has ended), and
the minimal failure nodes are tagged.
An example is presented in the next step.
Non-Minimal Failure Nodes
All nodes beneath a minimal failure node are tagged as successor nodes.
An example: the following figures show the minimal (on the left side) as well as minimal and
successor failure nodes (right side) corresponding to the temporal expression $ = A.
A
B
C
ABC
AB AC BCB
B
A A
C C
BC AC AB
AA BBC C C B A
A
B
C
ABC
AB AC BCB
B
A A
C C
BC AC AB
AA BBC C C B A
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Negated Events
Starting with the sequential failure tree corresponding to an event, all original non-failure nodes
are marked as new minimal failure nodes; and all original failure nodes (minimal as well as
successor) are marked as non-failure nodes. No new non-minimal failure nodes are added.
The following figure shows the sequential failure tree for the example of ¬A.
A
B
C
ABC
AB AC BCB
B
A A
C C
BC AC AB
AA BBC C C B A
Conjunction/AND Relationship
The sequential failure tree of the conjunction of two temporal expressions is the “intersection”
of the individual expressions’ sequential failure trees. Minimal failure nodes thereby absorb
non-minimal failure nodes. In a next step, non-minimal failure nodes are added as necessary;
this is especially necessary in case of negated events.
An example is presented in the next step.
Disjunction/OR Relationship
The sequential failure tree of the disjunction of two temporal expressions is the “union“ of
the individual expressions’ sequential failure trees. Non-minimal failure nodes thereby absorb
minimal failure nodes. In a next step, non-minimal failure nodes are added as necessary; this
is especially necessary in case of negated events.
An example: the following figure shows (from left to right) two simplified sequential failure
trees, as well as their “intersection” and “union“, respectively.
A
B
C
B BA AC C
AA BBC C
A
B
C
B BA AC C
AA BBC C
A
B
C
B BA AC C
AA BBC C
A
B
C
B BA AC C
AA BBC C
PAND Relationship
The sequential failure tree of the PAND connection of two temporal expressions, i.e. $1
∧$2,
is generated as follows: All those nodes are marked as minimal failure nodes that are minimal
failure nodes of $2 together with being non-minimal failure nodes of $1. In a next step, non-
minimal failure nodes are added as necessary.
An example: the following figure shows (from left to right) two simplified sequential failure
trees and their PAND connection.
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A
B
C
B BA AC C
AA BBC C
A
B
C
B BA AC C
AA BBC C
A
B
C
B BA AC C
AA BBC C
SAND Relationship
The sequential failure tree of the SAND connection of two temporal expressions, i.e. $1
=∧$2,
is generated as follows: All those nodes are marked as minimal failure nodes that are minimal
failure nodes of$2 together with being minimal failure nodes of$1. In a next step, non-minimal
failure nodes are added as necessary.
An example: the following figure shows (from left to right) two simplified sequential failure
trees and their SAND connection.
A
B
C
B BA AC C
AA BBC C
A
B
C
B BA AC C
AA BBC C
A
B
C
B BA AC C
AA BBC C
A.3 Examples: Mutually Exclusive (Disjoint) Temporal
Expressions
The following assumes n = 3 and failure events A, B, and C.
First Example
The failure function $ = B is already given as a TDNF with only one sub-expression; it is not
a minterm, though, as not all possible failure events are included in this expression. Using the
method provided on page 52 yields a TDNF of mutually exclusive (disjoint) and minimal event
sequences, that are temporal minterms, too:
B = B ∧ (¬A∨A)∧ (¬C ∨C) =
=
[
A∧B ∧C]∨ [¬C ∧ (A∧B)]∨ [¬A∧ (B ∧C)]∨ [(¬A¬C)∧B] .
For better readability, the four resulting sub-expressions are inspected separately.
η1 = A∧B ∧C .
Using the law of completion twice yields
η1 =
[
(A∧B) ∧C]∨ [(A∧B) =∧C]∨ [C ∧ (A∧B)] =
=
[
(A
∧B ∨A =∧B ∨B ∧A) ∧C]∨ [(A ∧B ∨A =∧B ∨B ∧A) =∧C]∨
∨ [C ∧ (A ∧B ∨A =∧B ∨B ∧A)] .
A.3 Examples: Mutually Exclusive (Disjoint) Temporal Expressions 121
As the expressions in round brackets are mutually exclusive (disjoint),
η1 =
[
A
∧B ∧C]∨ [(A =∧B) ∧C]∨ [B ∧A ∧C]∨ [(A ∧B) =∧C]∨ [(A =∧B) =∧C]∨
∨ [(B ∧A) =∧C]∨ [C ∧ (A ∧B)]∨ [C ∧ (A =∧B)]∨ [C ∧ (B ∧A)] .
Applying the transformation laws of the temporal logic then yields
η1 =
[
A
∧B ∧C]∨ [(A =∧B) ∧C]∨ [B ∧A ∧C]∨ [A ∧ (B =∧C)]∨ [A =∧B =∧C]∨
∨ [B ∧ (A =∧C)]∨ [A ∧C ∧B]∨ [(A =∧C) ∧B]∨ [C ∧A ∧B]∨
∨ [B ∧C ∧A]∨ [(B =∧C) ∧A]∨ [C ∧B ∧A]∨ [C ∧ (A =∧B)] .
With this the transformation of the first sub-expression is completed.
Now, applying the law of completion on the second sub-expression, i.e.
η2 = ¬C ∧ (A∧B)
yields already disjoint expressions, thus
η2 = ¬C ∧
(
(A
∧B ∨ (A =∧B)∨ (B ∧A)) =
=
[¬C ∧ (A ∧B)]∨ [¬C ∧ (A =∧B)]∨ [¬C ∧ (B ∧A)] .
The third sub-expression is transformed analogously, thus
η3 = ¬A∧ (B ∧C) =
[¬A∧ (B ∧C)]∨ [¬A∧ (B =∧C)]∨ [¬A∧ (C ∧B)] .
The fourth sub-expression consists of one event sequence, that cannot be further simplified:
η4 = (¬A¬C)∧B .
Combining these results, the three-variables minterm form of expression $ = B is given as
(meaning of underlines, see below):
$ = B = η1 ∨ η2 ∨ η3 ∨ η4 =
=
[
A
∧B ∧C]∨ [(A =∧B) ∧C]∨ [B ∧A ∧C]∨ [A ∧ (B =∧C)]∨ [A =∧B =∧C]∨
∨ [B ∧ (A =∧C)]∨ [A ∧C ∧B]∨ [(A =∧C) ∧B]∨ [C ∧A ∧B]∨ [B ∧C ∧A]∨
∨ [(B =∧C) ∧A]∨ [C ∧B ∧A]∨ [¬C ∧ (A ∧B)]∨ [¬C ∧ (A =∧B)]∨
∨ [¬C ∧ (B ∧A)]∨ [¬A∧ (B ∧C)]∨ [¬A∧ (B =∧C)]∨ [¬A∧ (C ∧B)]∨
∨ [C ∧ (A =∧B)]∨ [(¬A¬C)∧B] .
In this form $ is not yet minimal. As shown in figure A.1, only eleven of the 20 nodes, in which
B = True, are really minimal. The minterms corresponding to these non-minimal nodes are
underlined in the figure above. Applying the temporal laws of absorption provides the following
minimal form, where
$ = B = η1 ∨ η2 ∨ η3 ∨ η4 =
=
[
A
∧ (B =∧C)]∨ [A =∧B =∧C]∨ [A ∧C ∧B]∨ [(A =∧C) ∧B]∨ [C ∧A ∧B]∨
∨ [¬C ∧ (A ∧B)]∨ [¬C ∧ (A =∧B)]∨ [¬A∧ (B =∧C)]∨
∨ [¬A∧ (C ∧B)]∨ [C ∧ (A =∧B)]∨ [(¬A¬C)∧B] .
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Specifically, the structurally and temporally non-minimal temporal expressions (see chapter
4.3.2) demonstrate that
(¬A¬C)∧B covers [B ∧ (A =∧C)] , [¬A∧ (B ∧C)] , [¬C ∧ (B ∧A)] ,
¬A∧ (B ∧C) covers B ∧C ∧A ,
¬C ∧ (B ∧A) covers B ∧A ∧C ,
¬C ∧ (A ∧B) covers A ∧B ∧C ,
¬A∧ (C ∧B) covers C ∧B ∧A ,
¬C ∧ (A =∧B) covers (A =∧B) ∧C ,
¬A∧ (B =∧C) covers (B =∧C) ∧A .
A
B
C
ABC
AB AC BCB
B
A A
C C
BC AC AB
AA BBC C C B A
Figure A.1: Sequential failure tree corresponding to $ = B with eleven minimal failure nodes
and nine non-minimal failure nodes. Nine failure nodes also include at least one
SAND connection.
Second Example
The failure function $ = (A∨B) ∧C is not presented in a TDNF. First, the transformation
laws of temporal logic are used in order to create a TDNF:
$ = (A∨B) ∧C = (A ∧C)∨(B ∧C) .
Both sub-expressions on the right side do not include all three relevant variables. Each sub-
expression is therefore transformed according to (4.122) as to include the missing variables.
$ =
[¬B ∧ (A ∧C)]∨ [B ∧ (A ∧C)]∨ [¬A∧ (B ∧C)]∨ [A∧ (B ∧C)] =
=
[¬B ∧ (A ∧C)]∨ [B ∧A ∧C]∨ [A ∧B ∧C]∨ [(A =∧B) ∧C]∨
∨ [A ∧ (B =∧C)]∨ [A ∧C ∧B]∨ [¬A∧ (B ∧C)]∨ [A ∧B ∧C]∨
∨ [B ∧A ∧C]∨ [(A =∧B) ∧C]∨ [B ∧ (A =∧C)]∨ [B ∧C ∧A] .
The expressions A ∧B ∧C and B ∧A ∧C and (A =∧B) ∧C are listed twice each. Moreover,
¬A∧ (B ∧C) and ¬B ∧ (A ∧C) cover the non-minimal expressions B ∧C ∧A und A ∧C ∧B.
Thus, the minterm-form of the failure function is given as
$ =
[¬B ∧ (A ∧C)]∨ [B ∧A ∧C]∨ [A ∧B ∧C]∨ [(A =∧B) ∧C]∨
∨ [A ∧ (B =∧C)]∨ [¬A∧ (B ∧C)]∨ [B ∧ (A =∧C)] .
Figure A.2 shows the sequential failure tree of this second example, including its seven minimal
and two non-minimal failure nodes.
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A
B
C
ABC
AB AC BCB
B
A A
C C
BC AC AB
AA BBC C C B A
Figure A.2: Sequential failure tree corresponding to $ = (A∨B) ∧C seven minimal and
two non-minimal failure nodes. Three failure nodes include at least one SAND
connection.

B Abbreviations/Acronyms
BDD binary decision diagram
BDMP Boolean logic driven markov
processes
CCF common cause failure
DFT dynamic fault tree
DGL differential equation
DNF disjunctive normal form
DRBD dynamic reliability block diagram
E/E electric/electronic
FAA federal aviation administration
FMEA failure modes and effects analysis
FT fault tree
FTA fault tree analysis
HRA human reliability analysis
MoCaS monte-carlo-simulation
MCSS minimal cutset sequences
PAND priority AND
POR priority OR
RBD reliability block diagram
SAND simultaneous AND
TDNF temporal disjunctive normal form
TFTA temporal fault tree analysis
ZSA reliability and safety analyses
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C Notation
Symbol Meaning
.(t) time dependend parameter .
.i parameter . for element i
o(∆t) function with lim∆t→0
o(∆t)
∆t = 0
∧ Boolean AND
∨ Boolean OR
¬ Boolean NOT∧ temporal PAND
=∧ temporal SAND
⊂;⊆ proper subset; subset
⊥ are disjoint (for events, e.g. A ∧B ⊥ B ∧A)
∈ is element of (for sets, e.g. 1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n})A is part of (for events, e.g. A A A ∧B)
∃ there is
⊇⊂upslope is minimal
A,B,C,D failure events (within examples), see X
ae token for atomic events
ce token for core events
E expectancy value
eK extended core event
ece token for extended core events
ES event sequence
es token for event sequences
eES extended event sequence
ees token for extended event sequences
etdnf token for extended temporal expressions in TDNF
η temporal (sub)expression (in chapter 7 and appendix A)
f failure density (density function of the failure probability)
F failure probability/unavailability
i index
j index
k index
k position of an extended core event within an extended MCSS
K core event
~K system-state-vector/-node (sequential failure tree)
~K ′ predecessor node (sequential failure tree)
~K ′′ successor node (sequential failure tree)
continued on next page
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continued
Symbol Meaning
l index
λ failure rate
λi,j transition rate between states i and j
max(.) maximum
MS minimal cutset
MCSS minimal cutset sequence
n index
nae token for negated atomic events
nce token for negated core events
nes token for event sequences with negated events
nees token for extended event sequences with negated events
O{x} order of complexity x
P state probability
P˙ derivative of the state probability
ϕ Boolean failure function
$ temporal failure function
r system state (sequential failure tree)
r number of AND-connected basic events within an extended core event
R reliability
S cutset (as in minimal cutset)
t time
tX time of occurence of event X (at this time the failure represented by X occurs)
T life expectancy
TM mission time
τ time (parameter in integrations)
τ{i} i-th parameter in integrations in multiple integrals
∆t (infinitesimally) small time span
tdnf token for temporal expressions in TDNF
u index
U unavailability
w number of extended core events within an extended MCSS
X Boolean event (failure logic: X = 1 → failed, X = 0 → not failed)
Υ number of MCSS covered by an extended MCSS
ζ number of cutsets
ξ number of minimal cutsets
(END OF DOCUMENT)
